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ABSTRACT
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT NEWSPAPER’S ROLE IN MODERATING NORFOLK, 
VIRGINIA'S, 1958 SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CRISIS
Alexander Stewart Leidholdt 
Old Dominion University, 1991 
Director: Dr. Maurice R. Berube
This dissertation explores the critical role played by the 
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot newspaper’s editor, Lenoir Chambers, in 
moderating public opinion during Norfolk, Virginia's, 1958/1959 
public-school closing.
In 1958 the nation's attention was focused on Norfolk. In an 
attempt to stymy judicially mandated integration, Virginia's 
Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., supported by the powerful 
political organization of United States senator Harry Flood Byrd, 
Sr., ordered the city to close its public schools.
Norfolk was a major urban area. Over ten thousand students 
were displaced by the state action; and four months after the 
closing, three thousand students were still receiving no 
education. Massive resistance transformed Norfolk into a 
civil-rights battleground where massive resisters were pitted 
against pro-school forces and the courts. In February of 1959, 
Norfolk's schools were reopened and Virginia's policy of massive 
resistance was broken. Although the process by which the 
schools were integrated was far from orderly, the transition was 
characterized by debate, political maneuvering, and judicial 
action--not violence.
The Virginian-Pi1ot served as an important influence in
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facilitating this peaceful integration. The Pilot, alone among 
Virginia's major white newspapers, urged compliance with the 
Supreme Court's mandate in Brown v. Board. Chambers was later 
awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his four-year editorial campaign 
opposing massive resistance.
Data for this study was drawn from a series of oral-history 
interviews with key actors in the school closing (including all o 
the surviving members of the Pilot's editorial and publishing 
staffs), a wide variety of personal papers and documents, the 
Virginian-Pilot's editorials and reportage, and a review of 
secondary sources.
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INTRODUCTION
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This dissertation examines the activities of the Norfolk 
Virginian-Pi1ot 's editorial page editor Lenoir Chambers and the 
role he and his staff played in influencing public opinion during 
Virginia's "massive resistance" to public-school integration.
This dissertation attempts to fill a historical vacuum with a 
detailed account of the exemplary journalism practiced by a major 
southern newspaper at a critical time in our nation's history and 
the impact of that paper's stance on the resolution of a bitter 
controversy.
This study is of further significance because it examines a 
pivotal moment in our nation's racial history. The peaceful 
reopening of Norfolk's public schools portended the collapse of 
Virginia's massive resistance and considerably advanced the 
momentum of the civil rights movement on a national level.
Journalistic media can have a profound influence on public 
opinion and policy. Operating in a responsible fashion, the media 
can influence compromise, moderation, and justice. Irresponsible 
media can encourage extremism and prejudice.
The murder of Carol Stuart in 1989 provides an example of the 
consequences of irresponsible reporting. Boston's major 
newspapers, the Globe and the Herald, despite obvious 
contradictions in the testimony of Stuart's husband, immediately 
circulated the story that a black man was the perpetrator. The 
Stuarts were depicted as "starry-eyed lovers out of Camelot cut
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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down by an urban savage" (Time, 1990, January 22, p. 10). In a 
city already known for tenuous racial relations, racial tension 
increased dramatically. Hundreds of black men were questioned by 
police, and an innocent man was arrested for the murder.
Accurate reporting and responsible journalistic policy can 
have an altogether different effect on public opinion. The press 
can encourage racial tolerance and moderate behavior. The 
Virginian-Pilot provided an illustration of the power of the 
press to facilitate positive race relations.
In 1958 the nation’s attention was focused on Virginia. In 
an attempt to stymy judicially mandated integration, Virginia's 
Governor J. Lindsay Almond, supported by the powerful political 
machine of United States senator Harry Flood Byrd, Sr., ordered 
Norfolk, Charlottesville, and tiny Warren County to close their 
public schools. During the previous year, mob violence had 
erupted when the Little Rock, Arkansas, school board had 
unsuccessfully attempted to comply with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
Almond's order displaced only two thousand students in 
Charlottesville and Warren County, and these small school systems 
quickly and effectively improvised ad hoc educational 
arrangements. Norfolk, however, was a major urban area. Over ten 
thousand students were displaced by the state action; and four 
months after the closing, three thousand students were still 
receiving no education (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 140).
Massive resistance transformed Norfolk into a battleground
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where resisters were pitted against pro-school forces and the 
courts. The outcome of this battle had national implications. 
Byrd warned Virginians that the forces of integration were 
"working on the theory that if Virginia [could] be brought to her 
knees, they [could] march through the South singing Hallelujah" 
(Wilkinson, 1968, p. 141).
In February of 1959, Norfolk's schools were reopened, and 
Virginia’s policy of massive resistance was ended. Although 
the process by which Norfolk's schools were integrated was far 
from orderly, the transition was characterized by debate, 
political maneuvering, and judicial action--not violence.
The Virginian-Pi1ot served as an important influence in 
facilitating this peaceful integration. The Pilot, alone among 
Virginia's major newspapers, urged compliance with the Court's 
mandate. Its editor, Lenoir Chambers, was later awarded the 
Pulitzer Prize for his five-year campaign opposing massive 
resistance.
Throughout this emotionally charged period, the 
Virginian-Pi lot influenced public opinion by arguing against the 
extremism of the time. "Accurate news coverage and editing were 
never more important," wrote Harold Sugg, one of Chambers's 
associate editors during this period. "Editorials were never more 
read, praised and damned. Letters to the editor flowed like 
rivers" (Chambers, Shank, and Sugg, 1967, p. 387).
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METHODOLOGY
A historical methodology has been employed to investigate the 
role of the Virginian-Pilot in defusing the crisis surrounding 
the school closing. Historical research is the systematic 
collection and analysis of data for the purpose of testing 
hypotheses pertaining to the past. The ultimate function of this 
research is similar to that of other forms of scientific inquiry, 
in that historical research attempts to explain and, at times, 
predict. Historical research is generally acknowledged as 
belonging to the qualitative genre of research, although the use 
of quantitative methods of analysis is not precluded.
Historical sources are categorized as either primary or
secondary. Primary data is information gathered from firsthand 
accounts by observers or participants in the historical event. 
Secondary data is drawn from sources not actually witnessing the 
historical event. Primary sources are preferred over secondary 
sources, which are considered less reliable.
The primary sources for this dissertation consist of memoirs
and documents— letters, diaries, court records, memoranda, and the
like--written and recorded by participants and observers of the 
school closing. Newspaper editorials are the focus of this 
dissertation and in this case constitute a primary source. 
Additional primary source material has been compiled from 
oral-history interviews conducted with participants in the 
closing. These interviews have been carefully structured and 
conducted according to a protocol developed by my dissertation
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committee. Secondary sources for this dissertation consist of 
books and articles on massive resistance; southern, Virginia, and 
local history; the civil rights movement; racial politics; and 
Norfolk's school closing.
All historical sources have been carefully evaluated for 
authenticity and accuracy. Accuracy has been the more difficult 
criterion to substantiate; verification of accuracy has entailed a 
careful examination of the knowledge and possible biases of the 
sources, and the consistency of the data provided by these 
observers and participants. My committee has provided invaluable 
assistance during this crucial stage of my research.
In the initial phase of my research, I conducted a review of 
the literature. In the early stages of this review, I drew heavily 
from scholarly books and journals. As my understanding of the 
historical event broadened, my review became more focused. I 
examined the personal papers and memoirs of key participants and 
the many editorials written by the Virginian-Pilot's editorial 
staff pertinent to significant developments in the crisis.
The next stage of my research consisted of oral-history 
interviews with fourteen principal actors in the closing. 
Interviewees were selected on the basis of the degree of influence 
they exerted during the school closing. In the case of the 
Pilot, I have conducted oral-history interviews and corresponded 
with all of the surviving members of the editorial staff and with 
the newspaper's publisher during that time.
To facilitate a focused analysis of the Virginian-Pilot's
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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editorials written during this period, I have examined all of the 
editorials written by the Pi 1ot and its sister newspaper, the 
Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, during a one-week period preceding and a 
one-week period following each of fourteen key events in Virginia’s 
massive resistance to Brown v. Board.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1 0
In order to assess the role played by Norfolk's 
Virginian-Pilot newspaper in moderating the crisis surrounding 
the city's 1958 segregationist school closing, it is essential 
first to develop an awareness of the nature of the race relations 
and racial politics of that period. A wealth of scholarly and 
journalistic writing treating racial politics and, more 
specifically, the South's massive resistance to the mandate 
of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka exists. I have grouped 
these sources into a number of categories to provide some structure 
to this review and emphasize the wide range of writing on southern 
resistance and related topics.
I have also attempted to provide readers with a cursory 
review of communications literature that examines dissemination 
and adoption of mass-media messages. This communications research 
points to the crucial role played by media communications such as 
newspaper editorials in influencing opinion leaders and, 
indirectly, their followers.
REGIONAL STUDIES
A number of scholarly books and journals examine the South 
and southern resistance to public-school desegregation. V. 0. 
Key's classic work, Southern Politics (1949), predates massive 
resistance but is essential to understanding the political context 
of the South and, more specifically, the mechanics and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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machinations of Virginia's Senator Harry F. Byrd-dominated 
oligarchy. Professor Key's book is based, to a large extent, on 
an impressive number of field interviews conducted with southern 
political leaders.
Southern Politics is especially pertinent to this study 
because of its emphasis on the structure of the Byrd organization. 
Key perceived Byrd's control as being so complete as to make 
Virginia a "political museum piece" (p. 19) akin to that of 
pre-reform England. Organized around a restricted electorate and 
an efficient system of patronage that effectively eliminated 
nearly all political competition, the organization nevertheless 
developed a reputation for efficient (if uninspired) 
administration and a courtly way of doing business.
Key's analysis touches on elements that are central to a full 
understanding of Norfolk's school closing. These include 
Virginia’s reputation for generally harmonious race relations, 
business’s close ties to the Byrd organization, the anti-Byrd 
animus of the Tidewater section of the state, and the state's 
tendency to delve into affairs normally the province of 
localities.
Although Key perceived the southern states as being 
dissimilar in many respects, he argued that the region displayed a 
unified attitude toward race. He believed that the politics of 
the southern states were especially influenced by the reactionary 
attitudes of whites living in areas where the number of blacks 
rivaled that of whites. Because of the inflexibility of whites
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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living in these "black belts," Key was not optimistic as to the 
likelihood of the South's developing enlightened racial policies.
Southern School News and Race Relations Law Reporter, both of 
Nashville, Tennessee, provide very complete and objective 
reports of massive resistance and of related legislative and 
judicial activities. These publications are possibly two of the 
most useful sources for scholars exploring southern resistance to 
racial integration of the public schools.
J, W. Peltason's study, Forty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern
Federal Judges and School Desegregation (1961), is an account of 
the judicial struggles waged over desegregation and a revealing 
scrutiny of the judges who were responsible for enforcing the 
mandate of Brown v. Board. Peltason's narrative provides 
researchers with considerable insight into the plight and actions 
of federal judges who, although many were native southerners and 
preferred the status quo to desegregation, were charged with 
implementing the Supreme Court's decision.
Peltason was critical of the Brown v. Board II mandate to 
desegregate public schools with "all deliberate speed," believing 
that its ambiguity provided federal judges with too much 
discretion in implementing the Court's mandate. Judges who 
decided to act boldly were held personally accountable because 
they possessed such a wide range of legal options. In Peltason's 
view, a Supreme Court order for uniform implementation of school 
desegregation would have mitigated this pressure by creating in 
effect a "heirarchy of scapegoats" (p. 246).
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James M. Wilhoit's The Politics of Massive Resistance 
(1973) is a descriptive analysis and critical discussion of the 
origins, ideology, and politics of massive resistance, Wilhoit has 
provided a basic overview of race relations in the United States 
and charted the development, strategies, and decline of resistance 
to the Supreme Court’s mandate.
Although his discussion of massive resistance is 
comprehensive, the author chose to focus almost entirely on the 
activities and motivation of resisters and neglected to examine in 
sufficient detail the strategies and actions of integrationists. 
Also weakening the book are Wilhoit’s inadequate documentation 
and his failure to conduct interviews with key segregationist 
policy makers.
If the scholarship of Wilhoit's examination is somewhat 
lacking, the detail in which he treated his subject is his book’s 
great strength. The author's analysis of massive resistance is 
multidisciplinary, employing historical, philosophical, 
theological, sociological, political, and psychological criticism. 
The richness of this discussion enhances understanding of southern 
resistance.
Regional in focus, The Politics of Massive Resistance 
nevertheless broadens insight into Virginia's resistance. Wilhoit 
acknowledged Virginia's leadership role in formulating massive 
resistance, in serving as a crucial political battlefield, and 
ultimately in portending the collapse of the movement.
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STATE PERSPECTIVES
Scholars examining Virginia's massive resistance will 
encounter an abundance of information, including a number of major 
works. Benjamin Muse’s Virginia's Massive Resistance (1961) 
predates other scholarly treatments of the subject and is widely 
cited in nearly all subsequent examinations. His analysis is 
comprehensive, although his methodology is unclear and his book is 
poorly referenced. Muse believed that the state's leadership was 
controlled by a reactionary minority influenced by the racial 
attitudes of Virginia's "black belt." In his opinion the 
confrontational policies advanced by the state's leaders were 
not reflective of the attitudes of the majority of their 
constituents.
The author, a former Republican gubernatorial candidate, 
explored Virginia's political and racial climates, discussed the 
activities of various interest groups, and examined the state's 
attempt to maintain segregated schools. The most enlightening 
aspects of his analysis are his comparison of the school 
closings in Charlottesville, Norfolk, Prince Edward County, and 
Warren County and his discussion of the integration of these 
school systems and that of the city of Arlington. Muse ably 
communicated the divergent impacts of the state’s segregationist 
policies on a range of dissimilar local communities.
Norfolk's resistance plays prominently in the author's 
treatment. His book effectively places the city's closing and its 
unique circumstances within the larger context of Virginia's
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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resistance.
Robbins L. Gates's The Making of Massive Resistance: 
Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation. 1954-1956 
(1962) examines the development of Virginia's massive-resistance 
legislative policy during the crucial two-year period immediately 
following Brown v. Board. Although the actual closing is treated 
only briefly, in the final chapter of the book, Gates's 
wel1-documented examination provides readers with a rich 
description of the development of massive resistance and a 
thorough analysis of the activities of the interest groups 
involved in charting Virginia’s response to the Supreme Court 
mandate. Gates sought to explain why Virginia turned away from the 
comparatively moderate policies advocated by the "Gray Commission" 
and adopted instead the reactionary stance espoused by militant 
segregationists.
The author’s major thesis was that, because Virginia's caste 
system effectively excluded blacks from meaningful participation 
in the political process, the state’s struggle was fought between 
degrees of white segregationist and white integrationist 
persuasion. Gates explored in detail these gradations of beliefs 
and the political and geographic factors that shaped the opinions 
of Virginians.
J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill's Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of 
Virginia Politics 1945-1966 (1968) is the most complete 
examination of the Byrd organization. Among the many strengths of 
Wilkinson's book are sections that focus on the mechanics of the
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organization and on regional politics, and his biographical 
sketches of principal Virginia political actors. The author has 
also provided readers with an analysis of Virginia's regionalism 
and its relationship to state politics.
Wilkinson's discussion of massive resistance was thorough and 
insightful. He submitted that Virginia's crisis was, to a large 
extent, contrived by the declining Byrd organization to coalesce 
public support. "This will keep us in power for another 
twenty-five years," he quoted a Byrd lieutenant as saying (p.
154).
Wilkinson, who later became editor of the Virginian-Pilot. 
wrote with some authority on Tidewater. The author examined the 
unique demographic and political characteristics of Hampton Roads; 
and although he neglected the important role played by the 
Virginian-Pilot in influencing state politics, he highlighted the 
critical role of Norfolk's political boss, Clerk of City Courts 
William L. Prieur, in controlling local political activities and 
appointments.
Virginius Dabney's Virginia: The New Dominion (1971) 
provides extensive coverage of Virginia history and treats massive 
resistance in some depth. In addition to being one of the 
nation's foremost scholars on the South, Dabney was the editor of 
the state's most influential press, the Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
for thirty-three years. Thus he was in a unique position to
observe Virginia politics during the period of resistance to 
public-school integration.
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Although this author’s discussion of the Byrd organization 
and massive resistance was thorough, he provided little original 
information on the school closing. He avoided the role he had 
played as a leading proponent of segregation, writing only that 
Virginia's presses were "willing to support the buying of time by 
the use of legal devices, in order that the impact of so 
far-reaching a decision as that in Brown v. Board of Education 
might be cushioned and disorder and violence held to a minimum"
(p. 542). He did on several occasions, however, acknowledge the 
Pilot editors' long tradition of arguing against
Byrd-organization policies ranging from inequities of funding for 
municipalities and rural counties to massive-resistance 
legislation.
James W. Ely, Jr.'s The Crisis of Conservative Virginia 
(1975) is a thorough examination of Virginia's policy of massive 
resistance. Ely's wel1-documented book is based on numerous 
interviews conducted by the author with important political 
figures, a scholarly examination of the papers of principal actors 
in massive resistance, and a comprehensive review of the 
literature. Ely's bibliographic essay is a major strength of this 
book.
Although the author was correct in writing that "much of the 
massive resistance story can be found in Virginia newspapers" (p. 
209), he relied excessively on the editorials and reportage of the 
pro-Byrd-organization Richmond Times-Dispatch; he virtually 
neglected the perspectives and effect of Virginia's
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anti-organization newspaper, the Virginian-Pilot. Generally, 
however, Ely performed an admirable job of exploring the activities 
of the many constituencies involved in massive resistance.
His book, a conservative analysis for the most part, at times 
departs from conventional histories of Virginia's attempt to 
circumvent the implementation of Brown v. Board. In his opinion 
massive resistance, portrayed by many as a threatened Byrd 
organization's grandstanding for votes, actually was spawned from 
a genuine belief by the white majority that segregation was 
desirable, that blacks were inferior, and that the Supreme Court 
had violated the Constitution by infringing on the rights of 
states. In effect, Ely asserted that the organization accurately 
reflected the sentiments of the white majority. Usually portrayed 
as opponents of massive resistance, political actors such as 
Virginia's business community, the state's white teachers, and 
even the federal judiciary were pictured by this author as 
indifferent to integration, if not antagonistic.
A number of articles in the popular press deserve attention. 
Foremost among these is Cabell Phillips's revisionist analysis, 
"Virginia--The State and the State of Mind" (New York Times 
Magazine, 1957, July 28), which explodes some of the romantic 
historical notions that served to create the mystique of Virginia 
and undergirded many of the arguments of the proponents of massive 
resistance. Phillips contended that most antebellum Virginians 
were simple yeomen who owned few slaves, not members of a genteel 
aristocracy, and that existing vestiges of plantation society had
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been toppled by the economic panic of 1820, not the occupation of 
the South by Union troops:
Thus an ideal that began to disintegrate more than a hundred 
and thirty years ago, and that vanished utterly with 
Appomattox--and one, moreover, which never had overwhelming 
validity in the first place--has done more to mold 
the Virginian's belief in what he is than anything else in his 
history (p. 49).
Phillips also conducted a general examination of Virginia and 
Virginians. He discussed the character of the state’s residents, 
its regionalism, the condition of its economy and educational 
system, and, most importantly, the structure and significance of 
the Byrd organization. His article provides readers with a brief 
but remarkably cogent analysis of state politics and Virginians' 
perception of themselves.
Virginia's Governor J. Lindsay Almond is pictured on the 
cover of the September 22, 1958, edition of Time magazine.
Time's lead story discusses Almond's motivation for guiding 
Virginia's fight to maintain segregated schools and his inner 
conflict over supporting a policy that he knew was politically 
expedient but legally unsound. The article also examines Almond's 
tenuous relationship with the leader of the state's political 
machine, Senator Harry F. Byrd, as well as the development of 
Virginia's policy of massive resistance.
Dr. Lorin A. Thompson's article, "Virginia Education Crisis 
and Its Economic Aspects," was circulated throughout the state
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prior to its publication in New South (1959, February) and had a 
major impact on the thinking of Virginia’s business leaders. 
Thompson served as the director of the Bureau of Population and 
Economic Research at the University of Virginia, and it is likely 
that his association with the state’s predominant institution of 
higher education lent credibility to his arguments.
Thompson examined the economic consequences of abandoning 
public education: school bond owners, he predicted, would demand
immediate repayment from localities, teachers would relocate to 
other states, and the deficient education of children at 
unaccredited private schools would cause widespread social 
problems. His discussion of the effects of the closing on 
industries, however, was particularly heeded by the business 
community. The author argued that the state's economic progress 
would be arrested because new industries would choose to locate in 
regions where public education was provided, and he warned that 
skilled workers in existing Virginia industries would move to other 
states with established systems of public schooling.
"Desegregation— or No Public Schools" (New South, 1959, 
March) examines the effects of two crucial court cases, James v. 
Almond and Cooper v. Aaron, on Virginia’s policy of massive 
resistance. The article's authors concluded that those decisions 
had dealt a death blow to segregation, and that obstructionist 
legislation developed by southern states would ultimately be 
declared invalid and serve only to inflict further damage on public 
education.
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THE BLACK VIEW
Scholars examining the experiences of black Virginians have 
contributed significantly to the study of the state's desegregation 
struggle. Andrew Buni’s The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965 
(1967), is a wel1-researched political history. The 
majority of Buni’s material was drawn from Virginia’s two major 
Negro weeklies, the Richmond Planet and the Norfolk Journal 
and Guide: from numerous personal interviews with both black and 
white political actors; and from private papers and other 
documents.
Buni’s book provides readers with a great deal of information 
on a topic often ignored. Beginning with the 1902 State 
Constitutional Convention, which effectively disenfranchised 
blacks and precluded their meaningful participation in politics, 
he traced the development of black political activities that 
resulted in organized opposition to the massive-resistance 
movement and contributed to the dismantling of the Byrd 
organization with the election of gubernatorial candidate Mills E. 
Godwin in 1965.
The author maintained that during most of Virginia's history, 
blacks were political issues rather than participants. The 1965 
election, when both political parties for the first time openly 
courted a black electorate, was a watershed that would culminate 
in Virginia blacks' gaining political rights they had been denied 
throughout the twentieth century.
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Philip Morgan’s "Don't Grieve After Me": The Black Experience 
in Virginia 1619-1986 (1986) is a collection of three essays
published in conjunction with a traveling photographic exhibit 
organized by the Hampton University Museum. The essays, which are 
presented chronologically, explore the history of black Virginians.
Morgan's essay, "Early Virginia," discusses the unique 
conditions of Virginia’s early slave society--one in which slaves 
freely socialized with white indentured servants and in which the 
black population grew primarily from reproduction rather than the 
importation of Africans. Michael Hucles's essay, "The Nineteenth 
Century," examines the black experience in antebellum Virginia and 
the temporary gains resulting from the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Sarah S. Hughes's essay, "The Twentieth Century," 
recounts the diminishment of black rights as a result of the 
1902 Constitutional Convention,* the development of Jim Crow; and 
the long struggle for equality, which culminated in the Civil 
Rights Movement.
"Don't Grieve After Me" does not treat massive resistance 
in great detail, but its general review of black history is 
helpful in understanding Virginia’s racial climate and history.
VIRGINIA'S RESISTERS
Accounts provided by three of Virginia’s leading proponents 
of continued public-school segregation are useful in comprehending 
their perspectives. James Jackson Kilpatrick’s The Sovereign 
States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia (1957) is a spirited
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defense of massive resistance by the movement’s leading 
intellectual. Kilpatrick advanced a number of arguments against 
integration and asserted that the Brown decision had usurped the 
rights of the sovereign states. Citing legal precedents 
associated with the doctrine of nullification, he maintained that 
southern states were justified in interposing their authority to 
prevent desegregation.
Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader, one of the 
state's most influential presses, and a confidant of Senator 
Harry F. Byrd and many others among Virginia's political elite, 
played a critical role in developing Virginia's resistance. 
Familiarity with his arguments is essential to grasping the 
intellectual origins of the massive-resistance movement.
Governor J. Lindsay Almond's "We Are Stewards of Our States' 
Inheritance" (1958, May) provides a defense of Virginia's massive 
resistance. In this article published in the American Mercury 
magazine, Almond argued that the federal government, by imposing 
the mandate of Brown v. Board on the state, had usurped the 
sovereign rights accorded the state by the framers of the 
Constitution. He maintained that the Supreme Court had placed 
Virginians in an intolerable position: that although the state's
citizenry strongly supported the maintenance of a system of free 
public education, the people were diametrically opposed to 
integrated schools and would refuse to enroll their children in 
them. Almond discussed massive resistance within the context of 
the Cold War, asserting that the federal government's policies
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had acted to undermine the strong and effective system of public 
education needed to counter the advances made in Soviet 
technology.
Virginius Dabney's article in Life magazine (1958,
September 22), "Virginia's Peaceable, Honorable Stand," provides 
still another rationale for Virginia's massive resistance. Dabney 
wrote that although the state's white population was seeking a 
peaceful and reasonable solution to the racial problems, it was 
justified in its unwillingness to compromise to the extent of 
supporting integrated public schools. He explained that Virginians 
opposed the implementation of the Brown decision for a variety of 
well-founded reasons, believing that the Supreme Court had 
incorrectly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, that integrated 
schools would bring about intermarriage (racial "amalgamation"), 
and that desegregated schools would be marred by violence as 
integrated schools in the North had been.
Dabney went on to suggest that the condition of racial 
relations in Virginia had been relatively progressive and that 
they had been improving rapidly during recent years until the 
Supreme Court’s decision served to create disharmony between the 
races and create an extremist racial climate.
Virginius Dabney's article in U.S. News and World Report 
(1960, January 18), "Next in the South's Schools: Limited 
Integration," examines the means by which the state developed a 
more flexible pupil-assignment policy--one that sought to contain 
integration rather than prohibit it. While not embracing
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desegregation, Dabney applauded Virginia's grudging but peaceful 
acceptance of the decrees of the federal and state courts. He 
expressed support for containment, insisting again that total 
integration would lead to intermarriage and racial amalgamation. 
Citing incidents of racial friction in the North and West, he 
concluded that racial relations were perceptibly better in 
Virginia.
LOCAL PERSPECTIVES
A number of scholars and journalists have focused on 
Norfolk’s school closing, and their findings provide valuable 
accounts of local events. Ernest Q. Campbell's When a City 
Closes Its Schools (1960) is a report of a study conducted by 
the Institute for Research in Social Science. Utilizing a survey 
methodology, Campbell and his team investigated the effects of the 
closing on the city’s displaced students and examined students' and 
parents' views on the controversy. When a City Closes 
Its Schools is a valuable source of information for scholars 
seeking insight into the Norfolk white citizenry's perceptions and 
attitudes regarding the closing. The major weakness of the work 
is its lack of a meaningful interpretation of the survey results.
Lenoir Chambers, Joseph E. Shank, and Harold Sugg's Salt 
Water and Printer's Ink (1967) furnishes some valuable source 
material for the purposes of this dissertation. Written in 
celebration of the hundred-year anniversary of the founding of 
Norfolk's first post-Civil War newspaper, The Norfolk Virginian,
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the book provides historical information regarding Norfolk and 
both the Pilot and the Ledger-Dispatch, Chambers served as 
editor of the Pilot during Norfolk's school closing; Shank was 
the news editor of the Ledger; and Sugg, whose final chapter 
examines the school closing and the related editorial policies of 
both newspapers, was an assistant publisher and former associate 
editor of the Pilot.
Although Salt Water and Printer's Ink serves well as a 
general reference on Norfolk and its newspapers and provides 
insight into the newspapers' roles during the closing, it does not 
do so in great detail; only a half-dozen pages concentrate on 
massive resistance. The book's treatment of the closing is 
traditional in nature and leaves many questions about the editorial 
policy of the Pilot unanswered.
Robert Mason's memoirs, One of the Neighbors* Children 
(1987), provides more insight into the newspapers' roles in the 
school closing. Mason served as one of Chambers's associate 
editors during the closing and, after serving as managing editor, 
was Chambers's immediate successor.
Although Mason’s treatment of the closing is no more detailed 
than Sugg's, Mason's coverage is much more colorful, containing 
rich descriptions of leading figures in the closing and providing 
readers with an especially revealing portrayal of Chambers.
Henry S. Rcrer's unpublished manuscript, "History of 
Norfolk Public Schools, 1681-1968" (1968), charts the 
development and organization of Norfolk's school system. Rorer's
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manuscript focuses on the day-to-day operation of the city’s 
schools and provides valuable reference material not contained in 
scholarly books.
The author's description of Norfolk’s schools is fairly 
comprehensive, but the scope of the manuscript is limited in that 
Rorer neglected to investigate the city's black schools in 
sufficient depth. Another weakness of the work is the author's 
failure to explore meaningfully the school closing and the issues 
raised by the crisis.
Jane Reif’s pamphlet, Crisis in Norfolk (1960), which was 
sponsored by the Virginia Council on Human Relations, provides the 
most complete account of Norfolk's school closing. Reif described 
Norfolk, identified and analyzed the major actors and interest 
groups involved in the closing, and examined the key events in the 
crisis. Crisis in Norfolk also treats the impact of the 
national and local media on the closing and makes special mention 
of the role of the Virginian-Pilot.
Reif concluded that the major factor in the deepening 
of the crisis in Norfolk was the failure of the established 
community leadership to confront the closing directly. This 
vacuum in responsible civic leadership resulted in both negative 
and positive outcomes; while it enabled extremism to flourish 
until the courts ultimately intervened, it also provided an 
environment conducive to creating a new generation of leadership.
''What Massive Resistance Costs” (Business W e e k . 1958,
October 4) examines the financial consequences of the school
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closing. The article itself had an important effect on Norfolk's 
business community and is often cited in discussions of the 
closing.
This article deals with the city’s fiscal conundrum: by 
operating integrated schools, nearly $700,000 of state funding 
would be lost; and by maintaining segregated schools, $350,000 in 
federal funding (impact funds) would be forfeited. Other 
potential repercussions of the closing are explored, such as 
action implied in the Navy's allusions to its dissatisfaction with 
the situation and the influence of the crisis in out-of-state 
industries' consideration of locating in Virginia.
"Eighty Days Without Public Schools" (Newsweek, 1958, 
December 1) discusses the effect of school closings on the 
displaced students of Norfolk and the city of Little Rock, 
Arkansas. Norfolk's makeshift tutoring groups are portrayed as 
unacceptable substitutes for public schools.
Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely's article, "Report on the 
Lost Class of '59" (New York Times Magazine, 1959, January 4), 
broadly explores the consequences of the school closing on 
students, parents, and teachers. The most useful aspect of the 
article is its description of the organization and limitations of 
the city's tutoring groups and the narrowing of the career choices 
of the displaced students.
Forrest P. White’s article, "Will Norfolk’s Schools Stay 
Open?" (The Atlantic, 1959, September), describes the closing 
and the precarious period immediately following the reopening of
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the schools. White served as treasurer and later as president of 
the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools, a citizens' group that 
lobbied against the closing.
The author explored the rationales of Norfolk's business and 
professional leadership for not speaking out against the closing, 
and examined the activities of the prime local actors and the 
governor during the crisis. White's major thesis was that "to be 
successful in his policy switch, it was essential for Governor 
Almond to have followed massive resistance down to a final 
resounding defeat" (p. 32).
Luther J. Carter's article, "Desegregation in Norfolk" (South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 1959, Autumn), furnishes a concise account of 
massive resistance on both a state and a local level. Carter 
served as the Virqinian-Pilot* s education reporter during the 
closing and thus commanded an excellent vantage point for 
chronicling Norfolk's school closing.
Much of his account centers on the power struggle between 
various interest groups as they jockeyed for the support of 
Norfolk's silent and seemingly detached citizenry. Carter's major 
thesis was similar to White's in that both authors believed 
Virginia's policy of massive resistance was politically 
motivated. The Byrd organization, in order to continue its 
political domination of the state, had to prove to an electorate 
overwhelmingly supportive of public school segregation that all 
conceivable actions to delay the implementation of Brown v. Board 
had been exhausted.
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"Quest for a Personality" (Time, 1960, September 5) focuses on 
the editorial differences of the Virginian-Pilot and the 
Ledger-Dispatch and on the keen competition that existed between 
the two newspapers. Calling both papers conservative by northern 
standards, Time characterized the Pilot as "downright liberal" 
and the Ledger as "middle roading" by southern standards (p.
51}. The magazine considered these papers "two of the South's 
better newspapers" (p. 51). This brief article is useful for its 
interpretation of the policies held by the joint management of the 
papers during the school closing.
David Pace's article, "Lenoir Chambers Opposes Massive 
Resistance" (Virginia Magazine. 1974, October), examines both 
Chambers's publicly expressed opinions and his private sentiments 
regarding Virginia's massive resistance to integration of her 
public schools. Pace described the major incidents in the 
development of the state's resistance and analyzed the editor's 
reactions.
Pace's thesis was that, although many viewed Chambers as a 
leading southern liberal with regard to race relations, in reality 
he held fairly conservative opinions— preferring, in fact, 
segregation to integration. This author submitted that it was only 
the editor's intense respect for the Supreme Court's decision as 
the "Law of the Land" that influenced him to adopt his adversarial 
role toward the Byrd organization's racial policies. Pace also 
maintained that Chambers refused to challenge Senator Byrd directly 
and instead chided Byrd associates such as Governor Thomas
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Stanley. The author believed that Chambers perceived Byrd as too 
powerful a target to criticize directly and was sympathetic to the 
states’ rights philosophy of the senator.
MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION
Literature on the subject of media influence points to the 
important role that can be played by media in swaying mass 
audiences both directly and indirectly. It has been widely 
acknowledged by communications researchers such as Marshall McLuhan 
(Understanding Media, 1964), Melvin DeFleur (Theories of Mass 
Communication. 1966), and Everett M. Rogers (Handbook of 
Communication. 1973) that mass communications can play crucial 
roles in influencing public behaviors, opinions, and attitudes. 
Researchers have differed, however, in their perceptions as to how 
mass media influence. Much of the following review is based on 
Stephen W. Littlejohn's discussion of mass communication research 
findings in Theories of Human Communication (1978) and on studies 
to which his book directs attention.
In his theory of mass society, W. Kornhauser (International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 1968) postulated that media 
messages have a direct and uniform influence over a gullible and 
increasingly estranged public. Often called the "hypodermic 
needle" model of media influence, this theory implies that media 
messages are injected into the public’s consciousness and naively 
adopted. Kornhauser believed that forces and trends in our 
turbulent world, such as burgeoning technology, the
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depersonalization of society, and the deterioration of family 
values, had created a public that was easily manipulated. 
According to his theory, as the public has become more malleable, 
the power of media to influence has greatly increased. Advances in 
communications technology and techniques of persuasion have enabled 
the media to become an aggregate institution with unrivaled 
influence.
Raymond Bauer (American Psychologist, 1964, 19) saw 
Kornhauser's "hypodermic needle" model as simplistic and the public 
as an "obstinate audience," attending most readily to messages 
consonant with existing attitudes and opinions. Bauer perceived 
the public as more complex, discriminating, and intelligent than 
did Kornhauser. Central to Bauer's theory is the premise that the 
effects of interpersonal communications compete with and/or mediate 
the effects of mass communications.
Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and H. Gaudet (The 
People's Choice, 1948), in a study of voter behavior, also found 
a strong interpersonal component in mass communication. Their 
conclusions indicate that after receiving media messages, 
recipients interact and influence each other.
The existence of this phenomenon has subsequently been 
confirmed by other researchers, and ultimately the effect has come 
to be called the two-step flow hypothesis. Adherents of this 
hypothesis maintain that media messages are first processed by 
opinion, leaders and are later disseminated to followers. Opinion 
leaders are individuals who receive information from the media and
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exert influence over others in regard to particular issues.
In their investigation of opinion leaders, Everett M. Rogers
and F. Floyd Shoemaker (Communication of Innovations. 1971)
developed a list of generalizations intended to clarify the nature
and roles of opinion leaders:
Opinion leaders have greater exposure to mass media than 
their followers.
.Opinion leaders are more cosmopolite [sic] than their 
followers.
•Opinion leaders have greater change agent contact than 
their followers.
.Opinion leaders have greater social participation than 
their followers.
.Opinion leaders have higher social status than their 
followers.
.Opinion leaders are more innovative than their 
followers.
.When the system's norms favor change, opinion leaders are 
more innovative, but when the norms are traditional, 
leaders are not especially innovative.
Of particular relevance to this study is the attribute 
concerning exposure to mass media. This suggests that Norfolk's 
leaders of opinion in the controversy surrounding the school 
closing would have attended to mass media treating the issue and 
that these opinion leaders would have influenced their 
followers.
Wilbur Schramm and David M. White (Mass Communications,
1960) reported from their study of newspaper readership that 
persons who read editorials constituted an especially authoritative 
and powerful cohort: "Reading of public affairs and editorials
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increases with age, with education, and with higher economic 
status" (p. 439). The authors also found that in the highest class 
of work status, executive and professional, well over half of the 
men and nearly half of the women regularly read newspaper 
editorials.
The editorial page of the Virginian-Pilot may have had a 
limited readership among the general population of Norfolk--as 
editorials today have limited readership--but it is likely that an 
influential elite regularly read and was influenced by the 
Pilot's opinion page, and that these opinion leaders, in turn, 
influenced their followers.
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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
For the South, the United States Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka constituted 
nearly as tumultuous a watershed as the Civil War. By calling for 
an end to segregated public schools, the Warren Court incited the 
South to embark on an emotional campaign to openly subvert the 
"law of the land" in order to preserve a way of life predicated on 
racial hierarchy. Four legal cases in four states, including 
Virginia, and a fifth case in the District of Columbia had been 
consolidated by the Court to test the constitutionality of state 
laws that mandated the maintenance of segregated educational 
facilities. The defendants, citing the precedent of the Court's 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1890, argued that "separate but 
equal" school systems were constitutional. The plaintiffs, led by 
future Supreme Court justice Thurgood Marshall, asserted that 
segregation deprived black students of equal protection under the 
laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing the opinion for a 
unanimous court, concluded that "in the field of public education 
the doctrine of separate but equal has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal" (Brown v. Board, 
1954). Importantly, the Court maintained that even if segregated 
school systems possessed equity of resources--a condition few 
possessed--the "effect of segregation itself" deprived the
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minority of equal educational opportunities.
Resistance to the Brown decision--"massive resistance"--became 
what historian J. Harvie Wilkinson III termed "Virginia’s issue of 
the century” (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 113). Virginia's resistance 
would in many ways define that of the South, and the collapse of 
the state's system of segregated schools would foreshadow the 
dismantling of the entire Jim Crow system.
The race problem in American society began in Virginia when a 
Dutch naval vessel unloaded its cargo of twenty blacks at 
Jamestown in 1619 (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 17). Initially, Virginia was 
an anomaly among the early plantation societies of the New World, 
in that the economy of the colony was much less dependent on black 
labor than were the economies of the other southern colonies. In 
the early days of the colony, white indentured servants 
outnumbered blacks four to one.
During this era little effort was made to provide systematic 
education for Virginia's youth. Schooling in colonial times was 
laissez faire in nature, and as a result, many children did not 
receive even basic educations. Some children, however, were more 
fortunate. Early apprenticeship laws mandated rudimentary 
educational training for a segment of the population, and endowed 
free schools created by wealthy benefactors provided more 
extensive education for some poor youth. Children with parents of 
means received education through community schools--cooperative 
ventures in which a number of parents would band together to 
employ a teacher for their children--or through tutors (Heatwole,
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1916, pp. 58-61).
During this period some whites tried to provide schooling 
for individual black and Indian families. It was not unusual for 
landowners to will portions of their estates for the purpose of 
educating servants.
Thomas Jefferson's 1779 plan for public education depended to 
too large a degree on the aristocratic class that governed many 
localities. This elite segment of the citizenry was disinclined 
to bear the brunt of the cost for public education. Jefferson's 
plan and its derivatives, although often debated, were never 
realized (Heatwole, 1916, pp. 100-102).
By all accounts race relations between black and white 
servants were comparatively less strained during this period than 
at any other time in colonial history. Whites were not threatened 
by superior numbers, and the two groups worked closely and shared 
similarly harsh living conditions. Assimilation of blacks was 
facilitated by the fact that this population grew primarily from 
natural increase rather than from immigration. Far fewer 
Africans--alien in appearance and non-English speaking--were 
received into the colony than into other plantation societies. 
Consequently, differences between blacks and whites were less 
apparent than they would later become (Morgan, 1986, p. 15).
As the British economy improved during the last quarter of 
the seventeenth century, indentured servitude became a less 
attractive option to the lower classes. The number of Africans 
began to swell as the British began to participate more
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fully in the slave trade. Race relations worsened as the number 
of African slaves began to surpass that of white servants (Morgan, 
1986, p. 16).
In 1662 the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a series of 
laws diminishing the status of blacks and drastically curtailing 
their rights; children born to slave mothers became slaves. 
Moreover, masters beating blacks to death were exonerated on the 
premise that owners would not knowingly destroy their property. 
Runaway slaves resisting arrest could be legally beaten or killed 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 16). This legislation, which effectively 
divested blacks of any protection under colonial law, served to 
create among whites a belief that, regardless of their social 
class, they enjoyed a status vastly superior to that of blacks.
The growth of slavery in Virginia was accepted with minimal 
resistance. Some whites, motivated by religious scruples or 
libertarian ideals advanced during the Enlightenment, argued 
against slavery. The institution was attacked by Thomas 
Jefferson, a slave owner himself, in his initial draft of the 
Declaration of Independence. That portion, however, was omitted 
from succeeding drafts in concession to pro-slavery forces 
(Wilhoit, 1973, pp. 18-19). Resistance by blacks occasionally 
took the form of rebellion; but by and large, protest was limited 
to slowdowns, sabotage, or attempted escape to other colonies, 
where blacks would try to pass as free.
Some blacks managed to gain their freedom through 
manumission, and others in return for military service during the
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Revolutionary War. Initially blacks had been barred from serving 
in the continental forces, but after the British army promised 
freedom to blacks who enlisted, continental forces advanced a 
similar offer. Five thousand blacks won their freedom this way 
(Wilhoit, 1973, pp. 18-19).
The growing number of freed blacks frightened Virginia 
slaveholders, and legislation enacted in the state in 1806 made 
manumission more difficult (Morgan, 1986, p. 23). Whites grew 
increasingly concerned about the possibility of a slave 
insurrection, and the practice of educating blacks was outlawed 
to prevent them from reading abolitionist literature. A Virginia 
law passed in 1805 read, "It shall not be lawful to require the 
master or mistress to teach an apprenticed black or mulatto orphan 
to read, or to write, or any arithmetic" (Buck, 1952, p. 22).
In 1846 the legislature passed an act providing for free 
primary education. However, the legislation was only permissory in 
nature, and schooling was not mandated. As a result of the act, a 
locality could develop free public schools if two thirds of its 
electorate supported the idea. The electors of Albemarle, 
Norfolk, and Washington counties voted to create free primary 
schools. Still, on a statewide basis, financial and moral support 
for public education was grossly lacking (Heatwole, 1916, p. 103).
The Civil War was the most significant event in the history 
of blacks in this country. In the wake of the war, amendments to 
the constitution progressively outlawed slavery, ensured equal 
protection under the laws, and guaranteed suffrage for adult males
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(Wilhoit, 1973, p. 20). Although this legislation purportedly 
secured equality, blacks in the South remained quasi-slaves. 
Frederick Douglass wrote that the slave
was free from the individual master but a slave of society.
He had neither money, property, nor friends. He was free from 
the old plantation but had nothing but the dusty road under 
his feet. He was free from the old quarter that once gave him 
shelter but a slave to the rains of summer and the frosts of
winter. He was turned loose, naked, hungry, and destitute to
the open sky (Tindall, 1984, p. 671).
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Reconstruction Act of the following year, Virginia--now part of 
Military District Number l--entered the radical phase of 
reconstruction. As radical Republicans gained control of the 
state legislature, former Confederate soldiers were 
disenfranchised and black men were awarded the vote. By 1867 
black voters were in the majority in many Piedmont and Tidewater 
counties and nearly equaled whites on a state level, 105,832 to 
120,101 (Morgan, 1986, p. 52).
Rather than be compelled to abide by the provisions of the 
Reconstruction Act, the Virginia General Assembly called for a 
constitutional convention for the purpose of developing an 
alternative document that would be acceptable to the Congress 
(Morton, 1919, p. 26). In a display of their newly found 
political power, 25 of the 105 delegates elected to 
attend the convention in Richmond in 1867 were blacks (Morton,
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1919, p. 50). The product of the convention, the Underwood 
Constitution (named for the convention's chairman, John C. 
Underwood of New York), guaranteed suffrage for black males in 
return for the defeat of provisions that would have 
disenfranchised former Confederates (Buni, 1967, p. 1).
The new constitution also provided for a system of public 
schooling and mandated that schools serve children of all races: 
"The constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or 
changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the 
United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the 
Constitution of the said State" (Heatwole, 1916, p. 214).
Virginia's public school system opened its first schools in 
November 1870. (Norfolk had been a particularly innovative 
community regarding education and had operated a city-wide public 
school system for white children since 1858.) Twenty-nine hundred 
schools for white and black children were operated that year, 
with 37.6 percent of the state’s white school-age children and 
23.4 percent of its black school-age children enrolled in these 
schools. Although state-supported public education was opposed by 
many, especially those who vigorously objected to educating 
blacks, public schooling gradually came to be accepted by the 
majority of Virginians. The state's schools were, of course, 
racially segregated (Heatwole, 1916, pp. 220-242).
Gains in black political power during this period were, 
however, illusory. Conservative members of the General Assembly 
managed to divest blacks of political participation through
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gerrymandering, imposition of poll taxes, and manipulation of 
voting lists (Buni, 1967, p. 2).
Race was very much an issue in postbellum Virginia. Blacks 
provided a convenient scapegoat for a population that was 
demoralized and suffering from economic privation brought on, to a 
large extent, by a state government committed to satisfying 
out-of-state creditors (Wilkinson, 1968, pp. 3-4).
Just prior to the Conservative State Convention of 1869, a 
forerunner of the Virginian-Pi1o t , the Norfolk Virginian, 
reflecting popular sentiment, shrilly denounced Republicans and 
the provisions of the Underwood Constitution: "Tell us to join the 
Republican Party in any form--tell us to endorse Negro 
suffrage... and we reiterate the sentiment for which we have been 
taken to task: 'Better that every man, woman and child in
Virginia were s h o t " ’ (Chambers et a l ., 1967, p. 46). The 
Republican Party, the party of the emancipation and the one with 
which most black voters aligned themselves, was attacked by 
Conservatives as "the party of the Negro."
As federal troops withdrew from the South, Conservatives-- 
rallying behind the slogan "Shall the whites rule and take care of 
the Negroes, or shall Negroes rule and take care of the whites?"-- 
elected the Confederate hero General James L. Kemper governor in 
1873 (Buni, 1967, pp. 2-3). By 1878 Conservatives had so 
completely garnered political power that Republicans did not 
bother to run a gubernatorial candidate. Blacks and Republicans
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had ceased to be viable actors in Virginia politics (Buni, 1967, 
P* 3).
Although blacks were excluded from leadership roles, their 
political support was still sought. In the 1870s and 1880s, the 
Conservative party was split over the issue of debt repayment. 
’’Funders," who derived the bulk of their support from the eastern 
and central regions of the state, advocated full repayment of the 
state's $46 million debt. "Readjusters," who received much of 
their support from the western region of the state, advocated 
partial repayment. Both sides guardedly sought black support 
(Buni, 1967, pp. 3-4).
The Readjusters, with the backing of blacks, elected William 
E. Cameron, future editor of the The Norfolk Virginian, governor in 
1881. Blacks made some political gains during his tenure. They 
were elected or appointed to minor political positions, and both 
the poll tax--a device commonly used to restrict sufftage--and 
punishment at the whipping post were outlawed. However, in 1883 
the Readjusters were swept from power amid charges of corruption 
and allegations that the party was dominated by blacks and 
Republicans (Buni, 1967, p. 3-4). A race riot in Danville also 
figured prominently in the election. Four blacks and one white 
were killed. Funders capitalized on the riot by attributing it to 
Danville's political domination by blacks (Buni, 1967, p. 5).
Fraud and corruption were common components of elections in 
postbellum Virginia. Illiterate black voters were easily 
manipulated, and whites employed a variety of strategies for
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electoral cheating. Votes were purchased, voting lines were made 
long by restricting the number of "colored" booths, and returns 
were often miscounted. Fraud accounted for sixteen of twenty 
contested Virginia elections for the House of Representatives in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Corruption in 
Virginia politics became so endemic that many people advocated 
disenfranchising blacks because they were cheated so regularly 
(Buni, 1967, pp. 11-12).
With the expressed purpose of disenfranchising blacks, a 
state constitutional convention was held in 1902. The convention 
resulted in legislation that formally provided for racially 
segregated schools and drastically reduced the black electorate, 
from 147,000 to 21,000 (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 5). Under the 
provisions of the new constitution, voters were subjected to a 
literacy test until 1904, when a poll tax requirement of three 
years' payment six months prior to voting went into effect. 
Exempted from the tax were Civil War veterans of either side, 
their sons, property owners who had paid taxes in the previous 
year, and descendants of those who had voted in 1861. Although 
most blacks were disenfranchised by these provisions, a sizeable 
number still remained eligible to vote (Chambers et a l ., 1967, pp. 
225-226; Buni, 1967, p. 17).
Delegate Carter Glass of Lynchburg, responding to those who 
argued that such legislation was blatantly discriminatory, 
exclaimed,
Discrimination! Why, that is exactly what we propose;
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that exactly, is why this convention was elected--to 
discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under 
the limitations of the Federal Constitution with the view to 
the elimination of every Negro who can be gotten rid of, 
legally, without materially impairing the strength of the 
white electorate (Woodward, 1951, pp. 232-234).
"The age of segregation," wrote Lenoir Chambers, who was editor of 
the Virginian-Pilot during the state's massive resistance to 
public-school desegregation and whose role in moderating the 
ensuing crisis is the subject of this study, "had begun" (Chambers 
et a l ., 1967 , pp. 225-226).
During the next several decades, blacks played a negligible 
role in Virginia politics. Generally, those who voted aligned 
themselves with the Republican Party, although both Republicans 
and Democrats were careful to maintain a cautious distance between 
themselves and the small black electorate lest they be tainted 
with charges of not supporting white supremacy.
Although ostensibly the provisions of the 1902 state 
constitutional convention had been devised with the intent of 
stymying electoral corruption, in effect they did little to reform 
campaign practices. The Ninth Distict congressional election in 
1910 was especially corrupt. Poll tax payments for faithful party 
members, vote buying, and even the importation of voters from 
surrounding states were common occurrences (Buni, 1967, pp.
59-60).
The period immediately following the First World War was
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characterized by an upsurge of racial violence and Ku Klux Klan 
activity in the state. Newport News was known as a center of Klan 
doings, and it was alleged that Norfolk’s chief of police was an 
active member (Buni, 1967, p. 72). In August of 1927 Raymond 
Bird, a black man accused of raping a white girl, was taken from 
his jail cell in Wytheville and lynched. Within little over a 
year's time, a number of other violent racial incidents occurred: 
Rev. Vincent D. Warren, a Roman Catholic priest, was forced from 
his car in Virginia Beach and terrorized because of his parish's 
work with black children; Leonard Woods, a black man accused of 
murder, was lynched and burned near the Virginia-Tennessee border; 
and Klansmen beat three white women near Bristol (Buni, 1967, p. 
101; Mason, 1987, p. 147).
This rash of racial violence, much of which was thought to 
have been sponsored by the Klan, triggered a backlash. Louis I. 
Jaffe, editor of the Virginian-Pilot from 1919 to 1950, 
conducted a vigorous personal and editorial campaign encouraging 
Virginia lawmakers to adopt strong anti-lynching legislation.
With the assistance of Monroe Nathan Work, a sociological 
researcher at Tuskegee Institute, Jaffe carefully documented each 
lynching for the purpose of educating the public as to the horrors 
of lynching and the need to enact legislation that would 
effectively deal with the crime. Jaffe, in a personal appeal to 
Virginia's Governor Harry F. Byrd, wrote, "I hope you will find a 
means of forcing a showdown on this outrage--in the name of 
Virginia and in the name of decency." Byrd suggested that Jaffe
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outline his ideas regarding his proposed legislation and later 
presented them to the General Assembly. With few changes, the 
bill passed through the legislature and was signed by the governor 
on March 14, 1928. Since the passage of the law, no lynching has 
occurred in Virginia. Byrd later wrote that Jaffe's editorials 
and personal solicitation, more than any other influence, had 
encouraged him to introduce the legislation.
Louis Jaffe was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished 
editorial writing for "An Unspeakable Act of Savagery," an 
editorial prompted by the lynching of a black man in Houston, 
Texas, during the 1928 Democratic National Convention. Jaffe's 
award was the highest any Virginia newspaper writer had received 
(Mason, 1987, p. 150; Chambers et a l ., pp. 316-18).
Blacks in the state achieved other gains during the next two 
decades, primarily in the areas of suffrage and teacher-salary 
equalization. Luther Davis, a black man from Hampton, sued the 
Elizabeth City County registrar in 1931 after being denied the 
right to vote. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that 
registrars could not query voters as to arcane voting laws and the 
like, and could ask questions about a voter's age, residence, 
occupation, and previous voting record only. As a result, Luther 
P. Jackson, director of the Virginia Voters League, could report 
in 1940 that only a few registrars continued to attempt to deny 
blacks the right to vote (Morgan, 1986, p. 86).
Virginia's poll tax, however, constituted a major obstacle to 
black suffrage and would continue to do so until 1964, when the
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Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited denial of 
the right to vote in federal elections because of failure to pay 
taxes.
In 1938 Aline Elizabeth Black, a black teacher at Norfolk’s 
Booker T. Washington High School, petitioned the city’s school 
board for a salary equal to that of her white counterparts. 
Black’s contract was not renewed after she brought suit against 
the school board. The next year Melvin 0. Alston, also a teacher 
at Booker T. Washington, petitioned the board to equalize the 
salaries of all teachers. The United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed a district court decision; and on January 1, 
1943, all salaries were equalized. Some indication of the toll 
exacted on the litigant is communicated by Alston's physician's 
request that his patient be given a month’s leave for a "complete 
change and rest needed to improve his physical and nervous 
condition" (Rorer, 1968, p. 279-282).
Improvements in the status of blacks, such as the elimination 
of harassment by registrars as an impediment to voting and the 
equalization of black and white teachers’ salaries, led V. 0. 
Key, in his classic work, Southern Politics (1949, p. 32), to 
call Virginia's race relations "perhaps the most harmonious in the 
South." By the time of Brown v. Board, there was additional 
evidence to support Professor Key's conclusion. Only 22 percent 
of the state's population was black--considerably less than in the 
Deep South, where race relations seemed to worsen as the number of 
blacks approached that of whites. Institutions of higher learning
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were beginning to integrate their academic programs, and blacks 
held a number of minor elective and appointive offices (Muse,
1961, pp. 2-4).
While only the naive would have inferred from these 
concessions that Virginians would embrace public-school 
integration, nevertheless to even the most seasoned political 
observers there was considerable evidence to suggest that Virginia 
would, after some foot dragging, accept the Supreme Court's 
mandate. The tumult that occurred was foreseen by no one. What 
occurred was due in great measure to two interrelated factors: 
Virginia's regionalism and the state's political organization led 
by Senator Harry F. Byrd.
VIRGINIA'S REGIONALISM
At the time of Brown v. Board, Virginia was made up of a 
number of highly dissimilar regions. The bustling seaport city of 
Norfolk had little in common with the burgeoning suburban 
community of Fairfax, which resembled not at all the arrested and 
caste-driven counties of the Southside. The forces that created 
this sectional diversity were numerous and could be attributed to 
much more than simple geography. The major regions of the state 
varied widely in economics, politics, urban influence, and, most 
critically, their racial makeup and attitudes. Robbins L. Gates, 
in The Making of Massive Resistance (1962, pp. 2-12), clearly 
delineates the state’s regions and defines their inhabitants.
Much of the following description is based on his assessment.
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Virginia's black belt was comprised of thirty-one contiguous 
rural counties, which extended south, west, and north from the 
mouth of the James River toward North Carolina, the Piedmont, and 
Northern Virginia. With the exception of some light industry, the 
economy of this region was almost entirely dependent on 
agriculture. Cabell Phillips, a native Virginian, described it as 
"a bleak country of red clay and scrub pine; of somnolent small 
towns; of marginal worked-out farms; of much poverty, ignorance, 
and prejudice" (1957, p. 49). The proportion of blacks living in 
this region ranged from 41 percent in Northumberland County to 81 
percent in Charles City County. Whites living in the region, 
always conscious of their minority or near-minority status, 
perpetuated a rigid caste system. It was here, in the Southside 
and Tidewater, that racial attitudes most nearly resembled those 
of the Deep South. The politics of the black belt revolved around 
the courthouses in the small towns that dotted the region. This 
was the heartland and the soul of the "Byrd machine."
Running northeast to southwest through the central part of 
the state were the majority of the thirty-five counties termed the 
"middle ground." The black population within this region fell 
between 10 percent in Botetourt County and 40 percent in Louisa 
County. Here the diversified economy included manufacturing and 
was less dependent on agriculture. Residents were industrious and 
held racial attitudes that were less extreme than those of white 
inhabitants of the black belt. "Negroes residing in middle-ground 
counties still live in a caste-structured society, but it is
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doubtful that many of them would care to trade places with their 
brethren in the black-belt" (Gates, 1962, p. 7). If a particular 
region of Virginia represented the state's ideological and 
political mean, it was the middle ground.
The white belt, a long band of thirty-two counties that ran 
parallel to the middle ground, extended into the mountains in the 
western part of the state and included the counties suburban to 
Washington, D.C. Industry flourished in portions of the white 
belt, and the economy was similar to that of the middle ground. 
Many of the residents of this region were of Scottish and Irish 
descent, and "the Civil War was less their fight than it was that 
of the lowlanders" (Gates, 1962, p. 7). Here the number of blacks 
ranged from zero in Buchanan County to 10 percent in Fairfax 
County. Racial attitudes in the white belt were fairly 
progressive.
At the time of Brown v. Board, Virginia had thirty-two 
cities. While the smaller cities were fairly similar to their 
surrounding counties in terms of racial attitudes, the state's 
major metropolitan areas--Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke--were 
"laws unto themselves" (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 118) and did not fit 
neatly into the categories of black belt, middle ground, or white 
belt.
Richmond in 1950 was the state's largest metropolitan area, 
with a population of 230,310, 32 percent of which was black. The 
city was more "dogmatically Virginian" than either Norfolk or 
Roanoke (Gates, 1962, p. 11). Roanoke was the state's third
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largest city and, with a population of 91,921, was significantly 
smaller than the other large cities. Roanoke's percentage of 
blacks was only 8.5, and the city's residents held racial 
attitudes similar to those of the residents of the surrounding 
counties in the white belt.
Norfolk, with a population of 213,513, was the state's second 
largest city in 1950 and was growing so rapidly that by the time 
of the school closing, it would supplant Richmond as Virginia's 
largest metropolitan area. Thirty percent of Norfolk's population 
was black.
All of these regions, then, because of the diversity of their 
characteristics and their attitudes toward race, had different 
responses toward the mandate of Brown v. Board. Of crucial 
importance was which response would exert the most powerful 
influence on Virginia's political leadership.
THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Norfolk was first and foremost a great port and 
transportation center. Possessing one of the world's finest 
natural harbors, the city exported more tonnage than any other 
Atlantic coast city in the 1950s. It experienced an astounding 
600 percent increase in exports during the period 1950-1957. Nine 
major railroads linked Norfolk with the rest of the nation. 
Consequently, in 1957 the city was one of the ten fastest-growing 
markets in the country (Ford, 1989, p. 2).
As a result of Norfolk’s strategic location, the area was
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home to the largest naval base in the world. Most career naval 
personnel and their families could anticipate serving at least two 
"tours" of duty in the city; and because the base served as 
headquarters for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
many international visitors were stationed there. The counties 
and lesser cities surrounding Norfolk were dotted with a wide 
range of other military facilities, representing all branches of 
the armed services (Reif, 1960, p. 1).
Norfolk’s naval base and the Norfolk Navy Yard constituted 
the city's major industrial enterprises. The federal government 
employed 60,000 of the city’s 162,000 adult males. The civilian 
labor force alone consisted of 35,000 federal workers, twice the 
number in Richmond’s entire employed population (Campbell, 1960, 
PP. 1-2).
Norfolk, however, was a study in contradictions. On the 
surface the city appeared to be relatively progressive and 
cosmopolitan. Many of the city’s residents had lived elsewhere 
and had been exposed to differing perspectives on racial issues. 
Indeed, 13 percent of Norfolkians in 1950 had lived in a different 
county or abroad during the previous year (Campbell, 1960, p. 2).
Community leaders claimed that race relations in Norfolk were 
better than average. The Norfolk delegation to the state 
Democratic convention in 1948 had strongly and successfully 
opposed Governor William M. Tuck's anti-Truman bill, an attempt by 
the governor to seize control of the Democratic national ballot
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because of President Truman’s appointment of a Civil Rights 
Commission.
The city's members of the Virginia General Assembly also 
displayed relatively progressive views on racial relations. In the 
early 1950s Norfolk's representatives, led by Delegate Delamater 
Davis, supported a bill that would have abolished segregation in 
public transportation. (The bill, however, was rejected in 
committee.) Norfolk's representatives supported increased funding 
for public education, advocated the modification of the poll tax, 
and generally held stances associated with an advanced view of 
race relations. The city's delegates resembled more the liberal 
Democrats from Roanoke and the state's liberal Republicans than 
the delegates from regions of the state that comprised the 
Byrd-organization heartland (H. Sugg, personal communication, 
October 12, 1990).
Norfolk's Journal and Guide, one of the country's four 
largest black newspapers, also contributed to the city's 
comparatively moderate racial climate. Its publisher, P. B. 
Young, Sr., one of the most influential black men in the United 
States, was an independent and highly respected leader. Early in 
his career he had been influenced strongly by Booker T. 
Washington's accommodationist philosophy. Young wrote, "It will 
not hurt to sacrifice racial heat and temper to gain the greater 
objective of economic advancement" (Suggs, 1983, pp. 399-409). He 
encouraged blacks not to migrate to northern cities but to remain 
in the South and seek the friendship of whites.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 5
Certainly some of the credit for the city’s comparatively 
moderate racial climate was owed to the Virainian-Pilot, led by 
Louis Jaffe and his successor, Lenoir Chambers. In a time when 
the newspaper was easily the most dominant and influential of the 
communications media, the Pi lot championed improved race 
relations. Robert Mason, a former editor of the Pilot and a 
reporter under Jaffe, maintains that the editor's contributions 
extended far beyond Norfolk: "In social affairs he was not only a
liberal writer, but he was a social activist....He was a national 
figure in his time. I once mentioned him to Roy Wilkins 
[Executive Secretary of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People] and spent the next half hour 
listening to Wilkins review his associations with Jaffe over the 
years." Chambers, assuming the editorship after Jaffe’s death in 
March of 1950, continued Jaffe’s editorial policies (R. Mason, 
personal communication, April 10, 1989).
These major moderating influences--the Navy, the federal 
government, Norfolk's political leadership, and the city's white 
and black presses--helped promote interracial cooperation. The 
Women's Interracial Council was formed in 1945 and over the next 
few years rapidly increased in size. The membership of the 
Norfolk Ministers Association was integrated, as was that of the 
Norfolk Ministers Fellowship (Reif, 1960, p. 1). Joint meetings 
of black and white school principals had been held for a number of 
years (Rorer, 1968, p. 291). Norfolk's Women's Council was 
interracial and in 1955 successfully sponsored an integrated
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nursery for the children of its members ("How Norfolk’s Schools 
Were Reopened," February 25, 1959, White Papers). That same year, 
Norfolk Catholic High School was integrated without incident (Reif, 
1960, p. 1).
Yet, despite this veneer of racial harmony, the city was 
strongly influenced by the traditional racial attitudes of the 
South, in part because much of the city's work force came from the 
surrounding counties of the black belt, and partly because the 
comparatively low educational and income levels of many Norfolk 
white residents placed them in competition with blacks (Campbell, 
1960, p. 2).
Whites and blacks in Norfolk interacted as white employers 
and black maids or gardeners or janitors, infrequently as equals. 
The institution of segregation was rarely questioned (E. Burgess, 
personal communication, August 2, 1990; S. Barfield, personal 
communication, August 8, 1990). In addition to operating 
segregated schools, the city maintained separate public restrooms 
and beaches for blacks and whites (Campbell, 1960, p. 2).
Norfolk's political elite connected with the Byrd 
organization conspired to exclude blacks from meaningful 
participation in municipal affairs. The organization generally 
opposed racial progress (Wilkinson, 1968, pp. 59-60); and blacks, 
in turn, supported liberal Republican candidates such as Theodore 
("Ted") Dalton (Buni, 1967, p. 174). William L. ("Billy") Prieur, 
Jr., Byrd’s political lieutenant and arguably the most powerful 
political figure in Norfolk, in his private correspondence to the
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senator wrote of a committee of blacks who approached him in an 
attempt to place a black on the school board: "I gave them 
distinctly to understand they could expect no quarter from us as 
long as they opposed our candidates" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, July 
11, 1953, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
The city's electorate, basically content with the status quo, 
was notoriously apathetic, as were most Virginia voters. By 1958, 
when the city's population had swollen to nearly three hundred 
thousand, there were only fifty thousand qualified voters, and only 
one in twelve had voted in recent elections ("How Norfolk’s Schools 
Were Reopened," February 25, 1959, White Papers).
Also belying the appearance of progressive racial relations 
in Norfolk was, although certainly not as extensive as that of the 
Deep South, a history of racial violence. Immediately following 
the Civil War, bands of armed white men had attacked blacks 
participating in a parade celebrating the passage of a civil 
rights bill. Several blacks had been killed, and federal troops 
had been forced to restore order (Chambers et a l ., 1967, p. 19). 
In the next several decades, there were a number of reports of 
lynchings, race riots, and racially motivated murders in Norfolk 
(Chambers et a l ., 1967, pp. 219-224). In the wake of the First 
World War, a celebration planned by the Norfolk City Council for 
returning black veterans had deteriorated into a race riot (Suggs, 
1983, p. 401). Much more recently, in the fall of 1954, the same 
year as the Brown decision, bombings and civil unrest had occurred 
when black families moved into the previously all-white middle
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class neighborhood of Coronado (Carter, 1959, Autumn, p. 514).
And so, with its contradictions--especially in its racial 
relations--Norfoik was "a complex city...provincial and 
cosmopolitan...Southern, modified by the presence of the 
non-Southerner" (Carter, 1959, Autumn, pp. 514-515).
THE BYRD ORGANIZATION
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., and his family played major roles 
in Virginia and American history. William Byrd, the colonial 
author, was an ancestor of Harry Byrd. The senator's uncle "Hal" 
Byrd was a powerful congressman from Appomattox County. Senator 
Byrd's brother, Richard Byrd, achieved international fame as a 
polar explorer.
Harry F. Byrd, Sr., is classified by political scientist 
Francis M. Wilhoit as massive resistance's foremost "tutelary 
genius,...who, more than any other single individual, determined 
the shape and style of the movement as it evolved in the decade 
after 1954" (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 76). In addition to orchestrating 
the South’s response to court-mandated desegregation and 
thoroughly controlling nearly every facet of Virginia’s politics 
from his election to the governorship in 1925 until the 1966 
congressional elections, Byrd played a prominent role in 
influencing national politics. As chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee and as the senior member of Virginia's congressional 
delegation--which included Howard W. Smith, chairman of the House 
Rules Committee, and Willis A. Robertson, chairman of the Senate
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Banking Committee--Byrd was a formidable national political 
1eader.
Byrd was first and foremost a politician of Virginia, 
singularly skilled in controlling and perpetuating the political 
organization he had inherited from Senator Thomas Staples Martin, 
The core political philosophy embraced by Senator Byrd and his 
followers centered around white supremacy, balanced budgets, and 
a tightly restricted electorate (Ely, 1976, p. 6). V. O. Key wrote 
in 1949,
Of all the American states, Virginia can lay claim to the most 
thorough control by an ol igarchy.... Political leadership has 
been closely held by a small group of leaders who, themselves 
and their predecessors, have subverted democratic institutions 
and deprived most Virginians of a voice in their government 
(Key, 1949, p. 19).
Some degree of democracy within the organization was allowed. 
Contenders would battle among themselves while the senator 
carefully weighed the strengths and weaknesses of his 
subordinates. When Byrd reached his decision, the unappointed 
would be expected to bow out gracefully. The senator's candidate 
would be assured of the Democratic nomination and, with the 
monolithic support of the powerful organization behind him, the 
office itself. Byrd exerted his power in carefully selecting only 
the strongest candidates for political office. This pragmatic 
strategy enabled him always to present a candidate who was 
electable and thus allowed him to project an appearance of
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complete control of the state's politics (Ely, 1976, p. 9).
He also appeared to exert control through the State Board of 
Compensation. The board determined the salaries of many local 
officials such as commonwealth's attorneys, treasurers, 
commissioners of revenue, clerks of circuit courts, and sheriffs. 
The senator's closest associate, longtime clerk of the state 
senate E. R. ("Ebbie") Combs, served as chairman of the board. 
Although it is uncertain whether the board actually used its 
fiscal powers to enforce organizational loyalty, local officials 
were unlikely to risk incurring the board's wrath (Key, 1949, pp. 
21-22) .
Circuit court judges in the counties and hustings court 
judges in the cities were appointed by the Byrd-controlled 
General Assembly and comprised still another means by which the 
senator perpetuated his organization and controlled Virginia's 
politics. These judges, who possessed appointing powers for a 
wide range of local positions such as electoral offices and 
membership on school-trustee electoral boards and boards of 
public welfare, were, along with the clerks of the court, the key 
representatives of the organization at the local level (Key, 1949,
pp. 21-22).
The organization was further insulated from the electorate by 
virtue of Virginia's "short" ballot. In 1928 then-governor Byrd 
had reformed the state's electoral process by introducing the 
short ballot. This reform made a number of previously elective 
offices appointive and diminished the ability of voters to have a
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direct impact on state and local politics (Buni, 1967, p. 103).
By tightly restricting Virginia’s electorate, Senator Byrd 
was most effective in limiting access to political participation. 
On a regular basis a smaller percentage of the state's electorate 
voted for governor than in any other state in the South (Key,
1949, p. 20). Virginia's poll tax was a major device by which 
potential voters--primarily blacks and lower-income whites--were 
excluded from voting. Virginia laws stipulated that the $1.50 
poll tax be paid six months prior to elections. Citizens 
delinquent in payment of poll taxes were required to pay the fee 
for the current year and the two immediately preceding years in 
order to vote,
Apathy was another major cause for the low turnout 
in state elections. The Byrd organization had so completely 
consolidated power that the outcome of elections was rarely in 
question. Voters, basically satisfied with the way things were 
and had always been, were largely disinterested in political 
matters (Wilkinson, 1968, pp. 37-38).
On racial issues, the Byrd organization adopted a 
paternalistic attitude toward blacks and opposed racial progress 
and civil rights. Although blacks were never categorically denied 
the right to vote, neither were they encouraged. The organization 
never, however, supported or condoned racial violence, and Byrd 
actually earned the enmity of the Ku Klux Klan through his support 
of anti-lynching legislation and the short ballot. The Klan, of 
limited power in Virginia, threatened Byrd with a flogging and
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burned a cross in Covington when he was speaking nearby (Buni, 
1967, p. 103).
THE BYRD ORGANIZATION IN NORFOLK
Although much of Virginia's electorate was placed firmly in 
Senator Byrd's pocket, anti-organization sentiment did exist, most 
notably in the urban portions of northern Virginia and Hampton 
Roads. Some voters in these areas felt that the organization 
favored rural residents and slighted persons residing in urban 
areas (Ely, 1976, p. 21).
The senator's conservative fiscal policy, "pay as you go," 
alienated him from residents of the rapidly growing Hampton Roads 
area, who desired a modern highway network. Residents were forced 
to pay for improvements through highway bonds issued at high rates 
of interest, which, in turn, were financed through excessive 
tolls. Byrd also distanced himself from Hampton Roads by refusing 
to allow the localities to implement the sale of "liquor by the 
drink." Virginia's bottle-only law hindered the trade of 
Norfolk's and Virginia Beach's taverns and hotels. The senator's 
popularity in the military-dependent region was further impaired 
by his famous "golden silences," in which he refused to endorse 
Democratic presidential candidates. Residents of Hampton Roads 
felt that Byrd's recalcitrant political stands earned the region 
the enmity of the federal government and resulted in decreased 
military appropriations (Wilkinson, 1968, pp. 191-194).
Although many of Byrd’s policies served to alienate him from
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residents of Norfolk, his local organization, led by clerk of 
courts Billy Prieur, was still very powerful. From the early 
1920s, when Prieur inherited the leadership from the 
rough-and-tumble saloon owner and clerk of courts Jimmy Trehy, to 
the 1960s, Billy Prieur was Harry Byrd's lieutenant and boss of 
Norfolk. Prieur was one of the senator’s closest confidants, 
along with Ebbie Combs and E. Blackburn ("Blackie” ) Moore, speaker 
of the House of Delegates (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 190; Chambers et 
a l ., 1967, pp. 216-217). Late in the senator's career, two years 
before his death, Byrd would write to Prieur, "I have never had a 
friendship that I valued more than yours" (H. Byrd to W. Prieur, 
June 8, 1965, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Roy B. Martin, Jr., longtime mayor of Norfolk, recalls the 
political role played by the city's clerk of courts: "Billy 
Prieur, in his day, would pretty well designate who [would run for 
local political offices] like commissioner of the revenue, city 
treasurer, and those types [of positions]. He used to recommend 
very strongly who would get the judgeships....That was Prieur's 
main influence, pretty well being able to say who would get the 
various jobs around" (R. Martin, personal communication, August 20, 
1990).
Farley W. Powers, Jr., a prominent local attorney, also 
remembers the central role played by Prieur: "He was one of the 
Byrd organization's key players....[He] was very influential, very 
powerful....Nothing went on without Bill Prieur's stamp of 
approval. He had the judges' interest, the appointments, the
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money, the political power, the contacts at the state level. He 
called the political shots locally" (F. Powers, personal 
communication, October 4, 1990).
Prieur's influence was temporarily diminished with the 
election of prominent businessmen Richard D. Cooke, Pretlow 
Darden, and John Twohy II to city council in 1946. These 
reformers, newcomers to politics, ushered in twenty-five years of 
businessmen's government. The three somewhat naively pledged to 
depoliticize city affairs by serving a single term (Chambers et 
a l ., 1967, pp. 376-377; R. Martin, personal communication, August 
20, 1990). Prieur, however, quickly regained power in the next 
election.
W. Fred Duckworth, former manager of Norfolk's Ford Motor 
Company assembly plant, with the reform ticket's support was 
elected mayor, to provide a more professional leadership for the 
city (R. Mason, personal communication, April 10, 1989; R. Martin, 
personal communication, August 20, 1990). Duckworth had been born 
into a family of North Carolina Republicans and seemingly embraced 
little of Virginia's romanticism. He referred to Norfolk's 
Confederate soldier statue as a "glorified pigeon roost" and 
informed the Norfolk Civil War Centennial Commission that there 
would be no funding for celebrating "that mess a hundred years 
ago" (Mason, 1987, p. 160).
The cigar-smoking, willful, and often antagonistic mayor was 
an effective and progressive leader in many respects. He was a 
tireless promoter of Norfolk and oversaw much of the city's
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impressive redevelopment (R. Martin, personal communication, 
August 20, 1990; S. Barfield, personal communication, August 8, 
1990). Says Roy Martin, reflecting on Norfolk's recent political 
history, "The Cooke, Darden, Twohy group tilled the land; 
Duckworth planted the seeds; and I brought the crop in" (R. Martin, 
personal communication, August 20, 1990).
Under Duckworth the city council was expanded from the five- 
member city-manager system that had replaced the ward system in 
1918 to include six members and a mayor (Chambers et a l ., 1967, pp. 
305-6). Duckworth was especially skilled in directing and 
controlling the council. The infrequent disagreements that 
occurred between council members were resolved in closed meetings, 
and city government spoke with a single and unified voice (S. 
Barfield, personal communication, August 8, 1990; R. Martin, 
personal communication, August 20, 1990).
Despite the mayor's progressive economic leadership, 
independent nature, and lack of ties to tradition, he 
uncharacteristically allowed himself to be influenced by Prieur 
and hence by Byrd, who revered fiscal restraint, loyalty to the 
organization, and all things Virginian. Duckworth's alignment 
with the organization was not as incongruous as it seemed. Both 
the senator and the mayor were deeply conservative, harbored 
traditional views toward race relations, and were highly placed in 
the Masonic Fraternal Order (R. Martin, personal communication, 
August 20, 1990; W . Malyik to H. Byrd, June 26, 1965, Byrd, Sr., 
Papers).
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As the struggle over public-school integration grew more 
heated, Duckworth was acclaimed throughout much of the South and 
experienced considerable celebrity because of his support for the 
Byrd organization's stand (R. Mason, personal communication, July 
17, 1990). Much of the credit for Duckworth's enlistment in the 
Byrd camp is certainly owed to Prieur, who zealously courted the 
mayor and reported on him to Byrd (R. Martin, personal 
communication, August 20, 1990). Indeed, there is evidence that 
Prieur and Byrd led Duckworth to believe that his support of 
massive resistance would earn the mayor the governorship (P. 
Darden, personal communication, August 23, 1975).
THE RESISTANCE
Virginia's official response to Brown v. Board was immediate and 
surprisingly moderate. Within two hours Governor Thomas B. 
Stanley called for "cool heads, calm, steady and sound judgment" 
(Wilhoit, 1973, p. 31). The governor hinted that it would be 
possible to devise a policy response that would both abide by the 
Supreme Court's decision and be acceptable to Virginia's 
citizenry. Stanley also indicated that he would establish a 
commission to recommend a response to Brown.
Across the state, in Virginia's counties and metropolitan 
areas, informal reactions to Brown varied widely. White citizens 
in the rural counties of the black belt predictably responded 
differently than their counterparts in the suburbs of the nation's 
capital.
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On May 24, 1954, a week after the Supreme Court's decision, 
Governor Stanley summoned to the state capital five black leaders 
including Oliver W. Hill, chairman of the Virginia legal staff of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Dr. R. P. Daniel, president of Virginia State College; and P. B. 
Young, Sr., publisher of the Norfolk Journal and Guide. These 
leaders were asked to influence Virginia's blacks to accept 
segregation voluntarily. The governor’s request was refused 
(Dabney, 1971, p. 531).
In June, Stanley met in Richmond with nine of his peers from 
southern and border states to discuss state responses to Brown.
It was the consensus among the governors that the decision would 
not be complied with willingly (Gates, 1962, p. 30).
Prom within the state, especially from the Southside, the 
governor was pressured to adopt a more militant response to 
desegregation. On June 19 twenty state legislators met in a 
Petersburg fire station and expressed their opposition to the 
mandate of Brown. State senator Garland Gray was elected chairman 
of the group. Across the state other groups of segregationists, 
granted a hiatus while the court pondered how best to implement 
its decision, began to organize (Gates, 1962, p. 31; Ely, 1976, p. 
5).
Most significantly, the governor was under duress by Senator 
Byrd to harden his position. A decade later Stanley's successor, 
J. Lindsay Almond, referring to Byrd, would confide that after the 
governor's mild response, "I heard, I don't know, that the top
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blew off of the U.S. Capitol" (Virginian-Pilot. 1964, June 8).
A later Virginia governor, Mills E. Godwin, supported Almond's 
perception that the senator influenced the governor (Ford, 1989,
P. 13).
On June 25 Stanley yielded to pressure and, reversing his 
previous position, vowed to "use every legal means at my command 
to proclaim resistance to the court order" (Ford, 1989, p. 13).
He also urged that consideration be given to the repeal of section 
129 of the state constitution, which mandated that the state 
maintain free public schools (Gates, 1962, p. 31).
On August 30 the governor, in keeping with his original 
proclamation, appointed a thirty-two-member legislative committee 
to examine the effects of Brown and "make such recommendations as 
[might] be deemed proper" (Public Education Report. 1955, p. 5, 
White Papers). Because the composition of the committee was likely 
to affect its findings, various factions had differing ideas as to 
who should be appointed. The Virginia Council of Churches argued 
for a biracial group of leaders in education, political science, 
economics, and sociology. Others felt strongly that the commission 
should be comprised of state legislators. In the end it was the 
legislators who won out; and although the committee was bipartisan, 
it was all white and heavily skewed with representatives and 
senators from the Southside. At the first meeting, state senator 
Garland Gray of the Southside's Sussex County was appointed 
chairman (Dabney, 1971, p. 532; Gates, 1962, pp. 51-52). In 
addition to being a militant segregationist, "Peck" Gray was an
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intimate of Byrd and an ambitious politician who harbored a strong 
desire to succeed Stanley (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 36; Virqinian-Pilot. 
1964, June 8).
Two months after the formation of the "Gray Commission," 
another organization that would have a profound effect on the 
emerging crisis was created. The Defenders of State Sovereignty 
and Individual Liberties was formed by J. Barrye Wall, editor of 
the Farmville Herald, and Robert B. Crawford, owner of a laundry 
in the same Southside town (Gates, 1962, pp. 36-37). The name of 
the organization was inspired by the similar wording of an 
inscription on a Farmville statue honoring its Civil War heroes 
(R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
The Defenders would become easily the most powerful 
pro-segregation organization in the state, far surpassing in 
influence other groups such as National Protective Individual 
Rights, Inc.; the Virginia League; the Crusaders for 
Constitutional Government; the Seaboard White Citizens Council; 
and a number of other white citizens' councils (Muse, 1961, p. 9). 
The Defenders, who derived much of their strength from the 
Southside, were more moderate than the Ku Klux Klan, which was 
never a significant factor in Virginia politics. The Defenders’ 
publicity-conscious leadership eschewed violence and cross 
burnings, preferring instead to portray themselves as 
quintessentially Virginian (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 121).
Much was made of the fact that membership in the Defenders 
was not secret. However, although the names of the regional
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 0
officers and executive committee members were prominently 
displayed on the organization's letterhead, membership in some 
chapters, such as Norfolk's, was not disclosed (R. Crawford to 
J. Almond, February 24, 1958, Almond Executive Papers; Reif, 1960, 
P. 23).
This organization's primary objections to Brown were that the 
decision usurped rights constitutionally reserved for the states 
and that integration would lead to intermarriage--"mongrelization 
of the races" (White, 1959, September, p. 30). The Defenders, 
denying widely held perceptions that they were white supremacists, 
insisted that they were concerned about the effects of 
desegregation on blacks as well. William I. McKendree, a leading 
figure in the Defenders, maintains that the organization was 
concerned about the welfare of blacks: "I saw the black student as 
not being prepared to be thrown in the classroom with the white 
student. . . .The biggest question in all the good people's minds that 
[I knew] in the South was how to bring the colored man's position 
up in life, not to destroy him, not to embarrass him, not to hold 
him down" (W. McKendree, personal communication, November 19, 
1990).
The Defenders claimed as members a number of prominent 
Virginians, including Byrd-organization insiders former governor 
William Munford ("Bill") Tuck and Congressman Watkins M. Abbitt. 
Other notable public figures such as former governor John Stewart 
Battle and future governors Mills E. Godwin, Jr., and Albertis S. 
Harrison, Jr., regularly attended Defenders' functions. James
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Jackson ("Jack") Kilpatrick, Jr., the young and energetic editor 
of the Richmond News Leader, was also in attendance at many of 
these events (Ely, 1976, p. 31).
Opposing the Defenders was the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. The NAACP was exceptionally well 
organized in Virginia. By 1958 its state conference could claim 
an impressive membership of twenty-seven thousand and would pursue 
more legal activity in Virginia than in any other state (Muse, 
1961, p. 47; Ely, 1976, p. 46). The major goals of the NAACP were 
to abolish segregation; to work for equality in education, 
employment, and housing; and to ensure the voting rights of blacks 
(Peltason, 1961, p. 64).
The most effective activities of this organization's state 
conference were legal in nature, rather than political. Blessed 
with a talented legal staff of attorneys such as Oliver W. Hill, 
Spottswood ("Spot") Robinson, and Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP, 
under adverse circumstances, actively sought to ensure that the 
state complied with the Supreme Court’s mandate.
Within the white community the role of opposing the Defenders 
fell upon the Virginia Council on Human Relations. The 
organization was founded February 22, 1955, with the goal of 
readying the state for the peaceful implementation of Brown. Its 
biracial leadership included academicians, clergy, and social 
workers. Established political leaders were conspicuously absent. 
The council attempted to influence Virginians through educational 
activities rather than political action (Gates, 1962, p. 53;
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Wilkinson, 1968, p. 124). Also expressing opposition to the 
state's rapidly hardening segregationist sentiment were leaders of 
some religious denominations such as the Methodists, Presbyterians, 
and Baptists (Gates, 1962, p. 51).
On January 19, 1955, the Gray Commission issued a preliminary 
statement. Citing findings based largely on a single public 
hearing that had been held some months earlier in Richmond's Mosque 
theater, chairman Garland Gray concluded that
the overwhelming majority of the people of Virginia are not 
only opposed to integration of the white and Negro children of 
this state, but are firmly convinced that integration of the 
public school system...would virtually destroy or seriously 
impair the public system in many sections in Virginia (Public 
Education Report, 1955, p. 15, White Papers).
Gray advised the governor that the commission would work to develop 
a program to prevent public-school integration.
In the early summer of that same year, the Supreme Court 
issued its long-awaited decision concerning the implementation of 
Brown. Often referred to as Brown II, the decision mandated that 
integration of public schools should proceed with "all deliberate 
speed." The Court reasoned that the lower courts, because of 
their proximity to their communities, could best enforce 
compliance with Brown. By this delegation of responsibility to 
the lower courts and by the ambiguity of the phrase "all 
deliberate speed," the Court, albeit unintentionally, helped 
create an environment in which obstructionist maneuvering and
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legal delaying tactics could flourish. The Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties responded to Brown II almost 
immediately. The organization called for the amendment of state 
legislation providing for free public schools and prohibiting 
expenditure of state monies for private education. Also 
recommended were the removal from the state constitution of any 
mention of compulsory education and the enactment of legislation 
that would prohibit state expenditures for integrated public 
schools (Gates, 1962, p. 49).
Although the Defenders' recommendations were intended to 
subvert the Supreme Court's mandate, some public officials in 
Norfolk indicated their inclination to behave in keeping with the 
spirit of the decision. Norfolk's school board, chaired by 
industrialist Paul T. Schweitzer, responded to Brown by issuing a 
statement on July 1, 1955, that the board would support public 
education and obey the law: "We intend, without mental
reservation, to uphold and abide by the laws of the land. We 
believe in the public school system and pledge our efforts to its 
continuation in this city" (P. Schweitzer, Statement of School 
Board, 1955, July 1, Schweitzer Papers). However, the board 
maintained that overseeing compliance with Brown was not within its 
powers, and it looked to the State Department of Education and the 
legislature to supply leadership to that end.
Less than a week later, Walter E. ("Beef") Hoffman, former 
football official, former Republican candidate for attorney 
general, and newly appointed United States District Court judge,
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rendered a decision requiring that the management of nearby 
Seashore State Park rescind its policy of refusing to admit 
blacks. But rather than alter its policy, the state’s Department 
of Conservation and Development closed the facility for nearly 
eight years. Hoffman’s decision outraged many. "When you get the 
volume of mail you get after one of those decisions, you wonder if 
you are going to live another day," he wrote (Peltason, 1961, pp. 
77, 211; Hoffman, personal communication, August 30, 1990;
Virginian-Pilot. 1990, August 5).
The judge was an especially outspoken opponent of the Byrd 
organization and had earned its enmity well before his appointment 
to the bench. Billy Prieur, in particular, was critical of 
Hoffman. Prieur reminded Senator Byrd that Hoffman "took occasion 
to castigate you in the recent [gubernatorial election] outside 
and beyond the record" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, February 4, 1954, 
Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Perhaps motivated by the Defenders' proposals, Attorney 
General J. Lindsay Almond initiated a friendly suit to assess the 
constitutionality of expenditure of state monies for private 
schooling. Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution prohibited 
such expenditure. To test the legality of this prohibition, 
Almond filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia for a writ of mandamus ordering the State Comptroller to 
authorize payments for the children of deceased and disabled war 
veterans under Item 210 of the Virginia Appropriation Act of 1954. 
On November 7, 1955, in an opinion written by Chief Justice John
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W. Eggleston, it was determined that Item 210 was unconstitutional 
in light of Section 141 (Gates, 1962, pp. 64-65).
The long-awaited Public Education Report of the Commission to 
the Governor of Virginia, the "Gray Report," was issued on November 
11, 1955. The commission had operated in virtual secrecy and, 
with the exception of a single public hearing, had sought 
little input from Virginia's citizenry.
The authors of the report acknowledged the formidable nature 
of the crisis at hand, calling the problem "the gravest to 
confront the people of Virginia in this century" (Public 
Education Report, 1955, p. 6, White Papers). The commission 
proposed legislation under which authority for pupil assignment 
would reside with local school boards, not the state. School 
boards would take into account factors such as "availability of 
facilities, health, aptitude of the child, and the availability of 
transportation" in deciding where to assign children (Public 
Education Report. 1955, p. 9, White Papers). The commission also 
proposed legislation ensuring that compulsory attendance laws would 
not force children to attend integrated schools. Parents who 
objected to their children's enrollment in integrated schools would 
be eligible to receive tuition grants to support private-school 
education.
The adoption of the proposals set forth in the Gray Report 
would likely result in limited integration in a few communities. 
Many localities, however, would employ the criteria for assignment 
as a means of camouflaging de facto segregation. State funding for
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private education would, of course, necessitate the amendment of 
Section 141, and it was advocated that a special session of the 
General Assembly be called to prepare for a limited constitutional 
convention for that purpose.
Although the Gray Commission included many members of the 
Byrd organization, the senator distanced himself from its 
findings. While on a congressional trip to Europe, he was sent a 
copy of the "Grey Plan." "This won't do," he is quoted as having 
said (Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Star. 1990, September 23).
Byrd issued a statement in which, although he endorsed tuition 
grants, he avoided supporting local option (Dabney, 1971, p.
533).
Many political observers felt that Byrd was embarrassed by 
the recommendations of the commission. The senator's southern 
colleagues had expected Virginia to play a leadership role in 
impeding the implementation of Brown, and the policies of the 
commission seemed to imply a strategy of compromise rather than 
confrontation (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
Byrd hurriedly worked to develop a regional response to 
Brown: "Ten other states are confronted with the same acute
problem. These states are all seeking a way to preserve their 
schools, and it is possible that some form of action can be 
accepted as a pattern for all" (Virginian-Pilot. 1964, June 8).
Seeking to rally public support for the maintenance of 
segregation, Jack Kilpatrick of the Richmond News Leader helped 
disinter the forgotten doctrine of "interposition." The doctrine
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had come to Kilpatrick's attention after William W. Old, an 
elderly Chesterfield County attorney, had published in August of 
1955 a thousand copies of a pamphlet advocating that states 
interpose their sovereignty to negate attempts by the federal 
government to usurp rights the states believed were justly 
afforded them by the Constitution (Dabney, 1971, pp. 534-535). 
Developed in the late eighteenth century by Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison and later employed by John C. Calhoun, doctrines of 
nullification and interposition were seen by many massive 
resisters as potentially effective roadblocks to desegregation 
(Tindall, 1984, pp. 313-314).
Kilpatrick, a respected advisor to Senator Byrd, quickly 
became a widely influential propagandist on the related topics of 
interposition, states' rights, and white supremacy. At the peak 
of the debate surrounding interposition, Kilpatrick launched an 
editorial campaign, lasting from November 21, 1955, to February 2, 
1956, in which he touted the virtues of the doctrine. The 
campaign culminated in the appearance of Senator Calhoun in a 
series of three-column portraits.
Many members of the Byrd organization, the senator included, 
naively saw interposition as a legal means of circumventing the 
Supreme Court's order (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 8). Others, 
such as Kilpatrick and Almond, viewed interposition as a symbolic 
protest and were acutely aware that the doctrine and its 
manifestations would ultimately be rejected by the courts (Race 
Relations Law Reporter. 1956, April, pp. 462-464; Dabney, 1971,
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p. 535).
On November 30, 1955, the General Assembly was convened in a 
special session to consider the Gray Commission's recommendation 
that Section 141 be amended to allow for tuition grants. The 
section stated that "no appropriation of public funds [should] be 
made to any school or institution of learning not owned or 
exclusively controlled by the state or some political subdivision 
thereof" (Constitution of Virginia. 1902). The delegates, with 
only six objections, voted to support the amendment. A statewide 
referendum to ratify the revision of Section 141 was scheduled for 
January 9, 1956 (Gates, 1962, p. 72).
The State Referendum Information Center was established in 
Richmond on December 9, 1955. Its purpose was to create public 
awareness of the need to vote in favor of tuition grants. Dr. 
Dabney Lancaster, a widely respected moderate who was a president 
emeritus of Longwood College and a former state superintendent of 
public instruction, was named its director. The efforts of the 
center were supported by most of Virginia's political elite, 
including the entire Byrd organization, by the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, and by nearly all of the 
state’s white presses. Lancaster and other leaders of the center 
issued a statement indicating that the amendment of Section 141 
would in no way affect the Gray Commission's recommendation that 
localities be allowed to determine the degree to which they would 
integrate, if at all (Dabney, 1971, pp. 533-534; Gates, 1962, pp. 
76-82) .
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Privately, within the normally unified Byrd organization, the 
issue of local option was factious. Some moderate organization 
members, such as former governors John Stewart Battle and Colgate 
W. Darden, Jr., preferred that public schools continue to operate, 
even at the risk of integration. Hardliners such as Byrd,
Stanley, and Congressmen Bill Tuck, Watkins Abbitt, and Howard W. 
Smith vehemently supported segregation regardless of the costs 
(Wilkinson, 1968, p. 127). The Referendum Center officers who had 
issued the statement that local option would be upheld would later 
be chagrined over their proclamation (Dabney, 1971, p. 534).
Opposing tuition support was the Virginia Society for 
Preservation of Public Education. Armistead Boothe, an 
anti-organization Democrat from Northern Virginia, spearheaded its 
efforts. The VSPPE argued that state support for private 
schooling would destroy public education. The NAACP, the Virginia 
Council of Human Relations, some religious leaders, a handful of 
political representatives, and what vestiges of organized labor 
existed in Virginia supported the society's efforts. The 
Virginian-Pilot and the Ledoer-Dispatch. alone among the 
state's white presses, sided with the VSPPE.
The referendum to amend Section 141 was held January 9, 1956. 
The ballot asked voters to indicate whether they wished
to permit the General Assembly and the governing bodies of the 
several counties, cities and towns to appropriate funds for 
educational purposes [for]...elementary, secondary, 
collegiate, and graduate education of Virginia students in
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nonsectarian public and private schools and institutions of
learning (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1956, February, p.
246) .
The results of the referendum demonstrated conclusively that 
Virginians strongly supported the provision of tuition assistance 
for private education. Regional percentages of voters supporting 
the amendment varied predictably, ranging from 84.3 in the black 
belt to 56.4 in the white belt (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 127). In 
Norfolk, perhaps as a result of the Virginian-Pilot's editorials, 
the results were nearly even (Chambers et a l ., 1967, p. 384).
The overwhelming public support for amending Section 141 
helped reinforce the perception among Virginia’s political 
leadership that incendiary segregationist posturing and rhetoric 
would be strongly supported. This impression, along with the 
efforts of organization hard-line segregationists, had the effect 
of escalating resistance to Brown.
The adoption of an "Interposition Resolution" by the General 
Assembly on February 1, 1956, was an early manifestation of this 
increasingly blatant resistance. Strongly influenced by the 
Richmond News Leader's two-month editorial campaign, the 
legislature decried the infringements of the federal government: 
We pledge our firm intention to take all appropriate measures 
honorably, legally, and constitutionally available to us, to 
resist this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers, and
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urge upon our sister States... their prompt and deliberate 
efforts to check this and further encroachment by the Supreme 
Court (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1956, April, p. 447).
The assembly also scheduled a special summer session to enact more 
segregationist legislation (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 139).
The "Interposition Resolution" was a symbolic gesture and 
little more. Anti-organization Democrat Robert Whitehead called 
interposition "nullification nonsense" and disdainfully dismissed 
the overblown emotionalism surrounding the resolution: "The
lightning flashed, the thunder struck, and a chigger died!" 
(Dabney, 1971, p. 535). Seeking clarification as to exactly what 
the resolution meant, Whitehead wrote to Attorney General Almond. 
Almond conceded that the resolution did not constitute a defense 
against Brown but touted the resolution as "an unequivocal epitome 
of Virginia's unyielding devotion and loyalty to the perpetuation 
of that constitutional system of government which, more than any 
other state, she molded and launched in the formation of the 
Union" (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1956, April, p. 463).
With opposition to integration at a fever pitch, on February 
24, 1956, Senator Byrd called for "massive resistance" to 
integration:
If we can organize the Southern States for massive 
resistance to this order [the Supreme Court's decree in the 
School Segregation Cases] I think that in time the rest of the 
country will realize that racial integration is not going to
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be accepted in the South (Richmond Times-Disoatch. 1956,
February 25).
The senator appears to have been the first congressional 
representative to use the term "massive resistance" (Wilhoit, 
1973, p. 55).
Byrd's role in shaping massive resistance was carefully 
concealed from the public. According to Robert Mason, "Senator 
Byrd didn't have anything to with [massive resistance] 
officially....He was completely in the background. He never 
showed himself in that whole time. [However] it became pretty 
apparent who was pulling the strings and who was answering to 
whom, but he was an elusive target" (R. Mason, personal 
communication, December 5, 1990).
Many historians and journalists believe that Byrd’s advocacy 
of massive resistance was motivated more by political survival 
than by racial prejudice, although white supremacy certainly 
motivated many organization insiders such as Abbitt and Tuck 
(Wilkinson, 1973; Carter, 1959, September). For the first time, 
there were indications that the omnipotent organization led by the 
aging senator was in decline. The 1954 gubernatorial election had 
been hotly contested, and it was only with Byrd's personal 
intervention that Stanley weathered the challenge of Theodore 
Roosevelt ("Ted") Dalton, the popular delegate from Radford.
Its superiority threatened, the organization sought and 
became increasingly dependent on support from whites living in the 
black belt. Byrd used the issue of integration to rally the
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support of these voters. "This will keep us in power another 
twenty-five years," an anonymous leader in the organization is 
quoted as having said (Wilkinson, 1968, p. 154).
The senator correctly perceived that massive resistance had 
great popular appeal in regions other than the Southside. White 
Virginians elsewhere, nearly all of whom wished to maintain their 
tradition of segregated schools, differed from their counterparts 
in the black belt only in regard to the sacrifices they were 
willing to endure to stave off integration.
Byrd's motivations for embracing massive resistance were 
personal and political. As one of the primary architects of the 
"Southern Manifesto,” which was being developed in the U.S. Senate 
during this time, Byrd felt it only appropriate that Virginia 
provide leadership for the rest of the South in maintaining 
segregated schools.
Representatives assembled in Richmond on March 5, 1956, to 
hold the limited state constitutional convention mandated by the 
January 9 referendum. The forty delegates voted unanimously to 
amend Section 141 to provide public funding for private schools. 
One delegate advanced a resolution of support for local option, 
but it was dispatched in committee (Dabney, 1971, p. 537).
The Declaration of Constitutional Principles--the "Southern 
Manifesto"--was issued on March 12, 1956. The document was 
introduced by Senator Walter George of Georgia in the Senate and 
Representative Howard W. Smith, a key figure in the Byrd 
organization, in the U.S. House of Representatives. Byrd and
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Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina had been the foremost 
architects of the manifesto. One hundred one southern 
congressmen, the vast majority of the region’s federal 
legislators, including both of Virginia's senators and all ten of 
its representatives, signed the document (Race Relations Law 
Reporter. 1956, April, pp. 436-437).
The authors of the Southern Manifesto called the Brown 
decision "a clear abuse of judicial power" (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1956, April, p. 435). They pledged "to use all lawful 
means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary 
to the constitution and to prevent the use of force in its 
implementation" (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1956, April, 
p. 436). Byrd called the document part of the "plan of massive 
resistance we've been working on" (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 
8) .
Heartened by the early victories of massive resistance— the 
tuition referendum, interposition, and the Southern 
Manifesto--Senator Byrd assembled his upper echelon of leaders for 
a secret conclave in the nation's capital on July 2, 1956. With 
Stanley, Gray, Tuck, and Abbitt in attendance, Byrd reached the 
decision to escalate further the resistance to integration by 
prohibiting state funding for desegregated schools. The local 
option feature of the Gray Plan was rejected out of hand 
(Wilkinson, 1968, p. 130; Gates, 1962, p. 130; Virginian-Pilot, 
1964, June 8).
Speaking from his Berryville apple orchard in late August,
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the senator drew a line in the sand.
Virginia stands as one of the foremost states. Let Virginia
surrender to this illegal demand [the desegregation 
order]...and you'll find the ranks of other southern states 
broken.... It's no secret that the NAACP intends first to press 
Virginia.... If Virginia surrenders, if Virginia's line is 
broken, the rest of the South will go down, too (Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 1956, August 26).
In an atmosphere of extremism, the governor convened a 
special session of the General Assembly on August 27, 1956. The 
same Governor Stanley who had responded to Brown in such a 
moderate fashion and had supported local option now advocated 
massive resistance. Gray and the majority of the members of his 
commission performed a similar about-face. During the session 
more than twenty anti-integration laws were passed. The
obstructionist legislative scheme that emerged became known as the
"Stanley Plan."
The plan consisted of three principal redoubts to 
integration. First, local school boards would be divested of 
pupil-placement responsibilities. A three-member Pupil Placement 
Board, to be appointed by the governor, would be charged with 
assigning the state’s public-school students to specific schools. 
Ostensibly this board would assign students in an objective 
fashion; in reality it would exist solely to rebuff integration 
(Race Relations Law Reporter. 1956, December, pp. 1091-1113;
Ely, 1976, pp. 45-46; Wilkinson, 1968, p. 133).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Should black students bridge this obstacle--and it was 
anticipated that with the federal courts' assistance some 
would— they would confront a second and more formidable barrier to 
integration. Schools that were integrated, either voluntarily or 
as a result of students’ appealing decisions of the Pupil 
Placement Board, would be closed by the governor. State funding 
would be provided for the private education of students and for 
the salaries of teachers and principals locked out of the closed 
schools.
Finally, although the city councils of the closed systems 
could petition the governor to reopen their schools, these bodies 
would be denied state funding if they chose to do so. It would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, for most localities to continue 
to operate schools without assistance from Richmond.
In addition to the legislation that comprised the Stanley 
Plan, a number of other bills intended to ward off integration 
were approved. Many of these laws were designed to harry civil 
rights organizations such as the NAACP. Under these newly enacted 
laws, organizations that promoted or opposed race-related 
legislation would be required to furnish the State Corporation 
Commission with the names of donors and members. NAACP members 
were afraid that if their membership became known, they would face 
a number of forms of retaliation ranging from the loss of jobs to 
the denial of credit. Other laws were intended to harass NAACP 
attorneys who conducted civil rights litigation. Taken in 
concert, the laws enacted at this special session were formidable
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impediments to those working for integration (Race Relations 
Law Reporter, 1957, October, pp. 1014-1026; Peltason, 1961, p.
65). As one segregationist said, "As long as we can legislate, we 
can segregate" (Peltason, 1961, p. 93).
This legislation was not supported unanimously. Moderates, 
including embarrassed members of the Referendum Information Center 
such as Lancaster and former governor Colgate W. Darden, Jr., as 
well as many members of the State Board of Education, were opposed 
to the Stanley Plan's fund-withholding provisions. In the end, 
however, black-belt legislators and the Byrd organization won an 
unusually close vote: 59 to 39 in the House of Delegates and 21 to 
17 in the Senate (Gates, 1962, p. 173; Wilkinson, 1968, p. 133). 
Virginius Dabney would conclude that "the racial attitudes of most 
whites in Virginia’s black belt, comprising only a small fraction 
of the state's population, had been imposed on the entire 
Commonwealth" (Dabney, 1971, pp. 537-538).
In Norfolk, in a relatively minor case that foreshadowed 
events to come, Judge Hoffman continued to attack segregation. On 
August 29, the same day on which the General Assembly approved the 
Stanley Plan, Hoffman granted a preliminary injunction barring 
municipal officials in the neighboring city of Portsmouth from 
operating a golf course that refused to admit blacks (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1956, December, p. 1059).
The August 1956 special session of the General Assembly had 
also authorized the formation of two separate joint committees, 
one to investigate the activities of organizations that sought to
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encourage litigation pertaining to racial activities and another 
to oversee the enforcement of acts related to champerty, barratry, 
running, and capping--antiquated common-law offenses that 
basically amounted to stirring up quarrels and suits (Black, 1979, 
p. 137; Race Relations Law Reporter, 1957, October, pp. 
1020-1023). By early 1957, the Committee on Law Reform and Racial 
Activities (the Thomson Committee) and the Committee on Offenses 
Against Administration of Justice (the Boatwright Committee) had 
begun their investigations of the activities of the NAACP (Ely, 
1976, p. 47).
For the next several years these committees, named for their 
chairs, Delegate John B. Boatwright of Buckingham County and 
Delegate James M. Thomson of Alexandria (a hard-line 
segregationist and the brother-in-law of Harry Byrd, Jr.) would 
conduct closed hearings. Armed with subpoena power, the 
committees would attempt to intimidate members of the NAACP legal 
staff, litigants in desegregation suits, and members of 
human-relations groups (Ely, 1976, pp. 21-47).
In the fall of 1957, both committees issued predictable 
reports. The Thomson Committee concluded that "the manner in 
which the NAACP attorneys obtained their clients in the school 
integration cases [was], in most cases, reprehensible" and that 
the organization had been engaged in the "unauthorized practice of 
law" (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1957, December, p. 1170).
The Boatwright Committee found the NAACP and its legal staff in 
violation of statutes pertaining to champerty, barratry, running,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 9
capping, unauthorized practice of law, and unprofessional conduct; 
and the committee recommended that these violations be 
investigated by the Virginia State Bar (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1958, February, pp. 98-110).
Also that autumn, Lindsay J. Almond announced his candidacy 
for the governorship. He had wanted to declare his candidacy in 
1953; but when it had become apparent that Stanley was Senator 
Byrd's preferred candidate, Almond had postponed his bid for four 
years. Although Almond was a member of the Byrd organization's 
upper echelon, he had never ranked as one of the senator's inner 
circle of advisors. Despite the fact that Almond genuinely held 
Byrd in extremely high regard— in fact, had on one occasion 
actually lauded Byrd as "the greatest living American" 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 8) and supported the vast majority 
of the senator's policies— the two had differed on a number of 
political issues.
In 1950 Almond had naively written a letter of support for 
Martin A. Hutchison's nomination for the Federal Trade Commission. 
Hutchison had been an anti-organization opponent of Byrd, and 
there were rumors that Byrd was irritated by Almond's letter. The 
senator had also been taken aback by Almond's lack of commitment 
to Virginia's poll tax and by a legal opinion Almond had rendered, 
supporting the admission of a black graduate student to the 
University of Virginia. Almond’s most conspicuous deviation from 
Byrd-organization orthodoxy had been his support, albeit tepid, of 
Harry Truman's presidential bid in 1948. Byrd had refused to
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endorse his party's candidate and had, instead, maintained a 
conspicuous "golden silence" throughout Truman's campaign.
Almond ambitiously began to lay the foundation for the 1958 
gubernatorial campaign immediately after Byrd's unfavorable 
response. As attorney general, he took the fullest advantage of 
opportunities to position himself as a contender. He embarked on 
an energetic speaking tour throughout the state and, despite his 
overblown rhetoric and bombastic style of speaking, earned a 
reputation as a highly capable opponent of integration.
In 1957 Almond announced his candidacy unexpectedly early and 
without consulting Byrd. There were some indications that the 
senator would have preferred Garland Gray because of Gray's 
ideological orthodoxy, but pragmatism prevailed and Byrd endorsed 
Almond because of his popularity (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 
8).
Almond had announced his candidacy in the midst of 
participating in the argument of a major court case in Norfolk (W. 
Hoffman, personal communication, August 30, 1990). Two suits, 
Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport News and Beckett v. 
School Board of the City of Norfolk, had been brought by black 
plaintiffs to test the constitutionality of Virginia's pupil- 
placement laws. Judge Hoffman had consolidated the cases because 
of their similarities.
Hoffman found the pupil-placement act to be unconstitutional 
on its face, in view of the fact that it considered the race of 
students in determining school assignments. While he acknowledged
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the conundrum of local officials who were caught between 
conflicting state and federal statutes, Hoffman pointed to the 
primacy of federal laws:
I appreciate the fact that school boards and their division 
superintendents throughout the state of Virginia have been 
placed in a most unenviable position. If they comply with the 
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of this country, their schools will 
automatically be closed and all state funds will be cut 
off.... If the school boards and the superintendents fail to 
comply with the Constitution... they subject themselves to the 
process of contempt. It is not for me to advise these good 
people how they should proceed. But the constitutional law of 
this country cannot be evaded (Race Relations Law Reporter, 
1957, April, p. 336).
In his decision Hoffman took the fullest advantage of this 
forum to speak freely on a number of issues. He chided the 
General Assembly, "There has been no effort on the part of that 
body...to in good faith implement the governing constitutional 
principles," and hinted at a compromise solution to future 
desegregation litigation: "I do not know of any law that prevents 
the so-called gerrymandering of the school areas" (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1957, April, p. 336). The judge also 
noted the difficult role he and other federal judges faced in 
interpreting Brown II: "I haven’t the slightest idea what the 
words 'with all deliberate speed’ mean. I can only assume that it
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means that there must be some effective steps towards compliance" 
(Race Relations Law Reporter. 1957, April, p. 335).
Hoffman concluded his decision by enjoining the defendants to 
abolish their practice of assigning students to particular schools 
solely on the basis of race. The decree was to become effective 
August 15, 1957.
Hoffman’s judgment and the events surrounding it provide 
insight into the impending crisis and the emerging power struggle. 
In his decision the judge makes much of a statement provided the 
court by Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker, to the effect that Brown 
could be gradually implemented in Norfolk were it not for the 
obstructionist activities of the General Assembly. Through the 
use of a number of complimentary references to the superintendent 
and the board, Hoffman appears to have been attempting to forge an 
alliance with the city's educational leadership (Race Relations 
Law Reporter. 1957, April, p. 339).
Byrd, too, sought to influence the school board. In his 
correspondence with Kilpatrick, the senator writes of his 
apparently successful attempts to persuade the board to defy the 
federal courts:
I am very much pleased to hear from private sources that 
Norfolk is going to stand by us and the school board 
has made this decision. That Jackass, Hoffman, was attempting 
to make a deal with them by agreeing that there would be 
modified integration over a long term of years. One of the 
main considerations, of course, was the fact that their school
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funds would be withdrawn (H. Byrd to J. Kilpatrick, 1957, 
March 21, Kilpatrick Papers).
The disaffection between the senator and the judge bordered 
at times on open hostility. While Hoffman was trying Beckett and 
Adkins, Billy Prieur wrote to Byrd about the judge's extrajudicial 
barbs directed at the organization:
He is the type that starts talking and goes off with his mouth 
running. On at least two occasions he has been most 
intemperate with his comments while on the bench, and outside 
the record he is severely criticized by a large number of 
attorneys here for this apparent lack of judicial temperament 
(W. Prieur to H. Byrd, January 18, 1957, Byrd, Sr., Papers). 
Byrd reacted to Hoffman's decision and attacks by accusing 
the judge of having determined the case without having heard 
evidence and of having let the NAACP ghostwrite his decision. "I 
don't know how he got all that information," Hoffman muses; "but, 
of course, if I did all of that, I ought to have been impeached. 
I’d be the first to admit it" (W. Hoffman, personal communication, 
August 30, 1990).
Lenoir Chambers, editor of the Virqinian-Pilot, puzzled 
over Byrd's charges and telephoned Hoffman in an attempt to obtain 
transcripts to determine the accuracy of the accusations. The 
judge recalls the editor's inquiry: "It doesn't make any sense to
me that you would write an opinion without having anything in the 
files." Hoffman responded, "Well, Lenoir, if they're not going to 
look in the clerk's office where the files are kept, there's
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nothing I can do about it." After reading the voluminous 
transcript, Chambers wrote an editorial entitled "In Fairness to 
Judge Hoffman," which refuted Byrd's accusations. Additionally, 
the editor confronted Byrd during a telephone conversation: "I've 
got the record down here--five hundred and some pages. I'll send 
it to you....You owe Judge Hoffman an apology." "Well, I'll keep 
owing it to him," Byrd retorted (W. Hoffman, personal 
communication, August 30, 1990).
Hoffman's decision would be upheld by the United States 
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. The court, headquartered in 
Richmond, consisted of Chief Judge John J. Parker, a North 
Carolina Republican moderate who was one of the country's most 
distinguished judges; Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, a liberal 
Republican from Maryland; and Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., an 
independent-minded Democrat from South Carolina (Race Relations 
Law Reporter. 1957, August, pp. 808-810; Peltason, 1961, pp. 
22-24). The circuit court's decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which denied certiorari on October 21, 1957. The August 
15, 1957, deadline for Hoffman’s injunction having passed, the 
desegregation of Norfolk's public schools was set for the 
beginning of the 1958 school year.
Prieur later reported on Chambers to Byrd:
I have read Chambers's [editorial] and, in my opinion, it is 
so much eyewash. He, as well as the other editors of the 
Pilot, are more critical of the position taken in Virginia 
with reference to integration and I am inclined to doubt the
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sincerity of his statements in private conversation (W. 
Prieur to H. Byrd, May 28, 1957, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Chambers on occasion corresponded with the senator in an 
effort to elucidate the Virginian-Pilot's views on massive 
resistance.
We have never urged swift or sweeping mixture of the 
races in the public schools. We do feel certain that mixing 
in varying degrees is inevitable in a future that is difficult 
to measure in time; and we think strongly that government and 
citizenship, and all leadership, have the duty to try to 
appraise these problems, calmly, carefully, with good spirit, 
and with justice.
Much that has been done in the South reflects, I am 
afraid, a different spirit. We conceive it our duty in these 
circumstances to do what we can to encourage a climate in 
which the best minds and spirits of Virginia (and other 
states), and not only the most extreme or the best organized, 
can make their wisdom and intelligence count in dealing with 
these grave and complicated problems (L. Chambers to H. Byrd, 
May 23, 1957, Chambers Papers).
Chambers went on to remind Byrd of his "statesmanship" in 
sponsoring Virginia’s anti-lynching legislation and urged the 
senator to include blacks in the search for a solution to the 
state's racial problems.
Byrd responded to the editor’s letter by expressing 
his concern that moderate integration would lead to massive
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integration. The senator asserted that if Virginia adopted a 
policy of local option, the NAACP would initiate on a local level 
a large number of law suits that would result in widespread 
integration. "Modified integration," Byrd wrote, "is not going to 
satisfy the NAACP and others who favor the real integration of our 
public school system" (H. Byrd to L. Chambers, May 28, 1957,
Chambers Papers).
Billy Prieur disapproved of Byrd’s entreaties to the 
Pi 1ot * s editor. The clerk of courts wrote to Byrd,
I feel you are wasting your time in writing to him on the 
subject [of massive resistance]. He is, in my opinion, a most 
charming person personally, but a rabid integrationist in his 
news columns. I am enclosing (sic) copy of (sic) editorial 
which appeared in this morning's rvirginian-Pilot 1 apparently 
urging Dalton to run. This paper and its editorial columns 
are not for the Organization (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, June 4, 
1957, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Although Chambers believed that Senator Byrd was ultimately 
responsible for the state's worsening racial relations, the editor 
did not consider the senator to be a militant racist, as he did 
some organization insiders. The editor maintained that the 
senator's motivation for his development of massive resistance was 
his states' rights philosophy and his suspicion of federal 
government.
Chambers was uncertain as to the extent political pragmatism
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figured in Byrd’s policies. Chambers wrote to William Wing, a 
young Norfolk man who had left the Virginian-Pilot for the New York 
Herald Tribune,
There are in Virginia many politicians who know very well that 
trumpeting the hard segregation point of view is good for 
another election....They would not hesitate to exploit that 
issue to the utmost....How much Senator Byrd has been 
influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the political 
expediency of the segregationist point of view, I do not know 
(L. Chambers to W. Wing, October 3, 1958, Chambers Papers).
On September 24, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who 
had practiced a policy of neutrality toward public-school 
desegregation, issued a statement in which he outlined the 
responsibilities of the executive branch of the federal government 
in enforcing Brown. Events in Little Rock, Arkansas, had 
overtaken the president, and his policy of nonintervention had 
proved painfully ineffective. Many southern leaders had 
interpreted the president’s neutrality to mean that he tacitly 
supported segregation. Eisenhower now declared that although the 
federal government would not participate in the development of 
desegregation plans, states were compelled by law to abide by the 
Supreme Court's decision. The president stated that obstruction 
of justice and mob violence would not be tolerated. One thousand 
members of the elite 101st Airborne Division were flown to Little 
Rock Air Force Base. The troops surrounded Little Rock's 
previously all-white Central High School and escorted nine black
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students to and from class (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1957, 
October, pp. 930-931; Peltason, 1961, p. 46; Wilhoit, 1973, p. 44; 
Williams, 1987, pp. 102-107).
Ted Dalton, who before Eisenhower's use of federal troops had 
faced, at best, an uphill struggle in his campaign for the 
governorship, found himself constrained by events in Little Rock. 
Almond declared that Dalton's election would be considered "as 
approval of the invasion...of Arkansas” and would "constitute an 
invitation for the creation of many Little Rocks in Virginia" 
(Richmond News Leader, 1957, Nov. 1). In his most inflammatory and 
popular campaign speech, Almond raised his right arm and vowed that 
he would lose the limb before a single black child enrolled in a 
white school in Virginia (Ely, 1976, p. 61).
Dalton, because of his support for local option, found 
himself termed an integrationist--which he was not--and lumped in 
a class with Chief Justice Earl Warren, Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell, the membership of the NAACP, and other figures unpopular 
with the segregationists (Ely, 1976, pp. 59-61). Of all the 
state’s major daily newspapers, only the Virginian-Pilot 
endorsed him (Ely, 1976, p. 63). Dalton retaliated as best he 
could by accusing Almond of having reversed his position on the 
Gray Plan and by mocking a statement Almond had made regarding a 
secret plan he had devised for avoiding school integration 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 8).
In the end Dalton's efforts fell short, 188,628 votes to 
Almond's 326,921. "Little Rock knocked me down to nothing,"
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Dalton explained. ”It wasn’t a Little Rock, it was a big rock" 
(Dabney, 1971, p. 540).
Almond was pressured by Byrd to use his inaugural address to 
denounce the usurpation of state's rights by the federal 
government (Ely, 1976, p. 70). The governor acquiesced, and much 
of his address on January 11 was devoted to "the sovereignty of 
the states, the security of a nation— with particular reference to 
the problems of our public schools," and "the challenge that 
awaits our entire system of education in light of the Russians' 
ominous moon [the U.S.S.R. satellite Sputnik]" (Virginian-Pilot, 
1958, January 12).
The momentum behind Lindsay Almond's campaign and rousing 
victory over Dalton launched massive resistance in Virginia. In 
January the legislature met in regular session and enacted still 
more resistance laws (Ely, 1976, pp. 70-71). Chapter 642 of the 
1958 session of the General Assembly limited the expenditure of 
state funding to "efficient schools," Efficient schools were 
defined as schools that were not integrated (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1958, August, p. 768). Chapters 41 and 319, known as 
the "Little Rock Bills," ordered the closing of schools whose 
operation was policed by federal military forces (Race Relations 
Law Reporter, 1958, April, pp. 341-343).
Also illustrative of the tenor of the session was the 
controversial "blank paper" amendment. According to sections 
24-67 and 24-71 of the state code, a registration board could 
determine whether a printed registration form or a blank piece of
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paper, with no headings, questions, or information, would be 
issued to a prospective voter. Most registration boards issued 
printed forms. As attorney general, however, Governor Almond had 
ruled that printed registration forms violated Section 20 of the 
State Constitution (Buni, 1967, pp. 196-197).
The section stated that an applicant must make application to 
register in his own handwriting, without aid, suggestion, or 
memorandum in the presence of the registration officer, 
stating therein his name, age, date and place of birth, 
residence and occupation at the time and for one year 
preceding, and whether he [had] previously voted and, if so, 
the state, county, and precinct in which he [had] voted 
last.
Almond's decision was apparently based on the words "without aid, 
suggestion, or memorandum." The General Assembly deemed the 
session an especially propitious time to enforce the governor's 
decision (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, February 1).
Prospective voters would be forced to memorize the ten or so 
questions. Registrars who refused to implement the decision would 
be dismissed from their posts. The real purpose of the 
legislation was, of course, to obstruct the registration of blacks 
and reduce further the size of the electorate (Ely, 1976, pp. 
71-72).
The federal courts continued to dismantle massive-resistance 
legislation. That same month a three-judge panel sitting in 
Richmond ruled that state statutes intended to curtail the legal
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activities of the NAACP and force the organization to release its 
membership lists were unconstitutional (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1958, April, pp. 274-275). The court consisted of 
circuit judge Morris A. Sopher, an eighty-four-year-old Republican 
who had left active service several years earlier; district judge 
Sterling Hutcheson, a native Southsider with ties to the Byrd 
organization; and district judge Hoffman. Three-judge panels were 
required when the constitutionality of state laws was challenged 
and injunctions prohibiting the enforcement of those laws were 
requested. Decisions of these courts were directly appealable to 
the Supreme Court (Peltason, 1961, p. 108),
Surprisingly, this panel's decision would be overturned by 
the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices 
William 0. Douglas and William Brennan dissenting. The court felt 
that the panel should have delayed its ruling until the 
state courts had been given the opportunity to interpret the state 
statutes (Peltason, 1961, p. 78).
In early 1958 Byrd unexectedly announced he would not seek 
reelection. He had promised his invalid wife he would retire. 
Virginians--especially members of the organization--were 
astounded. Political life in the state was inconceivable without 
the senator. Tuck and Battle, the two most likely successors, 
made preparations to mount campaigns for the soon-to-be-vacant 
Senate seat. An internecine struggle between these two 
organization principals would have torn the Byrd machine apart. 
Letters poured in, begging the senator to reconsider his decision.
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The General Assembly, with complete unanimity, passed a resolution 
asking him to delay his retirement. Byrd belatedly realized the 
dire consequences stepping down would have for the organization 
and massive resistance. With his wife's support, he changed his 
mind and agreed to run again (Dabney, 1971, p. 540).
With the approach of the new school year, Norfolk braced 
itself for the long-delayed enforcement of the Brown decision and 
the possible closing of its public schools. On June 7, 1958, 
Hoffman announced from the bench that the city must, with 
reasonable promptness and without regard to race, act upon the 
transfers of black students who were requesting assignment to 
white schools (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1958, October, p.
942). Prieur responded by making preparations to evoke the 
state's massive-resistance laws. "As you have no doubt read in the 
papers," he wrote to Byrd, "Norfolk will be on the front line when 
the schools open. Our definite plans are to close the schools if 
the Negroes attempt enrollment. All of this, of course, within 
the new laws of Virginia" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, June 24, 1958, 
Byrd, S r ., Papers).
On June 27 the State Corporation Commission of Virginia issued 
a certificate of incorporation to the Tidewater Educational 
Foundation, a segregationist private-school organization connected 
with the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties 
(Race Relations Law Reporter, 1958, June, pp. 789-790). Among 
the five directors of the organization were James G. Martin IV, a 
local attorney, and W. I. McKendree, the past president of the
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City Parent-Teacher Association Council and a vendor of 
duplicating equipment. Martin, with his strong social standing, 
afforded the foundation an air of gentility, whereas the zealous 
McKendree, a charter member of the Defenders, with roots in the 
working class, represented the constituency most likely to feel 
threatened by desegregation (Southern School News, 1958, July;
W. McKendree, personal communication, November 19, 1990; Muse, 
1961, p. 112; L. Carter, personal communication, October 10,
1990) .
Besides objecting to integration on the grounds that it 
usurped state sovereignty, that it was not in the best interest of 
blacks, and that it would lead to "mongrelization" of the races, 
these principal members of the foundation professed the belief 
that integration was a communist plot intended to sow dissent and 
enervate the nation's youth (Ford, 1989, p. 35; W. McKendree, 
personal communication, November 19, 1990).
Later, during the making of a Columbia Broadcasting System 
television documentary on the closing, Martin would state the 
nature of his objections to public-school integration.
As a device in implementation of this scheme of subversion of 
American institutions, the Soviet has adopted this technique 
called integration...with the dual purpose, first since time 
means little to these master scientists--over the long haul, 
to so amalgamate the races in America that there will ensue a 
mongrel race so debilitated and so diffused that it has little 
or no principle left with which to withstand the avalanche of
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Communism, which then plans to take over ("The Lost Class of 
’59," 1959, January 21, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
McKendree also appeared in the documentary:
Hitler first federalized the police force gaining under him 
the power to coerce the people throughout the land. And 
secondly, he federalized the school system to capture the 
minds of all the children. And thus having done this, he set 
himself up as a tyrant that would dictate to all of the people 
of that land. Many of the states, throughout the Union, are 
now familiar with the crushing hand, the iron glove of this 
unit known as the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America. My friends, we teeter on the brink of total 
dictatorship. Let it not happen here ("The Lost Class of 
r59," 1959, January 21, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
The Tidewater Educational Foundation, actively supported by 
the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, began 
work to establish an alternative school system. Throughout the 
state other private school groups located in areas scheduled for 
desegregation, such as Arlington, Prince Edward County, and 
Charlottesville, also began to organize with varying degrees of 
success (Southern School News. 1958, July).
The TEF was faced with the most ambitious undertaking by far. 
Norfolk was a major metropolitan area, the state’s largest city, 
with a rapidly increasing public-school enrollment. There were 
32,163 white pupils and 15,171 black pupils enrolled in the city's 
thirty-six white and twenty black schools. Public schools
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received $6,000,000 in local funding, $2,439,000 in state money, 
and $1,240,000 from the federal government (Southern School 
News, 1958, September). Norfolk's school system required 
the administrative services of a superintendent, three assistant 
superintendents, and twelve directors of departments (Rorer, 1968, 
pp. 292, 341).
Of the five directors of the foundation, only Hal J. Bonney, 
Jr., a history teacher at Norview High School, had any 
professional experience as an educator. Although many of 
Norfolk's citizens were undoubtedly sympathetic to the goals of 
the organization, most perceived the foundation's prospects of 
replacing the city’s public schools as highly unlikely. 
Nevertheless, McKendree and his associates energetically began to 
lay the groundwork for obtaining substitute school facilities and 
a teaching staff (W. McKendree, personal communication, November 
19, 1990; L. Carter, personal communication, October 10, 1990; R. 
Tonelson, personal communication, July 18, 1990).
On July 17, 1958, the school board issued a resolution that 
enumerated the criteria to be employed in assessing the 
suitability of students attempting to transfer to schools that had 
previously been all black or all white. The standards purported 
to take the would-be transfer students' health, academic 
backgrounds, physical and moral fitness, mental ability, social 
adaptability, and cultural backgrounds into account, as well as 
the health, safety, and cultural backgrounds of the pupils already 
enrolled in the requested schools. Superintendent Brewbaker was
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charged with responsibility for overseeing the administration of a 
battery of tests and personal interviews that would be used to 
evaluate the students (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1958,
October, pp. 942-944).
The board maintained that it would "exercise its proper 
discretion in making such assignments in the light of all the 
pertinent facts, but without regard to race or color" (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1958, October, p. 944). The board had 
earlier stated that in the event of a conflict between state and 
federal laws, the latter "must be regarded by the school board as 
paramount" (Southern School News, 1958, August, p. 6) NAACP 
attorney Oliver Hill praised the board for its "excellent" attitude 
(Southern School News, 1958, August, p. 6).
On August 18, 1958, Justice Willis D. Miller of the State 
Supreme Court of Appeals issued an injunction restraining the 
school board from "performing any act of enrollment or placement 
of pupils in the public schools of the City of Norfolk." The 
justice asserted that the responsibility of assigning students 
rested with the state Pupil Placement Board. This restraining 
order, which was to remain effective well into the school year, was 
issued after Judge Clyde H. Jacob of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk had refused the request of the board for an injunction 
prohibiting the assignment of the black students (Race 
Relations Law Reporter. 1958, October, pp. 944-945; Peltason, 
1961, p. 6).
That same day, the school board announced that all of the 151
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all-white schools were denied. Sixty-one students had declined to 
take the prescribed California Achievement Test, one had withdrawn 
his application, one had refused to submit to the personal 
interviews conducted by the five-member panel of educators and 
psychologists, and sixty students were judged as not having met 
the minimum scholastic requirements. Of the remaining 
twenty-eight applicants, twenty-four had requested transfer to 
schools in the racially tense Norview area, where, it was 
maintained, their assignment would incite racial conflict. It was 
determined that the final four students would be so isolated that 
they would suffer psychological harm (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1958, October, pp. 945-946; Southern School News,
1958, September, p. 1).
The next day thirty of the would-be transfer students who had 
been denied admission to white schools petitioned Hoffman to 
overrule the board’s decision (Southern School News. 1958, 
September, p. 6). The judge, who knew most of the seven board 
members personally, pressured them to admit the applicants. "I 
kept telling the school board it was their duty, it wasn't my 
duty. They took the same oath, as members of the school board, as 
I took as district judge....I kept poking at that school board: 
'You're going to admit them"’ (W. Hoffman, personal communication, 
August 30, 1990).
None of the six members of the appointed school board favored 
integration (White, 1959, September, p. 31; L. Carter, personal
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president of the Layne Atlantic Pump Company, had attended a 
predominantly Hispanic elementary school in Arizona and 
felt strongly about the cultural alienation he had experienced 
{Carter, 1959, p. 516). The other members of the board were a 
lawyer, a seafood wholesaler, a fertilizer manufacturer, a 
furniture retailer, and one woman--Mildred J. Dallas— who was an 
executive in an automobile agency and also managed a kindergarten 
(Business W e e k . 1958, October).
Schweitzer had excellent qualifications to provide leadership 
for the city’s public schools. Despite the fact that he had no 
formal education beyond military preparatory school, he possessed 
a keen interest in educational matters. He had served on the 
board since 1952 and had three years' experience in the role of 
chairman ("Schweitzer Campaign Brochure," Schweitzer Papers; R. 
Martin, personal communication, August 20, 1990; R. Mason, personal 
communication, July 17, 1990). Schweitzer was a self-assured, 
quiet, and effective leader, who enjoyed considerable economic and 
social status as a result of his successful business ventures. He 
was ambitious and would later serve with distinction on the city 
council. Perhaps because of his political ambitions, his general 
inclination as chairman was to support the existing power 
structure and not to challenge authority {R. Mason, personal 
communication, July 17, 1990; L. Carter, personal communication, 
October 10, 1990).
School superintendent John J. Brewbaker had served as
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principal of James Madison School prior to accepting a position 
during World War II as supervisor of defense activities. During 
the war, public schools were used as registration sites for the 
selective service and as distribution centers for rationing 
coupons. It was to assume this responsibility that he had 
initially been appointed to the superintendent's staff (Rorer, 
1968, p. 283).
Although Brewbaker's career had been relatively 
undistinguished, he found himself a key actor in the controversy 
surrounding Norfolk's massive resistance. Earlier, he had 
testified before Judge Hoffman that desegregation could peacefully 
proceed were it not for Virginia's massive-resistance laws. The 
superintendent regretted the Supreme Court decision, as did 
Schweitzer, but he recognized that he was compelled to obey it. 
Brewbaker, over his wife’s objections, opposed the closing of 
Norfolk's schools (Carter, 1959, Autumn, p. 516; R. Tonelson, 
personal communication, July 18, 1990).
Brewbaker's opposition to the closing was most likely 
strongly influenced and supported by Schweitzer (R. Mason, 
personal communication, July 17, 1990). Several years after the 
school closing, Brewbaker would write to Schweitzer,
Our friendship over the years has meant much to me. You have 
given me the courage and inspiration to live up to high 
principles. I always knew that I could trust and depend on 
you....I hope to see you Mayor of Norfolk very soon. A most
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desirable change (J. Brewbaker to P. Schweitzer, July 5,
1960, Schweitzer Papers).
On August 25, 1958, Judge Hoffman, in response to the school 
board's denial of admission of the 151 black students to all-white 
schools, met with the board members to provide them with a 
judgment as to the legality of their actions. The judge reviewed 
the history of desegregation litigation, clarified the mandate of 
the Supreme Court, examined the rationale advanced by the board 
for refusing admission, and expressed his willingness to meet with 
school officials to furnish them with additional clarification 
regarding the desegregation order. In precise language Hoffman 
informed the board that racial tension, the threat of schools 
being closed, and the isolation of black students were not valid 
reasons for refusing to approve transfers. The results of 
achievement tests and personal interviews could, he said, be used 
as grounds for denial, provided these criteria were fairly 
administered. Additionally, a transfer could be disapproved if a 
new school located nearer the student's home than the requested 
school were to be opened within one year. Hoffman concluded his 
instruction by ordering the board to reconsider the transfer 
requests and to report the results of its activities on August 29 
(Race Relations Law Reporter, 1958, October, pp. 946-955).
Hoffman experienced considerable stress as the date set for 
the opening of schools, September 8, neared. He received hate 
mail and threatening telephone calls from rabid segregationists, 
and a cross was set on fire in front of his home in the Lakewood
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section of Norfolk (Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Star, 1990,
August 5). "He did not show it,” recalls Farley Powers, his law 
clerk during that period; "[but] he was under stress, I know" (F. 
Powers, personal communication, October 4, 1990). Hoffman was 
affected by the crisis on a personal level as well as a 
professional one. Some of the judge's friends ostracized him. A 
popular joke at the time--one that had some basis in 
reality--concerned the inability of the judge, an avid golfer, to 
find three partners with whom to play golf (W. Hoffman, personal 
communication, August 30, 1990; E. Burgess, personal 
communication, August 2, 1990). Unlike many southern judges, 
whose children received private educations, Hoffman would choose 
to continue to send his children to public schools (F. Powers, 
personal communication, October 4, 1990).
Two days after Hoffman ordered reconsideration of the 
students' transfer requests, the Pupil Placement Board telegraphed 
the school board to request that applications be sent to the 
Placement Board. "[We] cannot see," the executive secretary 
cabled, "how the furnishing of such information could possibly be 
construed as contempt of any court" (Southern School News.
1958, September, p. 6).
On August 29 the school board reported back to Judge Hoffman. 
Chairman Schweitzer stated that contrary to what the entire school 
board and Superintendent Brewbaker felt was in the best interests 
of the transfer students, the children in the schools to be 
integrated, and the city at large, the board had assigned
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 2
seventeen black students to six of the city's formerly all-white 
schools. Blair, Northside, and Norview Junior High Schools and 
Granby, Maury, and Norview High Schools were named as the schools 
to be integrated (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1958, October, 
pp. 955-957). The six had a combined enrollment of nearly eleven 
thousand students.
The board then, on the same day, delayed the opening of 
schools until September 22, appealed Hoffman's decision to the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and filed a motion to 
postpone the desegregation order until September of 1959. Three 
days later Hoffman denied the motion (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1958, December, p. 1156).
Despite its obvious recalcitrance and grudging compliance 
with the district court's order, the school board found itself 
castigated by hard-line segregationists. At a meeting held in 
Richmond on September 1 by the Defenders of State Sovereignty and 
Individual Liberties, that organization's leadership called on the 
governor to overrule the Norfolk board's action. The Defenders 
argued that the Pupil Placement Board was vested with the sole 
power to assign students ("Defenders Resolution," 1958, August 31, 
Almond Executive Papers; Muse, 1961, pp. 73-74).
Governor Almond responded the next day by informing reporters 
that the state's Pupil Placement Act could not legally be 
interposed to postpone desegregation in Norfolk (Southern School 
News, 1958, October, p. 3).
Nevertheless, on September 4, 1958, the governor advised the
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superintendents of school divisions under federal order to 
desegregate that they had been divested of their responsibility to 
assign students. Almond warned these local officials that if they 
did not abide by his order, they would be held in violation of the 
state laws. The governor underscored his instruction with a 
thinly veiled threat:
I am deeply concerned that no charge be justifiably made that 
any School Board has thwarted the will of the overwhelming 
majority of the people of Virginia and thus be 
brought into disfavor with the chosen representatives of the 
people in the General Assembly (Race Relations Law Reporter. 
1958, October, p. 959).
Eight days later, the Tidewater Educational Foundation 
announced that it had secured sufficient facilities to educate 
forty-five hundred pupils (Southern School Ne w s . 1958, October, p. 
3). The directors of the TEF had made arrangements with a number 
of churches and businesses to provide substitute classrooms should 
the public schools be closed (W. McKendree, personal communication, 
November 19, 1990).
Although the foundation had experienced some success in 
obtaining facilities, staffing the private schools was 
problematic. McKendree, accompanied by several colleagues, 
approached Superintendent Brewbaker in an attempt to recruit 
faculty. According to McKendree, Brewbaker seriously considered 
assigning teaching staff to the foundation: "Brewbaker says,
'I've got a right to take these teachers because they are school
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teachers under Norfolk and I would be an agent for the governor of 
Virginia.' He had a right to use those teachers if that's what we 
needed” (W. McKendree, personal communication, November 19,
1990) .
The governor and Davis Y. Paschal1, Virginia's superintendent 
of public instruction, were also attempting to devise a plan to 
educate the ten thousand students. According to the plan, schools 
would be reopened with the exception of the specific grades to be 
integrated at the schools to which black students had been 
assigned. White students in those grades would be transferred to 
schools in Norfolk County, the city of South Norfolk, Princess 
Anne County, and Portsmouth. The superintendents of those school 
divisions, with the exception of A. J. Mapp of Portsmouth, agreed 
to provide schooling for approximately forty-five hundred of 
Norfolk’s students (D. Paschall to J. Almond, Sept. 29, 1958,
Almond Executive Papers). This scheme was abandoned, however, when 
it was not supported by Norfolk's school board (The Christian 
Science News Monitor. 1958, October 8). The board likely realized 
Judge Hoffman would not have allowed such a blatantly 
obstructionist maneuver to circumvent the spirit of the Supreme 
Court's decision.
On September 12 the school board asked Hoffman to 
dissolve the Virginia State Supreme Court’s injunction barring the 
board from making pupil assignments (Southern School News,
1958, October, p. 3).
It was announced on September 13 that Superintendent William
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Story of South Norfolk had agreed to rent school buildings to 
Norfolk in the event that schools were closed. The buildings 
would be available after South Norfolk students had completed 
their school day at two o'clock. Norfolk would be charged $3,000 
a month for every one thousand pupils (Southern School News.
1958, October, pp. 3-4).
That same day, Governor Almond directed Attorney General 
Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to institute a test case in the 
Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals to assess the legality of 
tuition-grant payments, a critical component of Virginia's 
massive-resistance laws. The validity of tuition payments hinged 
on whether Virginia's constitution was violated by statutes that 
mandated the closing of integrated schools and the reallocation of 
state funding for tuition grants. The governor and the attorney 
general believed that a test of resistance legislation would 
ultimately occur and that a more favorable judgment would be 
provided by the state courts than by the federal courts (Ely, 
1976, pp. 75-76; Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, pp. 
65-78).
Virginia's first school closing took place September 15, 1958, 
in tiny Warren County in Northern Virginia. Twenty-two black 
students had been assigned to Warren County High School in the 
county seat of Front Royal after federal district judge John Paul 
had issued an injunction prohibiting the school board from barring 
their admission. Black students had been attending schools in 
neighboring counties because Warren County had no high school
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facilities for blacks. Even though this practice placed the 
county in flagrant violation of the law, the closing was 
unexpected. Attorney General Harrison had believed it was likely 
that legal maneuvering could postpone integration for another year 
(Southern School News, 1958, October, p. 3; Ely, 1976, p.
74).
On September 16 the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools was 
officially formed. This committee, which opposed the closing of 
the city's schools, had been meeting on an informal basis since 
May. Even though its members clearly identified themselves as 
pro-public schools, not pro-integration, they encountered 
hostility. A September issue of the Virginian-Pilot identified 
six members of the committee's executive board but did not 
disclose the name of the seventh member, who preferred to remain 
anonymous rather than risk facing public animosity (Muse, 1961, p. 
89).
The NCPS was comprised of an array of teachers, professors, 
physicians, real estate agents, housewives, and women active in 
civic affairs. The Reverend James C. Brewer, minister of 
Norfolk's Unitarian Church, was elected president. Although 
prominent business people and politicians were actively lobbied by 
the organization, and many were sympathetic to its goals, none 
were willing to be publicly associated with it. Their reasons for 
not joining included fear of economic reprisal, loss of jobs or 
prestige, diminished practices, and division of congregations. 
Despite its initial difficulties in attracting community leaders
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to its membership, the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools would 
become the most visible and influential white organization working 
to reopen the city's schools ("How Norfolk’s Schools Were 
Reopened," February 25, 1959, White Papers).
On September 18 Hoffman issued an injunction to prevent the 
state courts from denying the right of Norfolk's school board to 
assign pupils (Southern School News, 1958, October, p. 4). The 
next day, the board delayed the opening of the city's six white and 
three black secondary schools until September 29. That same day, 
after a similar set of postponements, Charlottesville became the 
second Virginia community to experience a school closure. Lane 
High and Venable Elementary schools were closed, displacing 
seventeen hundred students (Southern School N e w s . 1958, October, p. 
3) .
On September 23 Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, chief judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, denied the 
request of Norfolk's school board for a stay of Hoffman's 
desegregation order. Sobeloff had refused similar requests from 
officials in both Warren County and Charlottesville (Southern 
School News, 1958, October, p. 4).
Four days later Norfolk’s white secondary schools were 
ordered closed by Governor Almond. Earlier that day, Judges 
Sobeloff, Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., and Morris A. Soper of the 
court of appeals had upheld Hoffman's order admitting the 
seventeen black students to the city's all-white junior and senior 
high schools. A certified copy of the order was transmitted to
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the district court in Norfolk.
Upon hearing that its appeal had been denied, the school 
board approved the transfer of the students and notified the 
governor of its action (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1958,
October, p. 962). Chairman Schweitzer, understanding that the 
assignment would close the desegregated schools, requested that 
Almond use the "best efforts of [his] office to effect the 
reopening of [the] schools at the earliest possible time" (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1958, October, p. 962).
That same day, Almond removed the desegregated 
schools--Granby, Maury, and Norview High Schools and Blair, 
Northside, and Norview Junior High Schools--from Norfolk's system. 
The governor assumed complete jurisdiction over the closed 
schools: "All authority, power, and control over such schools,
principals, teachers, and other employees and all pupils now 
enrolled or ordered to be enrolled, will thereupon be vested in 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, to be exercised by the Governor" 
(Race Relations Law Reporter, 1958, October, p. 963). The order 
became effective September 29.
Although Warren County and Charlottesville were able to 
develop alternative school arrangements for nearly all of the 
2,779 students of their three closed schools, Norfolk was 
deplorably unprepared. Forty-four hundred of the 9,950 
dispossessed students would receive educations in informal 
"tutoring groups." Twenty-seven hundred students would be 
"unaccounted for,” presumably having dropped out of school or for
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other reasons receiving no educations at all (Southern School 
News, 1959, January, p. 9).
If massive resistance was Virginia's issue of the century, 
certainly the school closing was one of Norfolk’s most significant 
historical events of the century. Frank Batten, publisher of both 
the Virqinian-Pilot and the Ledger-Dispatch, and a major actor 
opposing the closing, recalls the heady emotions of the time: 
"People talked about massive resistance and integration all the 
time...and I ’m not sure that people who didn’t go through that can 
understand how high the emotions were. [It was] a very tense 
time." (F. Batten, personal communication, September 25,
1990).
For a brief period of time after the closing of Norfolk's 
white secondary schools on September 29, 1958, passions subsided 
as a stunned citizenry disbelievingly contemplated what had 
occurred. Although the Supreme Court's decision and the Byrd 
organization's confrontational stance had made such an outcome 
almost inevitable, to most people the closing of public schools 
was inconceivable.
As resisters and pro-school forces began to battle for the 
support of Norfolk's citizens, the clear and consistent voice of 
the Virginian-Pilot*s editorial staff would be heard encouraging 
reason, moderation, and lawfulness. The Virginian-Pi1o t 's 
editorials would be widely read by much of the public and would be 
closely monitored by the state's political elite and other key 
actors in the closing. In a "war of propaganda" (H. Byrd to J.
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Gravatt, October 20, 1958, Byrd, Sr., Papers), these editorials 
would do much to influence the peaceful outcome of the crisis.
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LENOIR CHAMBERS AND THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Lenoir Chambers determined the editorial policy of the 
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot newspaper and established its advocacy 
of compliance with the United States Supreme Court's landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. The Pilot 
was Virginia’s only major daily press to oppose massive 
resistance to public-school integration. Chambers's editorials 
during this period facilitated the moderate resolution of 
Norfolk's school crisis.
THE EMERGENCE OF AN EDITOR
Chambers was born December 26, 1891, to a distinguished and 
affluent family in Charlotte, North Carolina. The Chambers 
Building at Davidson College was named for his grandfather; and a 
city and county in North Carolina and a building at the University 
of North Carolina were named for other members of the Chambers 
family. His father, a graduate of Davidson College, worked for 
several years for a North Carolina newspaper and became a 
manufacturer of cotton gins, steam engines, boilers, and sawmills. 
The elder Chambers was active in civic affairs and served 
as the president of Charlotte’s public library board. Grace 
Singleton Dewey, the mother of Lenoir Chambers, Jr., was a 
graduate of Presbyterian College in Charlotte. Her mother had 
been the librarian of the city’s first public library 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1970, January 11; L. Chambers to Morrow Press,
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August 25, 1959, Chambers Papers).
Lenoir Chambers, Jr.’s great-grandfather had performed the 
marriage of Anna Morrison to Confederate General "Stonewall" 
Jackson. Some of young Lenoir's earliest memories were of the 
general's widow, who was a close friend of his grandmother. The 
general would become the subject of Chambers's Pulitzer-Prize- 
nominated two-volume biography, Stonewall Jackson (1959) (Chapel 
Hill Weekly, 1970, January 14).
Lenoir, the youngest child, was shy and the only boy of the 
four Chambers children. He received his early schooling in 
Charlotte’s public schools and for three years attended high 
school at the prestigious Woodberry Forest School in Orange, 
Virginia, where he would later teach (L. Chambers to Morrow Press, 
August 25, 1959, Chambers Papers; E. Burgess, personal
communication, August 2, 1990).
As a student at the University of North Carolina, Chambers 
displayed an interest in writing and journalism. For three years 
he was the editor of the university newspaper, the Tarheel. He 
also wrote for the college publications, the University Magazine 
and the Yackety Yack. A talented student, he graduated Phi Beta 
Kappa.
Sports were an important part of Chambers's student years.
At the university he earned three letters, playing varsity 
football and basketball for two years and varsity tennis for 
three. He modestly dismissed his athletic accomplishments, 
claiming that he had played these sports "without distinction"
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(L. Chambers to Morrow Press, August 25, 1959, Chambers Papers). 
Chambers would retain a lifelong interest in sports. He continued 
to play tennis, as well as golf.
Upon his graduation in 1914, he accepted a position teaching 
English and history and assisting in coaching the football and 
basketball teams at his previous alma mater, Woodberry Forest 
preparatory school. Chambers taught there--"learned, really"--for 
two years (L. Chambers to Morrow Press, August 25, 1959, Chambers 
Papers). He would later play an active role in the affairs of the 
school for many years by serving as a trustee. In 1968 he received 
Woodberry Forest's J. Carter Walker Award for distinguished 
service.
Chambers attended Columbia University School of Journalism as 
a member of the 1916-1917 junior class and worked briefly with one 
of his faculty and several fellow students to organize the 
short-lived New Republic News Service in Washington, D.C.
(L. Chambers to Columbia University, March 16, 1956, Chambers
Papers). He left Washington several weeks later, attended an 
officers' training school in Tennessee, and was commissioned a 
first lieutenant in the Army.
From 1917 to 1919 Chambers served in France and Germany with 
the 52nd Infantry of the 6th Division in the Allied Expeditionary 
Force. Although some sources report that he commanded a company 
in trench combat (Virginia Publisher and Printer. 1970, February; 
Virginian-Pilot, 1970, January 11), his division did not
participate in serious fighting. Chambers bemusedly wrote that his
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outfit earned the name of the Sight-Seeing Sixth, "because it went 
everywhere and did nothing of moment" (L. Chambers to Morrow Press, 
August 25, 1959, Chambers Papers). During his military service he 
recorded his experiences in letters to his family, with the 
intention of drawing upon them later for a book on the war (R. 
Mason, 1987, p. 154).
After the armistice, Chambers returned to Chapel Hill for two 
years to serve as director of the University of North Carolina 
News Service. His duties consisted of university publicity work 
and reporting. Many of his newspaper articles were published by 
presses throughout the state.
In 1921 he resigned this position and joined the staff of 
the Greensboro Daily News, where he would serve successively for 
eight years as reporter, city editor, and associate editor 
(editorial writer). Chambers's predecessor as associate editor 
had been Gerald W. Johnson, later a professor of journalism at 
the University of North Carolina and a talented essayist, critic, 
and historian. Johnson likely influenced Chambers's editorial 
writing, and the two remained friends and regularly corresponded 
throughout their careers.
The Daily News had a reputation of being independent. The 
paper's tradition of responsible journalism nurtured Chambers's 
development of his own editorial philosophy. Reflecting on the 
paper's role in encouraging moderation, Chambers later wrote,
Some courage was necessary in the first two decades of this 
century to be politically independent, to view some Southern
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 2 5
problems with understanding and tolerance for minority views, 
and to insist on printing the news. It was a period of great 
determination to lift the state not only from the mire of its 
old roads but from the clinging habits of allegiance that had 
lost their validity (Greensboro Daily News, 1970, January 
13) .
In Greensboro, while he was city editor, Chambers met his 
future wife, Roberta Burwell Strudwick. Ms. Strudwick, the 
society writer of the Daily News, was divorced and the mother of 
a young son, Robert. Chambers and Strudwick were married in 1928. 
It is likely that Chambers's courtship and marriage to Strudwick, 
a divorced woman in a small southern city in the late 1920s, was 
somewhat scandalous and the subject of gossip. Chambers's 
daughter, Elisabeth Burgess, recalls that divorce "was very 
shameful in those days; [Mother] was a fallen woman" (E, Burgess, 
personal communication, August 2, 1990).
In 1929 Chambers was offered the position of associate editor 
of the Virginian-Pilot, Norfolk's prominent morning newspaper, 
by the paper’s highly acclaimed and nationally known editor, Louis 
Jaffe. Chambers arrived in Norfolk and began work in December.
He would serve as Jaffe's associate editor for nearly fifteen 
years. Although the two shared professional values and a similar 
social consciousness, they differed greatly in their personal 
styles. Jaffe could be brusque and demanding in his interaction 
with his staff, whereas Chambers practiced a more genteel and 
nonconfrontational style of management (Chambers et al., 1967, p.
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While on the Pilot's staff, Chambers received an attractive 
offer of an associate editorship in Pittsburgh. As a consequence 
he was able to secure a promise from the management of Norfolk 
Newspapers, Inc., the owners of the Ledger-Dispatch as well as 
the Virqinian-Pilot, that he would receive the next editorial 
appointment (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 1990). 
Upon the death of the Ledger-Dispatch1s editor, Douglas Gordon, 
Chambers assumed that paper's editorship in 1944. The 
Ledger-Dispatch. the afternoon paper, was considered the lesser 
of the two papers both in reputation and circulation.
Joseph A. Leslie, Jr., Douglas Gordon's associate editor and 
a future editor of the Ledger, resented Chambers's appointment. 
Leslie had loyally served under Gordon for many years, working six 
days a week--often under trying conditions--and deeply desired to 
be appointed editor (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 
1990).
Leslie was born in Tazewell, Virginia. He had graduated from 
the University of Richmond in 1916. The associate editor was an 
experienced and accomplished journalist who had served as a 
reporter for the Richmond Virginian: two Newport News papers, 
the Daily Press and the Times Herald: the Virginian-Pilot: 
and the Ledger-Dispatch. Leslie was connected by marriage to 
the Byrd organization. His wife, Nell, was the daughter of Ebbie 
Combs, a powerful member of Senator Harry F. Byrd’s inner circle 
of advisors and chairman of the State Compensation Board. Leslie
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was a member of the Fraternal Order of the Masons, as were Byrd 
and Norfolk mayor W. Fred Duckworth (H. Byrd to N. Leslie, June 
23, 1959, Byrd, Sr., Papers; Who's Who in America. 1969-1973. 
1973).
Regardless of his personal feelings concerning Chambers's 
promotion, Leslie had to work closely with him and, to his credit, 
developed a friendly relationship with the new editor. Even 
during massive resistance, when Chambers and Leslie would take 
diametrically opposed positions on the school closing, the two 
editors would continue their close relationship (E. Burgess, 
personal communication, August 2, 1990).
Several months after the reopening of Norfolk's schools, 
Chambers would write to a friend, "I am forever poking my head 
into Joe Leslie's office to see how my old friend is--to catch a 
little more of the twinkle of his eye and feel again the strength 
of his virtues" (L. Chambers to P. Morgan, May 8, 1959, Chambers 
Papers). Leslie, sharing this affection, wrote, "Your friendship 
has been one of the possessions which I shall always prize most 
highly" (J. Leslie to L. Chambers, May 28, 1959, Chambers Papers).
Because of the Ledger's secondary rank vis-a-vis the 
Pilot, Chambers's six years as editor of the Ledger were often 
disappointing for him. Robert Mason recalls, "He never did quite 
fit into there, and I wasn't the only one who thought that....His 
friends would talk about it--that he was sort of like a fish out of 
his pond....On the Pilot. they would always look down their noses 
at the Ledger. It wasn't any prize to be editor of. It wouldn’t
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have been a good place to wind up one's career. There was a 
feeling at the Pi lot [that the Ledger was not as strong a 
newspaper]." (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 1990). 
Chambers, however, persevered, and with Leslie as his only 
associate editor, established an editorial philosophy very similar 
to that of the Virginian-Pilot (F. Batten, personal communication, 
September 25, 1990).
CHAMBERS AS EDITOR OF THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
In 1950, with the death of Louis Jaffe, Chambers became 
editor of the Pilot. Leslie was promoted to the editorship of 
the Ledger, where he would be assisted by George J. Hebert, a 
capable newsman who had been promoted continually since beginning 
as an office boy many years before. Chambers's two associate 
editors were Harold Gray Sugg and William Shands Meacham.
Sugg, who was from Greenville, North Carolina, had graduated 
from Davidson College and served briefly as the city editor of a 
small newspaper in Albemarle, North Carolina. Sugg had worked for 
the Pilot as a reporter and as its staff correspondent for 
political affairs and city government from 1939 to 1948, minus a 
four-year interruption for miliary service in the Army during the 
Second World War (H. Sugg, personal communication, November 30, 
1990; Who's Who in the South and Southwest. 1976, 1976).
Chambers insisted on having Sugg serve as his associate editor. 
Sugg had written editorials for Louis Jaffe and was highly 
respected for his writing ability (L. Chambers to R. de Rosset,
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January 7, 1959, Chambers Papers). Chambers had a great fondness 
for this associate editor, and the two shared a warm professional 
and personal relationship (L. Chambers to R. Mason, August 13, 
1957, Chambers Papers; R. Mason, personal communication, December 
5, 1990).
Chambers’s other associate editor was William Meacham, 
originally from Petersburg, Virginia. He had attended the Richmond 
Division of the College of William and Mary and studied at New York 
University School of Journalism. He had worked briefly as a 
reporter for the Ledger-Dispatch before becoming the editor of the 
Danville Register, a position he held for ten years. Meacham’s 
work attracted the attention of Virginius Dabney, the editor of the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch. Meacham served as Dabney's associate 
editor for six years before being appointed Virginia's first parole 
commissioner in 1942 by Governor Colgate Darden. Meacham had long 
been interested in penology and had written extensively on the 
subject (Chambers et a l ., 1967, p. 374; Who's Who in the World, 
1978. 1978).
When his appointment was not renewed by Governor Tuck, 
Meacham accepted a position with the Virginian-Pilot as Jaffe's 
associate editor. Jaffe's relationship with Meacham was tenuous, 
and Meacham impressed the high command of Norfolk Newspapers, Inc., 
poorly (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 1990).
The editorial position opened by Jaffe's death in 1950 was 
coveted by Meacham, and he was frustrated by Chambers's transfer to 
the Pilot. Consequently their working relationship was at times
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difficult (H. Sugg, personal communication, October 13, 1990; R. 
Mason, personal communication, December 5, 1990). Robert Mason 
writes of their strained relations, " [Meacham*s] vanity was 
enormous, and although Mr. Chambers took care not to prick it, 
tension between the two could be discomforting all round" (Mason, 
1987 , p. 162) .
Chambers rarely confronted Meacham. "Probably there were 
confrontations between the two," Sugg reflects, "but I happily 
arranged not to be around when one seemed to be, or just might 
have been, aborning" (H. Sugg, personal communication, October 13, 
1990). Mason has similar memories: "At those editorial 
conferences sometimes the hostility between them would be thick, 
and I would suffer. Really, I would suffer. I would wonder why 
in the hell they [didn't] get this thing out on the table and 
settle the differences between them....But then, Chambers would not 
confront anybody with unpleasantness, and Meacham was not in much 
of a position to do it” (R. Mason, personal communication, December 
5, 1990). Curiously, Meacham's detailed biography in Who's Mho in 
the World contains no mention of his tenure as associate editor at 
the Virginian-Pilot.
Chambers was extremely principled and set high standards for 
the editorial page. He subscribed to the Jaffe editorial formula, 
which emphasized first and foremost that "the subject had to be 
absorbed" (Mason, 1987, p. 152). Chambers strongly believed that 
editorial writing "must be informed, with the broadest possible 
background of personal capacity, education, reading, and
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experience" ("Statement of Editorial Policy," August 1958, Chambers 
Papers). He worked hard at his writing and expected the same of 
his associates.
In late 1957 Sugg assumed new responsibilities as assistant 
publisher and embarked on a program of study in Harvard Business 
School's advanced management program. Chambers and the publisher, 
Frank Batten, actively recruited Robert H. Mason, the editor and 
part owner of the Sanford Daily Herald, a small newspaper in 
North Carolina, to replace Sugg as associate editor. Mason was a 
versatile journalist and was held in particularly high regard by 
Chambers.
In some respects Mason's background was quite similar to 
Chambers's. Although he grew up in the small town of Mebane, North 
Carolina, Mason was a native of Charlotte, as was Chambers, and had 
graduated from the editor's alma mater, the University of North 
Carolina. Mason had served as city editor of the Sanford Herald 
and the Durham, North Carolina, Herald prior to becoming Sunday 
editor of the Virginian-Pilot. where he had worked closely with 
Louis Jaffe. After military service in the Navy in the Second 
World War, Mason had invested in the Sanford Herald and had 
returned to Sanford (L. Chambers to R. de Rosset, January 7, 1959, 
Chambers Papers; R. Mason, 1987; Who's Who in the South and 
Southwest. 1973, 1973). Chambers was particularly impressed by 
Mason’s knowledge of southern history.
As editor of the Herald, Mason had lobbied for improved 
race relations and had earned the enmity of hard-line
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segregationists. "I know a little of what it is to be up against a 
mean and nimble mind," he wrote to Chambers. "For a good many 
weeks a power in the North Carolina Patriots, Inc. [a white 
supremacist organization], has been blistering me from rural 
platforms in terms that his redneck audiences understand" (R. 
Mason to L. Chambers, February 5, 1956, Chambers Papers).
Mason came to Norfolk with the understanding that he would 
serve as Chambers's associate editor for five years and would 
succeed the editor upon his retirement. Meacham viewed himself as 
the most deserving successor to Chambers. Consequently, the 
relationship between Mason and Meacham "was a little bit delicate 
and a little bit uncomfortable" (R. Mason, personal communication, 
July 17, 1990).
The editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot worked from 
roughly ten o'clock to six, five days a week; during periods of 
heavy work, the hours would be extended. Editorial conferences, 
convened at approximately eleven o'clock, would be thorough and 
involved {L. Chambers to R. Mason, August 13, 1957, Chambers
Papers). Chambers directed the discussion and assigned and 
outlined the editorials. Mason remembers, "Writing [editorials] 
was a matter of fulfilling what the editor had agreed on and 
writing what the editor assigned....Chambers was in command. If 
anything strayed beyond the limits, it would be either rewritten or 
set aside. Yet there were broad areas in which Chambers would 
accept the judgment of an associate entirely--Meacham in medical 
and sociological topics, for instance, and myself in naval and
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maritime affairs. He encouraged me to write lighter stuff from 
time to time--humor, or what we hoped would pass for it. I found 
it a pleasant and civilized way to make a living" (R. Mason, 
personal communication, July 17, 1990; R. Mason, personal
communication, November 19, 1991).
In a speech to the Tidewater Builders Association, Chambers 
described the conferences and the way editorials were written:
[The editorial staff] may point out this subject or that one, 
which seems to require or permit analysis, interpretation, or 
comment. There may be much discussion or little. There may 
be disagreement, argument, uncertainty; and the conference may 
adjourn with the realization that we need to know much more 
than we can find out by any means within reach before we can 
attempt to say anything. At the end it is agreed what each 
will do and, broadly speaking, in what manner. For though 
nobody writes what he does not believe in, everyone writes for 
a newspaper and not as an individual. Late in the afternoon 
the fruits come back to the editor’s desk, and they are gone 
over, often with a second conference between the writer and 
the editor; and there are changes, modifications, or on 
occasion abandonment of the whole business may follow 
("Tidewater Builders," October 26, 1957, Chambers Papers). 
The editorial conferences could at times be tedious. Sugg 
recalls, "Mr. Chambers tolerated rambling talk more than Mr. Jaffe 
would, and conferences with [Chambers] tended to be overly long 
(H. Sugg, personal communication, October 13, 1990). Chambers,
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too, felt that the conferences sometimes lacked focus: "I am 
afraid we talk too long. I am constantly trying to better our 
record, but the flesh is weak. We like to talk" (L. Chambers to 
R. Mason, August 13, 1957, Chambers Papers).
Chambers's biography of Stonewall Jackson served to distract 
him from his editorial duties. He had begun work in 1947 on his 
meticulously researched two-volume biography, and he would often 
write well into the night. Consequently, he would arrive at his 
office later in the morning than other members of the editorial 
staff, on occasion unaware of late developments in the news. 
Chambers was too proud to accept news updates from his staff, and 
this resulted in less productive and unnecessarily long 
conferences (R. Mason, 1987, pp. 154-155; H. Sugg, personal 
communication, October 13, 1990).
Despite the occasionally frustrating conferences and 
Meacham's ego and prickly temperament, Chambers and his associates 
worked closely, and relations between Chambers and Meacham were 
often harmonious (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17,
1990).
Chambers sought to publish four editorials a day and 
preferred that each piece have a different focus, either local, 
state, national, or international (F. Batten, personal 
communication, September 25, 1990). Of the three editorial 
writers, Meacham wrote the largest number of editorials, usually 
three a day. All of his time was devoted to writing. Chambers, 
with his management responsibilities, wrote one to one and a half
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a day. Sugg, who was responsible for letters to the editor, 
syndicated columns, and the like, wrote one to two editorials (R. 
Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
Although members of the editorial staff would develop areas 
of special expertise, Chambers saw to it that all of his staff 
wrote on running subjects. This was particularly true of massive 
resistance. Despite the fact that Chambers wrote many of the 
editorials on this subject and even referred to segregation and 
integration as "Topic A," both Sugg and Meacham, and later also 
Mason, "dipped into this problem deeply" (L. Chambers to W. Abell, 
September 6, 1956, Chambers Papers). Sugg reports that "everybody 
got into the act on 'Topic A,' [although] Mr. Chambers usually 
wrote the lead pieces" (H. Sugg, personal communication, Oct. 13, 
1990).
For Chambers, who set the Virginian-Pilot * s editorial 
policy, massive resistance would become much more than a topic for 
editorials. The editor would become personally involved in the 
impending crisis. Robert Mason recalls that Topic A was regularly 
discussed at work and lunch: "I think Mr. Chambers became awfully 
close to this subject" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 
1990). Elisabeth Burgess remembers that massive resistance was 
also discussed with great frequency in the Chambers household: 
"When Daddy came home at night, my mother would say, 'What's the
news on the Topic A front?’" (E. Burgess, personal communication, 
August 2, 1990).
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Harold Sugg, too, became personally involved with this 
subject (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990). Sugg’s 
wife was active in the Parent-Teacher Association at Norfolk's 
Meadowbrook Elementary School and was greatly upset by the closing 
of the schools and the domination of the city-wide PTA Council by 
the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties (H. 
Sugg, personal communication, October 2, 1990).
Mason maintains that neither he nor Meacham became 
emotionally involved in the editorials they wrote opposing massive 
resistance. "I would write what I thought was the truth,” Mason 
explains, "and what happened next was beyond me. I didn’t get 
emotionally involved in it.... I don’t think Meacham did,
[either]....He wouldn't lose any sleep at night about it” (R. 
Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990). "I always had the 
confidence that the Supreme Court was going to stick to its 
guns....There was always the satisfaction, when I wrote, of being 
sure what the war's end was going to be, regardless of who won the 
immediate battle" (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 
1990}.
Chambers was an accomplished and competent editor. However, 
he readily acknowledged that his writing was at times verbose. 
Mason recalls, "He would write too much. He could have been a 
little sharper. He would have been the first to say that. I had 
great respect for what he said, but sometimes it could have been 
improved" (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 1990).
The Pilot’s editorial policy had little direct effect on
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the manner in which news stories were covered or written. The 
Virginian-Pilot had a long tradition of confining its editors' 
responsibilities and duties solely to the editorial page (F. 
Batten, personal communication, September 25, 1990). Editors and 
their associates were removed from the activities in the newsroom 
geographically as well as organizationally. Their three-room 
suite of offices was located a floor above the newsroom and was 
isolated from the paper's reporting activities (Mason, 1987, p. 
153).
Chambers did, however, have an indirect effect on the paper's 
news staff. He was widely respected, and his stand against 
massive resistance was admired by many reporters. "He had an 
influence on me," recalls Luther Carter, then the Pilot's young 
education reporter, "because I really looked up to him" (L. 
Carter, personal communication, October 10, 1990).
As a result of the reputations of Chambers and Jaffe, the 
Virginian-Pilot attracted a particularly gifted news and 
editorial staff. "1 don’t think that Chambers ever would have left 
North Carolina except to go to Louis Jaffe," Robert Mason recalls. 
"Chambers in turn attracted some other good people....It was a 
joy to work there....A lot of [the staff] wrote books and were 
accomplished in interesting ways....I remember there were three 
lawyers and a preacher on the staff at one time, and there had been 
a doctor....I think it was unusual....You wouldn't have found 
[that] in Richmond" (R. Mason, personal communication, December 5, 
1990).
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To be a member of the Virginian-Pilot * s editorial staff was to 
be a member of a "gentlemanly club" (I». Carter, personal 
communication, October 10, 1990). The editorial page was generally 
regarded as the strongest facet of the Pilot. and considerable 
status was accorded editors and their associates by their newspaper 
colleagues. Chambers was heir to an editorial tradition created by 
his direct predecessors, Louis I. Jaffe, winner of the Pulitzer 
Prize, and former governor William E. Cameron (R. Mason, personal 
communication, July 17, 1990).
The editor of the Pilot was also a respected member of 
Tidewater's social and professional communities. Editors served 
as honorary members of the Norfolk Bar Association and the Norfolk 
Medical Association and were routinely invited to naval ceremonies 
and civic gatherings (R. Mason, personal communication, April 10,
1989).
Chambers also exerted an indirect influence over the 
Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Dispatch* s young publisher, Frank
Batten. Batten had been appointed publisher in 1954 by his uncle,
"Colonel" Samuel L. Slover, upon the unexpected death of the 
previous publisher, Henry S. Lewis. Batten, a graduate of Culver 
Military Academy, the University of Virginia, and Harvard's 
Graduate School of Business, was only twenty-seven years old at
the time of his appointment (Chambers et a l ., 1967, p. 380;
Mason, 1987, p. 146).
By all accounts Batten was an unusually confident and capable 
young man. "He had one hell of a lot of nerve," Robert Mason
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recalls. "If he set out on a course, you could be absolutely 
certain he'd go through with that thing. There wouldn't be any 
second guessing, any flinching, anything like that. He was just 
direct. He was a brave young fellow, as his success indicates. I 
have all these times, including this moment, thought he had the 
coolest eye [during stressful times] I ever saw. And had a great 
sense of fairness about him" (R. Mason, personal communication, 
December 5, 1990).
Batten had great respect for his two editors--both much older 
and more experienced than he--but the young publisher developed a 
much stronger relationship with Chambers than with Joseph Leslie. 
"I was much closer to Mr. Chambers," Batten remembers...."He was a 
man for whom I had enormous personal regard and respect. And I 
used him often as a sort of elder advisor on a lot of things 
outside of editorial policy....He was a man whose judgment I 
respected and whom I trusted implicitly" (F. Batten, personal 
communication, September 25, 1990).
Chambers felt much the same way about Batten. The editor's 
daughter reflects, "[My father] was a great admirer of Frank 
Batten's. He and Frank Batten had a close relationship" (E. 
Burgess, personal communication, August 2, 1990). Chambers 
described Batten as "exceptionally intelligent, well versed in 
the modern executive spirit, thoroughly human and capable of 
constant and healthy growth" (L. Chambers to R. Mason, August 13, 
1957, Chambers Papers).
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THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-DISPATCH; OPPOSING VIEWS
Throughout much of Virginia's massive resistance to public- 
school desegregation, the editorial staffs of the Virginian-Pilot 
and the Ledger-Dispatch took opposing positions- The Pi 1ot urged 
a good-faith compliance with the Supreme Court's decision, whereas 
the Ledger generally supported the actions of the Byrd 
organization. It is likely that this phenomenon--co-owned papers 
taking opposite positions on public-school desegregation--was a 
unique occurrence in southern journalism (R. Mason, personal 
communication, December 5, 1990).
A few observers believe the divergent editorial stances of 
the two papers were contrived in an attempt by the owners of 
Norfolk Newspapers to increase readership and advertising 
revenues. "[Frank Batten] ran a newspaper to make money," recalls 
Sam Barfield, a prominent local political figure, "and he often 
said 'I want my newspapers to be opposite each other.1 Now I laugh 
about that. That’s so people can't bring in another newspaper, 
won't want to bring in other newspapers. How sincere the editors 
were I don't know" (S. Barfield, personal communication, August 9,
1990).
Regardless of perceptions such as this, the differences 
between the Pilot's and the Ledger * s editorials were not 
contrived. The opposing editorial stances of the two papers were 
entirely the result of the conflicting beliefs of the two papers’ 
editors. Throughout Chambers’s editorial career he had argued for 
political moderation and racial tolerance. Leslie was much more a
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traditionalist in racial matters; and because of this and his 
relationship with Ebbie Combs, he tended to align himself 
closely with the Byrd organization. Robert Mason reflects, "[The 
difference between the two papers] was simply the matter of two 
editors' following their longtime persuasions--their longtime 
convictions--fol1 owing what they [had] thought all their lives" 
(R. Mason, personal communication, April 10, 1989).
Chambers himself bristled at allegations that the differences 
between the papers were not genuine. In response to a reader's 
insinuation that the papers were more concerned with profit than 
responsible journalism, the editor wrote:
There is no purpose to make 'better business' in the sense you 
appear to intimate out of the natural, normal, and historical 
differences in the views of the Virginian-Pilot and the 
Ledger-Dispatch. I should appreciate it if you should repeat 
as much to any persons you may hear suggesting that there 
is....Those who know the history, traditions, and principles 
of the Virginian-Pi1ot , for which I have some right to speak, 
or who know the editors of this newspaper, know better (L. 
Chambers to L. Weary, November 19, 1958, Chambers Papers). 
The editorial autonomy granted the two senior editors by 
their young publisher helped to create an environment in which the 
editors' views on integration could be expressed without 
reservation. Frank Batten explains, "The papers at that time had 
a long tradition of having separate editorial policies. It was not 
necessarily a separate editorial policy by design, but we had
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different editorial staffs; and the ownership of the papers, 
going back through several publishers before me, had always 
given the editors wide latitude on setting editorial policy"
{F. Batten, personal communication, September 25, 1990).
Some observers feel that the different perspectives espoused 
by the two papers' editorials had a positive effect and stimulated 
thinking and debate on integration. Elisabeth Burgess, Chambers’s 
daughter, reflects, "I thought it was healthy for the city and for 
the citizenry to have different points of view being set forth by 
different newspapers. I think that was the philosophy Frank 
Batten had, and I don't think my father felt the fact that someone 
had a different opinion was bad" (E. Burgess, personal 
communication, August 2, 1990).
Nevertheless, the appearance of the ownership of the two 
papers trying to pander to readers was disturbing to Robert Mason: 
" I  was pained that there was another paper under the same roof 
that was taking an opposite view. I don’t think that would ever 
happen again.... I think (it) was a mistake.... At the time, I never 
heard anyone at the newspapers or editorial offices object to it. 
I did" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
Mason believes that had Batten been more experienced, he 
would have unified the papers’ editorial policies: "He had no 
doubts at all about his ability to run that business, but he had 
great respect for his editors. He had little urge for editorial 
work and so he let them alone. If he had been thirty-five at the 
outset, I think he would have gone to them and said, 'Look, it’s
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too bad you feel differently, but we aren't going to give the
appearance of working both sides of the street. We've got to agree
on a course on this thing, and there's going to be unity.' 
Certainly the time would come when [Batten] wouldn't blink at 
a transfer or early retirement" (R. Mason, personal communication, 
July 17, 1990).
WHY CHAMBERS OPPOSED MASSIVE RESISTANCE
Chambers objected to Virginia's massive resistance primarily 
on the grounds that it violated fundamental precepts of our system 
of government, especially the authority of the Supreme Court to 
interpret the Constitution. He explained:
My personal views and those of the Virginian-Pilot editorially
do not extend as far as the views of many of my brethren to
the south of us--or in Virginia for that matter. This does 
not mean that we have preached integration or that we are 
unaware of the magnitude and complexity of the problems. It 
does mean that we have more respect for a unanimous Supreme 
Court opinion than some others do, and that we have been 
critical of intransigence on a universal scale, and stupid 
ideas, and political exploitation of the emotionalism of the 
times, and various other current phenomena (L. Chambers to J. 
Jones, March 16, 1956, Chambers Papers).
The editor was disturbed and keenly disappointed by what he 
perceived as the obfuscation and dishonesty practiced by the Byrd 
organization. In a letter to his close friend Gerald Johnson,
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Chambers wrote,
The curse of this period in Southern civilization has not been 
that most Southerners wished the segregation system 
to remain unchanted (sic). It is easy to understand why they 
did. The curse is that the reasons they gave were 
preposterous, the facts they relied on were not facts at all, 
the case as they stated it was shot through with 
inconsistencies, hypocrisy, and downright dishonesty. What 
the politicians have done in these respects is beyond 
description (L. Chambers to G. Johnson, January 7, 1959, 
Chambers Papers).
Chambers was particularly perturbed by the unwillingness of 
respected leaders in the state's academic, professional, and 
business communities to challenge massive resistance openly. "It 
is depressing to have to add," he continued in his letter to 
Johnson, "that most college faculty and administrative leaders, 
nearly all doctors, and absolutely all businessmen dived into 
their holes four years ago and have not stuck their heads out 
except to estimate the force of the winds and thereafter to retire 
again" (L. Chambers to G. Johnson, January 7, 1959, Chambers
Papers).
Although Chambers's editorials were based primarily on his 
deeply held beliefs regarding the sanctity of American democracy 
and the duty of public officials to practice responsible 
leadership, the legacy of Louis Jaffe certainly played a part in 
shaping the Viroinian-Pilot’s editorial response to Brown v.
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Board. Chambers wrote,
The Virginian-Pilot has a long record of trying to do what it 
could for justice and opportunity for Negroes. My 
predecessor, Louis I, Jaffe, won a Pulitzer prize in 1928, for 
editorial work directed for the control of lynching....This is 
not a wildcat newspaper. It does not crusade. But it does 
try to appeal to reason and to encourage all educational 
processes that overcome prejudice in the end. It was doing so 
before May, 1954 ("Biographical Data," 1959, Chambers Papers). 
Chambers was not a social activist as Jaffe had been. He did 
not openly embrace integration, and his personal understanding of 
blacks and racial issues was limited. In many ways he was a 
product of the segregated South and a privileged upbringing. The 
only blacks he had known were menial and janitorial workers. He 
was removed from the masses by birth, education, and position (E. 
Burgess, personal communication, August 2, 1990; R. Mason, 1987, 
p. 159). "He never took the attitude that [Brown v. Board] was 
long overdue after all these years of oppression," Robert Mason 
recalls. "He never got into that phase of thought” (R. Mason, 
personal communication, July 17, 1990).
What impelled Chambers to target massive resistance and 
racial prejudice in his editorials was not foremost a desire to 
advance social justice. Instead, he was motivated by a deep 
belief in the precepts of American democracy and orderly and 
responsible government. For the editor, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court were truly the law of the land. Massive resistance
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was a further affront to Chambers because of its intellectual 
dishonesty, its lack of manners, and its emotionalism (R. Mason, 
1987, p. 159).
THE PILOT AND THE LEDGER: INCREASING DIVERGENCE
The Ledger-Dispatch* s initial editorial response to Brown 
v. Board was calm and relatively supportive. In a lead editorial, 
"The Segregation Decision," the paper acknowledged that although 
the court had infringed on the rights of the states, there was a 
perception among Virginians that "many former attitudes on racial 
questions [were] out of step with the times" (Ledger-Pispatch, 
1954, May 18).
The Ledger maintained that desegregation would not 
traumatize Virginia--most specifically, Norfolk--to the degree it 
would much of the South. The ratio of blacks to whites in 
Virginia was considerably lower than in many southern states, and 
it was likely that most of Norfolk's black school children would 
continue to attend the black schools that had been constructed 
near their homes.
Subsequent editorials written on this topic praised Governor 
Thomas Stanley's moderate reaction to Brown, in particular his 
call for the establishment of a commission charged with 
formulating a policy response to the Supreme Court's decision.
The commission's recommendations should be based on a deliberate, 
thoughtful, and unemotional discussion of the issues, the Ledger 
counseled; and the body should include blacks among its
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membership. The paper’s editorials deplored the efforts of the 
NAACP to force hasty implementation of desegregation 
(Ledoer-Dispatch. 1954, May 19-23).
The Virginian-Pilot editorials on the Brown decision were 
similar in substance to those of the Ledger. In a lead 
editorial, "The Decision on Segregation," the Pilot acknowledged 
that the effects of the Supreme Court's decision would be "vast and 
far-reaching." Virginia, however, would not be as severely 
affected by the decision as would many other southern states. The 
Court was lauded for deliberating the issue thoroughly and not 
pressing the South for immediate compliance. The editorial 
concluded with a call for responsible leadership: "This is a time 
for statesmanship, and the South will rise or decline as it 
produces it" (Virginian-Pilot, 1954, May 18).
In additional editorials on this subject, the Pilot 
wrote that there were many Souths (a theme it would revisit 
throughout much of the developing crisis). Some southern 
communities, such as Norfolk, were capable of prompt compliance 
with the Court’s decree. Other areas, such as Virginia’s black 
belt, faced a more problematic desegregation and would need more 
time to accommodate the Court's decision.
The Pilot urged southerners to adjust to integration with 
"good will, determination, and an earnest effort to adjust old 
folkways with newly defined constitutional law" (Virginian-Pilot, 
1954, May 19). Rash action and emotionalism must be avoided. 
Southerners should approach racial problems with
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soberness and responsibility, and with the best thought [they 
could] produce, not on how to overturn the Supreme Court's 
decision, which [they could not] do; but on how to adjust life 
in the South to the philosophy and requirements of the 
decision, which [they] must do (Virginian-Pilot, 1954, May 
2 2 ) .
Although the staffs of the Pi lot and the Ledger responded 
to Brown v. Board with editorials of a similar theme, the two 
papers’ editorials were markedly different in style. On the 
whole, the Pilot's writing was and would remain more involved 
and analytical; editorials were longer, sentence structure was 
more complex, and more evidence was set forth for conclusions.
The Ledger’s writing seems primarily to summarize the views of 
its editorial staff, whereas the editorials of the Pilot. while 
certainly reflecting the opinions of Chambers and his staff, 
appear to have been written with the intent of educating readers. 
As a result of this disparity in style, the Ledger's editorials 
were likely more readable, and the Pi 1ot’s more informative and 
analytical .
A year later, when the Supreme Court directed that 
integration should proceed with "all deliberate speed," the views 
espoused by the editorials of the two papers were still quite 
similar. The Ledger praised the moderation of Brown II, 
asserting that the decision took into account the difficulties 
involved in integration and that the implementation of the decree 
would not force schools to desegregate too precipitously
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(Ledger-Dispatch, 1955, June 1). The paper argued that 
maintaining a system of public education was an essential 
reponsibility of the state and opposed any efforts to repeal 
Section 129 of the Virginia State Constitution, which mandated a 
free system of public schools (Ledger-Dispatch. 1955, June 2).
The Pi lot, too, extolled the insight of the justices. In a 
lead editorial the decision was called "a wise attempt to adjust 
constitutional principles and practical problems"
(Virginian-Pilot, 1955, June 1). The paper warned, however, 
that it was unlikely either proponents of immediate integration or 
intransigents on the issue of segregation would be satisfied by 
the decision. "Somewhere in the South," the editorial ended, "a 
state will rise to leadership in this probably long and difficult 
duty. We hope it will be Virginia" (Virginian-Pilot. 1955, June 
1 ) .
During the next several days, the Pilot continued to call 
for responsible leadership which, unlike the Gray Commission, 
would be representative of a diversity of viewpoints pertaining to 
integration, and for depoliticization of the issue: "The state 
needs the advice of men and women of all races who are above 
political pressures" (Virginian-Pi1o t , 1955, June 2). The 
editorial staff also urged good-faith compliance with the Court's 
order and cautioned against delaying tactics and resistance.
That fall, when the Gray Commission issued its eagerly 
awaited report concerning Virginia's response to the Supreme 
Court's decision, its recommendations--local option and tuition
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support for private education--were enthusiastically embraced by 
the Ledger. In a lead editorial written a few days after the 
report was issued, Leslie stated that the recommendations were 
well conceived and well considered and that they provided 
effective solutions to the problems Virginia would face. The 
recommendations were flexible enough to accommodate the diverse 
range of racial situations in Virginia and would help to preserve 
public education (Ledger-Dispatch, 1955, November 14).
The Ledger supported the Gray Report's call for a limited 
constitutional convention for the purpose of amending section 141 
to provide state funding for private education. The paper urged 
legislators to enact the recommendations as rapidly as possible, 
to ensure that defenses against integration would be in place by 
the beginning of the next school year (Ledger-Dispatch, 1955, 
November 15).
It was over this issue of public support for private 
education that the editorials of the Ledger-Dispatch and the 
Virginian-Pilot began to diverge emphatically. While Chambers 
and his associates agreed that the Gray Report in many ways 
represented an "earnest effort to find practical and legal 
solutions for difficult problems" (Virginian-Pilot. 1955,
November 13), they cautioned that time was needed to deliberate 
the outcomes of the report's recommendations. Chambers noted 
that the commission--which had operated in virtual secrecy, 
without input from many concerned interest groups--had taken a 
year to prepare its report. To expect Virginia's citizenry to
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support the convening of the convention without the opportunity 
for thoughtful evaluation of its consequences was unreasonable.
The Pi 1ot found the recommendations pertaining to private 
schools to be particularly unclear, and the paper asked a number 
of obvious but difficult questions. With what facilities would 
these private schools operate? How would the schools be staffed? 
What standards would govern their existence? How would they be 
funded? Would their operation be constitutional 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1955, November 16)?
Chambers was also concerned over the divestment of the 
electorate in the decisions that would be reached by a 
constitutional convention. Although a referendum proposed by the 
Gray Commission would provide voters with the opportunity to 
declare their support or opposition to the convention, their 
participation would be limited to that declaration 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1955, November 13).
In a lead editorial Chambers summarized his reservations:
It is difficult now--in our opinion, impossible--to learn from 
available information the extent, the costs, the effects, the 
administrative practicality, and the constitutional soundness 
of a tuition payment plan. .. .The legislators who represent the 
people don't know the answers. The people whom they represent 
don't know (Virginian-Pilot, 1955, November 15).
As the January 9, 1956, date for the referendum grew nearer, 
the disparity between the two papers' editorial views widened.
The Ledger dismissed the Pilot’s charges that the
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constitutional convention was undemocratic. Leslie insisted that 
the mechanism by which Section 141 would be amended ensured 
maximum input from the citizenry. Voters would have the 
opportunity to elect delegates to the limited constitutional 
convention; and the General Assembly, which was comprised of 
elected representatives accountable to the electorate, would be 
charged with formulating the actual tuition legislation 
(Ledger-Dispatch, 1956, January 2).
The Ledger also argued that providing public assistance for 
private schooling was in the best interest of the state's black 
schoolchildren. Should Section 141 not be amended, it was 
probable that public schools would be closed in many communities. 
These closings were especially likely in the twenty-two Virginia 
counties in which black students formed majorities of the school 
populations. By voting for the convention, voters would make 
certain that a strong and viable public school system continued to 
operate (Ledger-Dispatch. 1956, January 5). Leslie and his 
staff assured readers that voting for the convention would in no 
way affect Section 129 of the Constitution, which mandated that 
the state maintain a free system of public schools 
(Ledger-Dispatch. 1956, January 7).
On the evening of the referendum, the Ledger warned that 
not voting for the convention would serve to fuel extremism: "If 
the constitutional amendment is rejected, there can be no 
question that the attitude of those who accept the Gray plan as a 
middle-of-the road course between the two extremes on the
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segregation issue will be changed" (Ledger-Dispatch. 1956,
January 9).
The Virginian-Pilot, with growing concern, continued to 
voice its opposition to the recommendations contained in the Gray 
Report: "The Gray Commission idea...is vague as a whole and 
unidentified in its most important aspects, and would involve the 
disestablishment, or dismantling, of the public school system as 
we know it today” (Virginian-Pilot. 1956, January 5).
Chambers and his associate editors saw merit in a plan 
advanced by two members of the faculty of the University of 
Virginia. With the purpose of depoliticizing the desegregation 
issue, these academicians suggested that a new advisory commission 
be established. This biracial commission, to be appointed by the 
presidents of Virginia's state-supported colleges and the 
University of Virginia, would be comprised of elected officials 
and representatives from academia, professional educational 
organizations, and parent-teacher groups. Similar groups would be 
formed at a local level. The Pi 1ot agreed that advisory groups 
such as these would more accurately reflect the sentiments of 
Virginia's citizens and would devise more innovative solutions to 
racial problems than the Gray Commission had provided 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1956, January 3).
The Gray Plan was seen by the Pilot as an over-reaction to 
the racial problems of a single community, Prince Edward County. 
It was likely that limited integration could occur without undue 
difficulty in most of Virginia's school districts. If the state,
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on the whole, demonstrated good-faith compliance with the Supreme 
Court decision, the court would be understanding of the 
difficulties faced in integrating schools in areas with entrenched 
racial attitudes. In these communities even the most minor steps 
toward desegregation would constitute compliance 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1956, January 7).
Chambers accused Virginia's leaders of intentionally 
creating an emotional climate to reap political benefits: "The 
advocates of the Gray Commission program seek to gain political 
advantage by conjuring up the nightmare of 'enforced mixing"’ 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1956, January 5). The paper also questioned 
the constitutionality of the use of tax dollars for private 
education. Chambers anticipated that the Supreme Court might well 
declare tuition support to be illegal (Virginian-Pilot, 1956, 
January 4) .
The Pilot concluded its unsuccessful campaign to persuade 
readers to vote against the constitutional convention with an 
editorial entitled "The Voter's Choice Tomorrow." In it the Gray 
Plan was dismissed somewhat contemptuously as "an idea, not a 
plan" (Virginian-Pilot, 1956, January 8).
Later that month, the Ledger was ambivalent toward the 
General Assembly's adoption of an interposition resolution. While 
the paper saw some merit in the resolution as a symbolic protest 
against the federal government's infringement of rights 
constitutionally delegated to the states, it conceded that 
interposition would do nothing to nullify the court's
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decision (Ledger-Dispatch. 1956, January 20).
Chambers and his staff vehemently voiced their opposition to 
the General Assembly's resolution, calling interposition "an 
exercise in fantasy" (Virginian-Pilot. 1956, February 4). Chambers 
wrote,
In the calm, cool second thinking that will come someday, 
the state will understand better that the interposition 
resolution is no help in complex school problems; that the 
chances of its leading to an amendment of the Federal 
Constitution or a change in the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
are slim indeed; that its present and future meanings are 
impossible to deduce from the language or circumstances of its 
adoption (Virginian-Pilot, 1956, February 4).
Leslie and his staff were tentative in their support of an 
alternative proposal by the governor--the "Stanley Plan,"--which 
would mandate the elimination of all state funding for communities 
that chose or were forced by court order to integrate their 
schools. The Ledger conceded that the provisions of Governor 
Stanley's plan would likely close schools in some areas, but 
argued that the integration resulting from local option would 
almost certainly result in school closings in large areas 
throughout the state. The editor also warned that local option 
would lead to mass integration (Ledger-Dispatch, 1956, August 
27) .
In response to the governor's assurance that schools would 
remain open unless members of one race attempted to enroll in
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schools designated for students of the other race, the Ledger 
wrote that "Stanley lean[ed] upon a fragile reed"
(Ledger-Dispatch. 1956, August 28). There was no reason to 
believe that the threat of school closings would dissuade the 
NAACP from continuing its efforts to desegregate schools. The 
Ledger predicted that whether local option or the Stanley Plan 
was adopted, there was a very real risk that schools would be 
closed (Ledger-Dispatch. 1956, August 28).
The Virginian-Pilot saw no merit in the Stanley Plan and 
vehemently denounced the provisions that would eliminate state 
funding for integrated schools. In a lead editorial, "How Many 
Schools Are Expendable?", Chambers and his staff expressed their 
astonishment that the General Assembly would consider adopting 
legislation that would inevitably result in the closing of the 
schools in the five Virginia communities (Norfolk included) soon 
to be under court order to desegregate their schools 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1956, August 28).
In "A Primary Concern of the State," the editorial staff 
contended that much educational progress in Virginia would be 
undone by the Stanley Plan. Localities would no longer be 
required by law to provide students with school terms of a nine- 
month duration, fixed state appropriations for local schools would 
become tentative, and school superintendents would be divested of 
important responsibilities. The Pilot wrote, "The threat 
Governor Stanley's program poses to the public schools is an 
appalling reality. Once the standards are gone, the work of a
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generation may be destroyed" (Virginian-Pilot. 1956, August 29).
Chambers urged the General Assembly to reject the Stanley 
Plan and, instead, adopt a local-option plan similar to that 
recommended by the Gray Commission. The Pilot maintained that 
the Stanley Plan would be declared illegal by the courts 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1956, August 30).
Chambers wrote that local option would stand a far better 
chance of satisfying the courts and at the same time would 
discourage massive integration. The Pilot conceded that local 
option
would not be pleasant to the large majority of Virginians
who, if they had the choice, would prefer the traditional
ways. If it was operated deceitfully to try to block any 
change anywhere, it would certainly be thrown out of the 
courts as a subterfuge. But if it operated honestly with a
clear eye on the legal requirement and on the requirement to
maintain public education, it would sharply reduce the impact 
of the change brought about by the Supreme Court decision 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1956, August 31).
Judge Hoffman’s ruling in Beckett v. Norfolk was anticipated 
by both newspapers. Ledger editor Leslie downplayed the 
significance of Hoffman's decision, calling it "only one skirmish 
in the school segregation battle," and noted the certainty of 
appeal: "The state is committed to full-scale resistance to 
integration and this includes all possible delaying action"
(Ledger-Dispatch, 1957, February 12).
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Chambers expressed the hope that the General Assembly and 
local officials would take note of the decision and the emphasis 
Hoffman placed on good-faith implementation of the Supreme Court's 
desegregation order (Virginian-Pilot, 1957, February 13). The 
Pilot praised the moderation of Hoffman's decision, in which he 
called for gradual rather than immediate integration. Hoffman's 
order mandated integration in only the first grades of the city's 
elementary, junior high, and high schools and encouraged the 
redrawing of school districts to minimize further the impact of 
desegregation (Virginian-Pilot, 1957, February 15).
Lindsay Almond's inaugural speech was very favorably received 
by the Ledger-Dispatch. Leslie wrote that at no time had "the 
case for continued racial segregation been presented with more 
force and logic" than in the address and that Almond "went deep 
into the truth of the whole integration issue" when he maintained 
that forcing parents to send their children to integrated schools 
would result in chaos (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, January 11). The 
paper urged that the General Assembly immediately enact the 
legislation Almond recommended in his address, authorizing the 
governor to close schools that were policed by federal troops 
(Ledger-Dispatch, 1958, January 11).
Chambers and his staff viewed the inaugural address with 
concern. Almond had insulted the Supreme Court by drawing a 
comparison between it and the Soviet Union’s space vehicle, 
Sputnik, categorizing both as "revolving bodies." The Pilot 
remarked that "these [were] strange words from a governor who
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lived his professional life in the law" (Virginian-Pilot. 1956, 
January 12). The paper also expressed displeasure at the singular 
focus of the address. Almond’s defiant speech might have earned 
him additional support from hard-line segregationists, but this 
was no substitute for providing the state with legitimate and 
much-needed leadership (Virginian-Pi1o t . 1956, January 12).
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NORFOLK'S SCHOOL CLOSING
The closing of the city's white secondary schools on 
September 29, 1958, took Joseph Leslie by surprise, as it did most 
of Norfolk's citizens. Harold Sugg recalls a conversation he had 
with the Ledger-Dispatch's editor shortly before the closing.
"I found Mr. Leslie alone, and the conversation ran something 
like this: 'Joe, I know you are in favor of the public 
schools. You just can't be in favor of them closing down.' 
'Harold, that isn't going to happen; they may close for a few 
hours or a few days, but they will reopen quickly in other 
forms'" (H. Sugg, personal communication, October 12, 1990).
The Ledger-Dispatch responded to the school closing by 
encouraging readers not to waver in their support of resistance to 
integration. "Massive resistance will come to nothing," Leslie 
wrote, "if it turns into weak-kneed resistance" (Ledger-Dispatch. 
1958, September 26). The Ledger maintained that the overwhelming 
majority of the city's electorate had demonstrated their support 
for massive resistance by selecting Lindsay Almond over Ted Dalton 
in the recent gubernatorial election and that although Norfolkians 
would be confronted with trying times, the school closing was to be 
preferred over the "Pandora's box of trouble and anguish" that 
would be opened should schools be integrated (Ledger-Dispatch. 
1958, September 22; Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, September 23).
Leslie and his staff stated that the legislature was not 
responsible for the crisis. The paper blamed, instead, the
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"NAACP's recklessness" (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, September 22) and 
"judicial absolutism" (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, September 30). 
Leslie wrote that it was naive to believe the Supreme Court was 
incapable of error and that it was well within the rights of 
citizens to challenge the Court's decisions.
The paper urged readers to support the segregationist 
Tidewater Educational Foundation. "It is more than ever 
imperative," the editor wrote, "that steps for improvising 
educational facilities to meet this problem be advanced. Only 
one agency, the Tidewater Educational Foundation, is organized for 
this purpose" (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, September 24).
Chambers and his staff were less surprised by the school 
closing. The Pilot had anticipated the possibility that the 
inflexibility of the state’s policies would result in such a 
crisis. "The Virginian-Pilot is the only newspaper in 
Virginia," Chambers wrote, "which has opposed from 1954--because 
of their impracticality, unconstitutionality, general lack of 
wisdom, and inevitable arrival at educational dead-ends--virtually 
everything that has been attempted in Virginia" (L. Chambers to 
L. Wilson, March 19, 1959, Chambers Papers).
The Virginian-Pilot held that the school closing was the 
logical result of the state's policy of resistance to the Supreme 
Court’s order. Chambers contended that massive-resistance 
legislation ultimately would be overturned by the courts and would 
do nothing to stave off integration. Massive resistance, he 
wrote, was the irresponsible invention of "a small coterie of
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political leaders" (the Byrd organization) and was based on a 
number of false cliches and shibboleths (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, 
September 28). Arguments by segregationists that the Supreme 
Court's order could legally be disobeyed, that states' rights must 
be defended or forever lost, and that outsiders were to blame for 
Virginia’s racial problems were dismissed by the Pilot as 
specious and misleading (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, September 24).
The editor decried the destruction of the state's system of 
public education and cautioned that newly created private schools 
and informal tutoring groups would be grossly inadequate 
substitutes for public schools. Trained teachers would be 
difficult to locate, the acquisition of facilities and educational 
equipment would be problematic, and accreditation of the 
substitute schools would be difficult to obtain 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1958, September 25).
The Pilot refused to endorse the segregationist Tidewater 
Educational Foundation and recommended that parents enroll their 
children in tutoring groups, despite their obvious shortcomings. 
The editorial staff wrote that the Tidewater Educational 
Foundation's "political coloration strip[ped] its prospective 
schools of the free atmosphere which most educators [considered] 
essential to learning" (Virginian-Pi lot. 1958, September 23).
Chambers questioned the commitment of the state's political 
leaders to its young people. He warned that students would pay 
the price of the legislature's irresponsibility. As a result of 
the school closings, many students would lose their "educational
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stride" (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, September 21). Others would 
drift into unemployment or delinquency. "The memory of...this 
stupidity...wil1 never fade," the editor wrote. "It will be like 
the memory of depression or war. It will press young attitudes 
into permanent shape" (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, September 21).
In a lead editorial, "The Schools Must Be Opened," the 
editorial staff implored citizens and educational and political 
leaders to work cooperatively to reopen the schools. The school 
board had delayed long enough and should provide leadership. The 
city council had a special responsibility to the community to work 
to develop a solution to the school problem. Citizens should 
speak out and lend their support to responsible policies. The 
state "has no moral right--" Chambers wrote, "and probably no 
legal right--to punish [Norfolk's schoolchildren]" 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1958, September 29).
In the first few days following the school closing, few 
voices in Norfolk, other than the Pilot's, were raised in 
objection to the closure. A hush descended over the city as a 
stunned citizenry attempted to come to terms with what had 
happened. Although the crisis had been clearly foreshadowed by 
the political and judicial events of the preceding several years, 
most of Norfolk's citizens never really believed that public 
schools could be closed. Many felt, as Leslie did, that even if 
the schools were shut down, they would reopen in a few days (Muse, 
1961, pp. 75-78).
Although some observers believe that a large percentage of
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Norfolk’s citizens favored the immediate reopening of the city’s 
public schools, few were willing to speak out. This was 
especially true of business and community leaders. Many of these 
leaders feared economic repercussions, social ostracization, and 
harassment by the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual 
Liberties and other hard-line segregationists (White, 1959, 
September, p. 30).
As the numbing sense of disbelief of the first few days of 
the closing wore off, tempers began to rise. Citizens were 
bitterly divided over the closing, Benjamin Muse writes that in 
the fall of 1958, Norfolk was not "a pleasant city in which to 
live" (Muse, 1961, pp. 92-93).
Observers of this period believe that the closure stirred 
emotions and divided the population to a degree not equaled in 
their lifetimes. Sam Barfield remembers, "It was a very emotional 
time, and the only thing that has come close to it in my lifetime 
has been the abortion issue; [and] I think it was even more 
emotional than the abortion issue. The city was split wide open" 
(S. Barfield, personal communication, August 8, 1990).
"People who write about it today," recalls Frank Batten, 
"have a difficult time in understanding the climate and 
emotions of the times. The people didn’t talk about anything 
but that, literally.... It was a very passionate subject....People 
who had been close friends--even families— broke apart. They just 
formed these hatreds over the subject" (F. Batten, personal 
communication, September 25, 1990).
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Still, emotional displays were not consistent with 
Virginia traditions of polite discourse and gentility. Many 
masked their anger with a facade of southern manners. Robert 
Mason recalls how this hypocrisy "disgusted" Kenneth Harris. 
Harris was a prominent local artist who was very vocal in 
expressing his displeasure with the school closing. "Kenneth 
would have preferred, if it was going to be ugly, that it be ugly 
completely-~not to be camouflaged, but to get down to the nitty- 
gritty of it" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990). 
{Interestingly, Harris was related by marriage to Mayor 
Fred Duckworth, an arch segregationist.)
The most profound effects of the closing were, of course, 
felt by students and teachers. Students in the last year of their 
secondary-school education were frustrated. Those who planned to 
attend college were particularly disappointed. City officials 
feared a wave of juvenile delinquency would sweep through Norfolk. 
The parents of students in schools that had opened were acutely 
aware of the fragility of their children's educations. Teachers' 
morale was lowered by the closing, and despite the fact that their 
contracts remained in effect until June 30, 1959, many were 
considering changing their careers {Race Relations Law Reporter, 
1959, Spring, p. 48; Muse, 1961, p. 116).
Warren County and the city of Charlottesville, with only 
three schools closed between them, were in much better positions 
to develop alternative school arrangements for displaced students 
than was Norfolk. Parents of Norfolk's displaced students
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desperately tried to improvise schooling arrangements for their 
children.
Informal "tutoring groups," usually conducted by teachers of 
the closed schools, sprang up across the city. Many of these 
groups were organized by students' mothers, who would gather half 
a dozen to two dozen students in improvised classrooms in private 
homes and twenty-seven churches and synagogues that made rooms 
available, and recruit a teacher. The teachers were often 
qualified to teach only a single subject. Normally twenty dollars 
a month for tuition was charged parents (New York Times Magazine, 
January 4, 1959, p. 20).
Prior to the closing, Norfolk's school teachers had received 
the lowest salaries in the country in cities of over three hundred 
thousand residents and were understandably grateful for the twenty 
dollars or so they received from parents for tuition ("How 
Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened," February 25, 1959, White Papers).
The facilities of the tutoring groups were clearly inferior 
to those of the public schools. Card tables often replaced school 
desks; cafeterias were nonexistent; and libraries, laboratories, 
and educational equipment were totally lacking. Additionally, 
"the quality of teaching was miscellaneous" (Muse, 1961, p. 117).
Other parents attempted to transfer their children into 
private schools or public schools in other districts. During the 
closing, Norfolk's students were scattered over twenty-nine states 
(Muse, 1961, p. 117). The schooling arrangements developed by Dr. 
Robert Stern, a professor at the Norfolk branch of the College of
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William and Mary, and his wife were not unusual. One daughter was 
sent to live with relatives and attend school in Glens Falls, New 
York. Another daughter attended private school in Virginia Beach, 
and a son was enrolled in a tutoring group. "It's a strange 
experience we're undergoing in Norfolk," Stern is quoted as having 
said, "a little like something out of Jonathan Swift" (New York 
Times Magazine, 1959, January 4, p. 4).
Some students continued their schooling at Oscar Smith High 
School and South Norfolk Junior High School in the neighboring 
city of South Norfolk, where the superintendent of schools, 
arch-segregationist William Story, was particularly supportive of 
the state's defiant stand. Classes were held from 4:00 to 9:00 
p.m., after the schools'regular hours.
A small number of students attended school at the Tidewater 
Academy, which was founded by the Tidewater Educational 
Foundation. The TEF encountered great difficulty in attracting a 
teaching staff. As a result, the opening of its only school was 
delayed until October 21. The academy's classes, held in Bayview 
Baptist Church in the Ocean View section of Norfolk, were conducted 
by retired school teachers (Muse, 1961, p. 112). Financing for 
the school was generated by a twenty-dollar monthly tuition fee. 
Although this would not raise sufficient revenue to support the 
academy, there were indications that the school would also receive 
assistance from the Virginia Educational Fund, a statewide 
segregationist foundation whose board was headed by former 
governor Thomas B. Stanley (Southern School N ews. 1958,
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November, p. 13).
The number of Norfolk's displaced students who would be 
unaccounted for and presumably receiving no schooling during the 
closing--2,700 out of 9,950--was startling. It constituted a 
much higher percentage than the corresponding figure in either 
Warren County or Charlottesville.
The closing would end the educations of many of Norfolk’s 
students. Some would drop out. Others would join the military or 
the work force. Many would marry and begin families. A number 
would drift into unemployment.
THE FIRST DAYS OF THE CLOSING
On September 29, 1958--two days after the closing of the 
Norfolk public schools--the city's two black junior high schools, 
Jaycox and Ruffner, and its only black high school, Booker T. 
Washington, were opened. One white junior high school, Willard, 
and all of the city’s elementary schools, black and white, would 
also operate throughout the closure. No integration had been 
ordered at these schools.
The next day the city council adopted a resolution that 
petitioned Governor Almond to invoke the emergency powers granted 
him under Chapter 69 of the General Assembly's extra session of 
1956 and reopen the city's schools. "There exists a need for... 
[a] State operated public school system embracing such secondary 
schools as have been closed," council moved (City Council
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Resolution. September 30, 1958, Almond Executive Papers). Almond 
received the petition the following day (City Council Resolution. 
September 30, 1958, Almond Executive Papers).
Throughout the closing the council was pressured by the 
school board to encourage the governor to reopen the schools. In 
a resolution directed to the city council, the board stated, UA 
system of free public education is essential to the well-being of 
the City of Norfolk” and "It is now apparent that under the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, such public 
education cannot be had without some measure of integration" 
(Southern School News, 1958, November, p. 13). The same school 
board that had actively sought to obstruct the integration of 
Norfolk’s public schools now became a prime force working to have 
them reopened.
The city council’s petition to the governor provided it with 
a convenient excuse for its inactivity in attempting to reopen the 
schools. Pressed by pro-school forces, the council could easily 
disclaim responsibility. "There is nothing we can say," Mayor 
Fred Duckworth often repeated during the crisis. "The schools are 
under the governor" (Reif, 1960, p. 16).
Duckworth refused to endorse a plan for city-operated schools 
until a city-wide referendum could be held. The mayor said that 
only qualified voters should be allowed to participate in the 
referendum: "Governor Almond was elected by an overwhelming 
majority to do what he has done. I think the only way to impress 
the governor is to let the same voters show him what they want
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7 0
done now" (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, October 15).
Only fifty thousand of Norfolk’s three hundred thousand 
residents were qualified voters; only one in twelve had voted in 
recent elections. Many observers of Norfolk politics felt that the 
results of such a referendum would be a foregone conclusion. 
Results of past elections in the city suggested that 
Byrd-organization candidates would be supported by two-thirds of 
the electorate ("How Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened," February 25, 
1959, White Papers; Reif, 1961, p. 18). Duckworth placed much of 
the blame for the school closing on the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People. He maintained that the city had 
"done more for its Negroes, within its limits, than any city in the 
South--barring none. . . .1 hate very much that the NAACP attacked the 
best city in Virginia in regard to its colored population." The 
mayor went on to say that although blacks made up 75 percent of the 
jail population, they paid only 5 percent of the city’s taxes (J. 
Reif, 1960, p. 16). If the seventeen black students would simply 
withdraw their applications, he said, the closed white schools 
could be reopened immediately.
Governor Almond was not keen to become the scapegoat for the 
state's crisis and did not acknowledge receipt of council's 
petition. This necessitated a personal letter from Duckworth to 
Almond.
We have had no further advices from you...and as a 
consequence of your failure to act in accordance with the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7 1
directions of state law...approximately 10,000 white pupils 
who would otherwise be attending the secondary schools in the 
Norfolk Division are now out of school (W. Duckworth to J. 
Almond, October 6, 1958, Almond Executive Papers).
Duckworth advised Almond that if the closed schools were 
reopened in a segregated condition and operated by the state, the 
courts would allow them to remain open while the matter was 
litigated. Although state-operated schools might be judged 
illegal, "at least the schools would proceed with their ordinary 
affairs until the final solution [was] reached" (W. Duckworth to 
J. Almond, October 6, 1958, Almond Executive Papers).
The governor responded in writing to the mayor's letter the 
next day and arranged a meeting with representatives of the 
council and Attorney General Albertis Harrison. The governor, 
however, declined to act hastily. "Any action in a matter so 
urgent and important," he wrote, "must come only after careful 
reflection and deliberation" (J. Almond to W. Duckworth, October 
7, 1958, Almond Executive Papers).
In reality the governor was stalling for time. He had never 
imagined that the schools would actually be closed, and he had 
little idea as to what the state's response should be. Almond 
would later reveal,
I thought the courts would immediately summon the school 
boards and say that the closing of the schools was 
without warrant of law and in violation of the rights of the
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children. I thought this would be done by injunctive decree, 
and that the constitutional issues, if any, would be decided 
later (Virginian-Pilot. 1964, June 9).
Senator Byrd was of little assistance to the governor 
throughout the closing. The two had not spoken during the summer 
leading up to the closure; and the senator and Blackie Moore, 
speaker of the House of Delegates, were vacationing in Alaska 
throughout much of September (Virginian-Pi lot. 1964, June 9).
Even after the senator's return to Virginia, he continued to 
be inaccessible to the governor. Almond, with growing concern, 
sought Byrd's counsel: "After the [Byrd’s senatorial] election, I 
hope we can get together for a talk on this terrible crisis" (J. 
Almond to H. Byrd, November 3, 1958, Byrd, Sr., Papers). "I have 
been away for a couple of weeks," Byrd breezily wrote, "and 
therefore, have not written to you" (H. Byrd to J. Almond, December 
19, 1958, Byrd, Sr., Papers). The governor replied with increasing 
frustration, "I hope in the near future you and I can sit down for 
a long talk relative to our problems" (J. Almond to H. Byrd, 
December 22, 1958, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Almond, cooperatively with Davis Y. Paschall, Virginia's 
superintendent of public instruction, had planned to reopen the 
nonintegrated grades of the closed schools and enroll the students 
in the integrated grades in public schools in surrounding 
communities (Report to the Governor, September 29, 1958, Almond 
Executive Papers). This ploy was abandoned when the governor, a 
skilled attorney, realized the courts would not allow such an
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evasive manuever to stand and when school officials in Norfolk 
stated that it was not workable (Christian Science News Monitor, 
1958, October 8).
ADVOCACY FOR REOPENING THE SCHOOLS
The activities of the Virginia NAACP provided the governor 
and other hard-line segregationists with little solace. The 
chapter held its annual convention in Norfolk's neighboring city 
of Hampton October 10-12, 1958. A goal was set to increase the 
state membership, already the largest in any southern state, from 
27,000 to 50,000 by the end of 1959. NAACP leaders also revealed 
that of 422,663 blacks of voting age in Virginia, only 131,626 
were registered to vote (Southern School News. 1958, November, 
p. 13; Muse, 1961, p. 47).
During the summer preceding the school closing, the Norfolk 
branch of the NAACP had sought to prepare the seventeen black 
students for the tribulations they would face when they eventually 
entered the white schools. This instruction continued throughout 
the time the schools were closed. The Norfolk NAACP asked Vivian 
Carter Mason, a graduate of the University of Chicago, to oversee 
the preparation of the students. Mason, a resident of Norfolk, was 
highly qualified for this responsibility. She was a former 
president of the National Association of Negro Women and had been 
a special delegate to the United Nations Commission on the Status 
of Women. During the early 1940s she had served as New York City's
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director of social services ("How Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened/' 
February 25, 1959, White Papers; Carter, 1959, Autumn).
In an effort to prepare the students psychologically for 
integration. Mason arranged for speakers who had experienced 
desegregation in other areas of the country to visit Norfolk to 
share their observations ("How Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened," 
February 25, 1959, White Papers). Mason's discussions with the 
students regarding the obstacles they would face were frank.
We told them one morning that they have left their childhood 
behind them--it's finished for all of them. That is because 
they have been trained and taught to see and hear nothing that 
is aimed at them in a detrimental and provocative manner. 
They are not to take cognizance of unfriendly or hostile 
actions on the part of their fellow students. They are to 
apply themselves with great vigor to the job of mastering the 
academic work required of them. Lastly, they are not to 
withhold warmth and friendliness from those who extend it to 
them. They have accepted the role of pioneers (Carter, 1959, 
Autumn, pp. 513-514).
To prepare the students academically, Mason established a 
school consisting of five grades and twelve subjects. To staff 
the school, which was based in a downtown church, she secured the 
services of an interracial faculty of eight teachers. Gertrude 
Ferry, a retired Norfolk school teacher with forty years of 
service, supervised their activities ("How Norfolk's Schools Were 
Reopened," February 25, 1959, White Papers; Carter, 1959, Autumn).
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The activism of the NAACP contrasted strongly with the 
unwillingness of the majority of Norfolk's white citizenry to take 
action to reopen the schools. A "Rally for Open Schools," held in 
the Norfolk Arena on October 13, attracted only a thousand 
participants, far fewer than the number hoped for by the event's 
organizers (Southern School News, 1958, November, p. 13).
Of the white organizations working to reopen Norfolk’s 
schools, certainly none was more active than the Norfolk Committee 
for Public Schools. The committee described its 
membership--professional people, real estate personnel, 
housewives, and women active in community affairs— as "realistic, 
public-spirited citizens who wish to maintain public schools" and 
attempted to portray itself as pro-public schools, not 
pro-integration ("How Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened," February 
25, 1959, White Papers; Muse, 1961, p. 89). The NCPS refused to 
accept black members lest their inclusion diminish the committee's 
ability to portray itself as a mainstream organization (Reif, 1960, 
p. 13).
Norfolk’s ministers and many members of its religious 
community also worked to reopen the schools. Sixty-six members of 
the biracial, Protestant Norfolk Ministers Association, which 
represented seventy-four congregations, authored a statement 
urging political leaders to take immediate steps to reopen the 
schools (Reif, 1960, pp. 9-10). Lenoir Chambers editorialized,
The church has acted with great speed, commendable boldness,
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and heartening unanimity.... It was the response of educated 
men unaffected by politics. It was the response of the 
institution to which much of Norfolk entrusts its 
conscience.... It was a response to evil and peril that this 
city and this state cannot ignore (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, 
September 30).
A number of other local religious organizations and 
individual congregations issued statements disapproving of the 
closing, but the outcry from the religious community seemed to 
have no effect on state policy. A delegation of five 
representatives from the Ministers Association was informed by 
Governor Almond that although the schools would not be closed 
permanently, he had little idea as to when or how they would be 
reopened (Reif, 1960, p. 10).
Jane Reif, in her pamphlet Crisis in Norfolk, notes that 
the association's members who spoke out against the closing did so 
as individuals, not as representatives of their congregations 
(Reif, 1960, p. 10). The clergymen's parishioners were deeply 
divided over the closing. Luther Carter recalls a story to the 
effect that James Martin, a leader in the Tidewater Educational 
Foundation, disapproved so strongly of his minister's pro-school 
sermons that Martin would sit in the front pew and read a magazine 
during church to show his disrespect (L. Carter, personal 
communication, October 10, 1990).
Although many Jews supported the reopening of the schools,
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they acted as individuals, not as congregations. Their leadership 
felt that Jews themselves could easily become targets of racism if 
their opposition to the closing became too visible (Reif, 1960, p. 
9). Racist hate literature was widely circulated throughout the 
crisis, but anti-Semitism was not a prominent feature of the 
closing. Rufus Tonelson, who was then the first-year principal of 
Maury High School, recalls, "Here I was, a Jewish principal and all 
this going on.... I was getting [anonymous] cal Is...'You1re a nigger 
lover.1 'You1re a communist.1 'You1re red.1 They threatened to 
burn a cross on the lawn. [But] in all those times no one ever 
threw up to me, 'What do you expect from a Jew?1" (R. Tonelson, 
personal communication, July 19, 1991).
A number of womenfs organizations such as the American 
Association of University Women, the League of Women Voters, and 
the W o m e n s  Interracial Council also opposed the closing. In 
general, w o m e n s  groups seemed to value the public schools more 
than organizations dominated by men (Reif, 1960, p. 10).
Late in October 1958, Frank Batten began to take some of the 
first steps to organize Norfolk's business community to urge the 
reopening of the schools. Batten met with Norfolk school board 
chairman Paul Schweitzer in an effort to "help the School Board 
with the present school problem." In a letter to Schweitzer, 
Batten expressed his opinion that "the business leaders of the 
community should join together to plan the action they should take 
at the proper time to help Norfolk and the School Board sclve this
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school problem" (F. Batten to P. Schweitzer, October 28, 1958,
Schweitzer Papers).
Batten and Pretlow Darden, former mayor of Norfolk and the 
brother of former governor Colgate Darden, would become the two 
primary organizers of the business community's long-delayed 
protest. Batten, who then was one of Norfolk's youngest business 
leaders, recalls that "Pretlow and I had been talking for months 
about... trying to figure out if there was some way that we could 
try to organize...the business community to take a responsible 
role [in the crisis]" (F. Batten, personal communication, 
September 25, 1991).
Some of the delay in the business community's reponse can 
likely be attributed to fundamental differences between Batten and 
Darden regarding integration. Batten supported the Supreme 
Court's decision, although he felt that integration should proceed 
"very cautiously and very carefully and very slowly" to avoid "the 
potential repercussions of a rush to integrate the schools" (F. 
Batten, personal communication, September 25, 1991). Robert 
Mason, who regularly lunched with Batten and Chambers during the 
closing, recalls that "all the conversation we had was on what 
Chambers called 'Topic A'....[and Batten] felt exactly as Chambers 
did” (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990). Despite 
Batten's personal feelings, he greatly respected Darden's 
political acumen. "Pretlow Darden was a guy that [had] a 
tremendous sense of timing" (F. Batten, personal communication, 
September 25, 1991).
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Darden had much less respect than Batten for the Supreme 
Court's decision. Darden remembers, "I had divorced myself from 
the Supreme Court in that matter. I thought they were wrong, and 
I didn't think much of their judgment" (P. Darden, personal 
communication, August 13, 1975). Darden would refuse to act until 
the Virginia Supreme Court ruled on the legality of the closing-- 
"when my [state] supreme court said to me, 'This is it....You 
can't do what you are doing now. The [state] supreme court has 
ruled and you've got to obey,' As far as I was concerned, I gave 
up any thought that we were going to then continue to defy the 
government and the [federal] Supreme Court" (P. Darden, personal 
communication, August 13, 1975).
Organizing the business community to protest the closing 
would be a formidable task for Batten. Business leaders were not 
inclined to challenge the Byrd organization, which stood for low 
taxes and anti-union legislation as much as for white supremacy. 
In Southern Politics, V. 0. Key observed that the organization 
enjoyed "the enthusiastic and almost undivided support of the 
business community and the well-to-do generally, a goodly number 
of whom [were] fugitives from the New York State income tax" (Key, 
1949, pp. 26-27).
What ultimately would motivate the city’s lethargic business 
community to begin to organize was the fear that the closing would 
have a negative impact on the area’s economy--in particular, that 
the Navy would close its large base, which was central to the 
city’s prosperity. Chambers stimulated the fears of the city’s
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business community by reprinting an article, "What Massive 
Resistance Costs," that had been published earlier in Business 
Week magazine. "This article," Chambers wrote to Business 
Week's editor, "seems to us to summarize very well indeed some 
important ideas and possibilities. We have been trying to impress 
these on the business community here" (L. Chambers to K. Kramer, 
October 14, 1958, Chambers Papers). "A gnawing fear among
businessmen," the article read, "is that Navy patience will wear 
thin, that uncertainty among naval personnel about the opportunity 
for educating their children will provoke a shifting of operations 
to other Atlantic ports" (Business Week, 1958, October 4, p. 32). 
"If the Navy left," an observer later claimed, "Norfolk would sink" 
(Friddell, 1966, p. 44).
Publicly, the Navy dissociated itself from the crisis. 
Sailors and officers were instructed not to make their association 
with the Navy known if they participated in political activities 
linked to the crisis. Still, many Navy children were affected by 
the closing, and Navy families were deeply concerned. One Navy 
wife wrote to Schweitzer, "You may wonder why Navy personnel have 
not been heard from in more numbers. Many people do not know that 
we have been ordered not to make our connection with the Navy known 
when we speak out against the crisis. But make no mistake about 
it, we Navy people are deeply concerned.... Something will be done 
and Norfolk may well be hurt permanently by what is done about the 
Navy in Norfolk" (L. McWhorten to P. Schweitzer, 3anuary 23, 1959, 
Schweitzer Papers).
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Navy personnel were somewhat removed from local politics. 
Many did not pay state taxes and therefore were prohibited from 
voting in state and local elections (New York Times Magazine. 
1959, January 4, p. 55). Although a number of Navy parents 
worked for the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools, they 
obeyed the order concerning disclosure of their affiliations 
(Reif, 1960, p. 12).
Behind the scenes, the Navy exerted pressure on Mayor 
Duckworth and the city council to take steps to reopen the 
schools. Rear Admiral F. Massie Hughes, Commandant of the Fifth 
Naval District, the popular "Navy mayor" of Norfolk, made known to 
the city administration the Navy’s displeasure with the closing. 
Although there was some history of a lack of cooperation between 
the Navy and the city, in recent years relations had grown much 
closer. During a meeting of the Hampton Roads Sales Executives 
Club, the admiral drew attention to the fact that four out of ten 
children in the Norfolk area had parents who worked for the 
federal government. "I hope and pray to God," he said, "[the 
school crisis] will soon clear up" (Virginian-Pilot, 1959,
January 17). The military was responsible for employing 44 
percent of the area's work force, and Hughes's opinion of the 
closing was closely heeded by this audience of business leaders.
Duckworth and Hughes were friends, and the commandant's 
criticism of the closing would have been received by the mayor. 
However, Hughes’s attempts to influence the mayor were 
ineffective. As the crisis grew, Duckworth's politics became
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increasingly polarized; and as Roy Martin, Duckworth's successor, 
observed, "there was no working with Duckworth" (R. Martin, 
personal communication, August 20, 1990; R. Mason, personal 
communication, April 10, 1989; R. Mason, personal communication, 
July 17, 1990; Reif, 1960, pp. 11-12).
Norfolk's public-school teachers played a major role in 
subverting militant segregationists' plans to establish an 
extensive private-school system for whites. On October 2, 1958, 
the Norfolk Education Association, a professional teachers' 
organization for the city's 1,100 white teachers, voted 487 to 89 
in favor of a resolution requesting that city council petition 
Governor Almond to allow Norfolk to operate the public schools on 
an integrated basis if the governor was unable to reopen them in a 
segregated condition (Southern School N e w s . 1958, November, p. 
13). The NEA was led by a popular former Duke University 
all-American football player, Charles ("Bolo") Perdue, the 
principal of Norview High School. Perdue warned that many teachers 
were considering changing careers: "Once your teaching force is
wrecked, it’s hard to build a good one back again" (New York 
Times Magazine, 1959, January 4, p. 55).
Some observers had viewed the NEA as "a fairly passive, 
politically unassertive" professional organization until the 
closing of the schools (L. Carter, personal communication, October 
10, 1990). However, when members saw their jobs threatened and 
their "life's work blow[ing] up," they closed ranks and urged the 
reopening of schools (New York Times Magazine, 1959, January 4,
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p .  5 4 ) .
At a meeting of the NEA, public-school teachers were 
recruited by the head of the Tidewater Educational Foundation, 
James Martin, whose audience had been arranged by Mayor Duckworth. 
Only one teacher elected to join the foundation’s faculty, ”We 
teachers didn’t take part in private school organizations," said 
Mary D. Johnson, a longtime Norfolk teacher and a member of the 
advisory board of the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools, 
"because we felt it would undermine public schools. We took part 
in tutoring groups only as a stopgap" (New York Times Magazine. 
1959, January 4, p. 54; White, 1959, September, p. 31; Reif, 1960,
p. 18).
The teachers' refusal to participate in the foundation's 
private-school plans angered Martin: "We are shocked and baffled
by the refusal of the teachers of the six closed schools who are 
standing idle refusing to teach their own children" (Reif, 1961, p. 
6).
Many teachers were concerned that the tutoring situations in 
which they taught would be perceived by parents as an adequate 
substitute for public schools. On October 18 Tonelson advised 
teachers to cease their participation in these groups by the 
beginning of the new year (Reif, 1960, p. 20). "I'm devoutly 
against these tutoring groups, although I'm teaching in one," one 
teacher was quoted as saying. "They obscure the issue, which is 
public schools vs. massive resistance" (New York Times Magazine. 
1959, January 4, p. 54).
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A CITY DIVIDED
The rancor and divisiveness displayed at the Virginia 
Congress of Parent-Teacher associations, held in Richmond on 
October 20-22, 1958, symbolized the degree to which Virginians 
were divided over the school closing and foreshadowed the struggle 
that lay ahead in Norfolk. On the opening day, Governor almond 
addressed the convention with a strongly segregationist speech. 
His fifteen-minute address was interrupted eleven times with 
cheers and applause. Nevertheless, moderates defeated an attempt 
by William I. McKendree, the president of the Norfolk PTA Council 
and a leader in the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual 
Liberties, to take over the organization (Southern School 
N e w s . 1958, November; Peltason, 1961, p. 214).
By a tie vote of 557 to 557, the parent-teacher congress 
rejected a resolution expressing support for massive resistance. 
Later in the convention, moderates managed to pass by the 
narrowest of margins--515 to 513--a resolution supporting local 
option as the best means of solving Virginia’s school crisis 
(Southern School News, 1958, November, p. 13).
Although McKendree was unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade 
the state Parent-Teacher Association to adopt a pro-massive- 
resistance stand, he was very successful in controlling the 
Norfolk City Council of PTAs. The council operated under rules 
that allowed the appointed chairpersons of its many committees to 
vote in its proceedings. This enabled McKendree, his officers, 
and the appointed chairs to outvote the local school
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representatives (F, White to PTA Unit Presidents, undated, White 
Papers).
Earlier the city council of Parent-Teacher Associations had 
issued a statement opposing the desegregation of Norfolk’s 
schools. The statement read,
We believe desegregation to be unnecessary and impractical and 
that it will create for all children a hitherto unknown 
standard of inferiority....We urge our Norfolk City School 
Board and Superintendent of Schools to take all possible and 
necessary action to retain the present equal opportunities now 
afforded all children ("Norfolk City Council of Parent-Teacher 
Associations Resolution," February 9, 1957, White Papers).
It is highly probable that other members of the PTA Council 
besides McKendree were members of the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties (Muse, 1961, p. 90). The 
previous year, the leadership of the Defenders had encouraged its 
membership to take an active part in PTAs: "All members of the 
Defenders [are] encouraged to join the Parent Teachers Association 
and...each member [should] attempt to encourage others of like 
mind to also join" (R. Crawford to J. Almond, February 24, 1958, 
Almond Executive Papers).
Rufus Tonelson recalls his efforts to influence the PTA 
council to adopt a pro-school resolution. "I learned that it’s 
possible to take over an organization in a legitimate fashion. I 
think Hitler did this... .Anything that came up that would favor 
opening the schools was always voted down....Everything we would
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propose and every challenge we would make, [the PTA 
parliamentarian] would always say, 'You're out of order'" (R. 
Tonelson, personal communication, July 18, 1990).
Wil1iam McKendree strongly opposed the efforts of the PTAs of 
the closed schools to continue to meet, fearing they would 
challenge the pro-resistance stand of the city-wide council. 
McKendree consulted with the national leadership of the 
organization to support his pronouncement that the chapters in the 
closed schools were defunct and should not be recognized (Reif, 
1960, p. 8). Despite his efforts, nearly all of the statements 
issued by Norfolk's individual PTAs were in favor of reopening the 
schools and passed by large majorities (White, 1959, p. 30). The 
one notable exception was Norview High School’s chapter, whose 
resolution to reopen the school barely passed, 65 to 64 (Southern 
School News. 1958, December, p. 6),
Across the state, individual PTAs issued position statements 
in attempts to influence state leaders. Lindsay Almond's 
gubernatorial papers contain many examples of these petitions, 
with pro-resistance statements from schools in Farmville, Green 
Bay, Ringgold, Powhatan, Blackstone, Wakefield, Emporia, 
Kenbridge, Westpoint, and Ellerston; and pro-school petitions from 
Lexington, Norfolk, Pulaski, Arlington, McLean, Vienna, and Falls 
Church.
On October 22 a delegation from the Norfolk Committee 
for Public Schools, led by the Reverend James Brewer, presented 
Almond with a petition signed by 6,190 white citizens of Norfolk,
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urging that schools be reopened (F. White to J. Almond, December 
7, 1958, White Papers; "Norfolk Committee for Public Schools
Petition," October 22, 1958, White Papers). The delegation warned 
the governor that the closing was having a profoundly negative 
impact on the city's economy and that the Navy was disturbed by the 
effects of the crisis on service families. Committee members 
assured Almond that the majority of Norfolk’s citizens would accept 
minimal integration "in a spirit of calmness and cooperation" 
("Norfolk Committee for Public Schools Petition," October 22, 1958, 
p. 4, White Papers). The governor informed the delegation that 
Norfolk’s schools would reopen only when the federal courts 
declared the closing to be illegal (Reif, 1961, p. 5).
Five days later, the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools 
brought suit against Governor Almond in federal district court on 
behalf of twenty-six white students displaced by the closing.
This suit, to become known as James v. Almond, was named after one 
of the plaintiffs, Ruth Pendleton James. James was a student at 
Maury High School and the daughter of Ellis James, a member of the 
NCPS's executive committee. Dr. C. Lyndon Harrell, Sr., a member 
of the committee's executive board, also brought suit on behalf of 
his two grandchildren, both students scheduled to attend Blair 
Junior High School. Several days later Victor J. Ashe, a local 
NAACP attorney, instituted a third suit on behalf of the 
seventeen black students (Reif, 1961, p. 6).
All of the suits challenged the constitutionality of the 
state’s massive-resistance laws and charged that the school
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closing violated guarantees of equal protection as stated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Governor Almond was named as a party in all 
three suits (Southern School News. 1958, November, p. 13).
The suits were to be heard before a three-judge panel consisting 
of chief judge Simon E. Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, circuit judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., and district 
judge Walter E. Hoffman.
Prior to Almond v. James, all suits for integration had been 
brought by black plaintiffs. The NCPS had reasoned, however, that 
a court order for integration would more likely be obeyed in a 
suit filed by white litigants than in a case initated by the 
NAACP, Dr. Forrest P. White, the treasurer and a later president 
of the NCPS, wrote, "The reaction against another NAACP suit might 
have tipped the balance toward further defiance (White, 1959, 
September, p. 32).
The committee encountered great difficulty in obtaining an 
attorney to argue its case. A number of prominent Norfolk 
lawyers, unwilling to risk incurring the wrath of the Byrd 
organization, refused to become involved (Reif, 1961, p. 5). 
Eventually Edmund D. Campbell of Arlington, Virginia, agreed to 
represent the plaintiffs. A Norfolk counsel, Archie L. Boswell, 
was engaged to assist Campbell. The defendants were represented 
by a formidable defense team consisting of Norfolk attorneys 
Leonard H. Davis, Leigh D. Williams, and W. R. C. Cocke; state 
attorney general Albertis Harrison; and Harrison's assistant, 
Walter E. Rogers.
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Harrison v. Day, a test case of massive-resistance 
legislation, was being heard in the Virginia State Supreme Court 
of Appeals at the same time. Almond's initiation of this 
"friendly” suit angered Senator Byrd. However, the governor 
believed that a judicial test of the constitutionality of 
resistance legislation was inevitable, and he saw an advantage in 
being able to "frame the issues" (Virginian-Pi lot, 1964, June 9, 
p. 13). Almond later recalled that both his attorney general and 
he felt "that it would be better to get an interpretation from our 
own Virginia courts" (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 9, p. 13).
The editorial responses of the Ledger-Pisnatch and the 
Virginian-Pilot to the initiation of James v. Almond were 
limited in their number. The Ledger was critical of the Norfolk 
Committee for Public Schools’ action in bringing the suit. In 
"This Might Increase Confusion," Joseph Leslie held that 
concurrent tests of the constitutionality of massive-resistance 
legislation at both the state and federal levels would likely 
confound matters. The editor wrote,
The federal case so closely parallels the action previously 
instituted before the state court, that its value as a means 
of clearing up the situation created by the closed schools is 
open to question. It might add to, rather than reduce, the 
confusion in which the school issue is involved (Ledger- 
Dispatch, 1958, October 30).
In a lead editorial, "Is School Closing Constitutional?", 
Lenoir Chambers and his staff declared that the institution of
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Almond v. James underlined the determination of white parents to 
reopen the schools and evinced the parents' belief that federal 
courts would provide the most responsible forum for facilitating 
an end to the school crisis. "It is apparent/' Chambers wrote," 
that the plaintiffs in these suits hoped the guidance would come 
from elsewhere, by through [sic] the action of others. They 
waited. It has not come.... Leadership from those who ordinarily 
would be expected to provide it has not appeared"
(Virginian-Pi lot. 1958, October 28).
As the third week of October approached, members of 
the Norfolk Education Association voted to end their participation 
in the tutoring groups. Lieutenant Governor A. E. S. Stephens 
responded tersely to the association's refusal to support massive 
resistance: "When you pick up the paper and see that a large party 
of teachers have voted not to participate in the private school 
movement, you ask yourself: where is their loyalty?" (Reif, 1960, 
pp. 6-7).
On October 30 the Virginia Education Association, the 
statewide white teachers' and administrators' organization, passed 
a resolution expressing strong disapproval of the closing and 
advising Governor Almond to take immediate action to reopen the 
schools (Southern School News. 1958, November, p. 13). With 
near unanimity, the organization's board of directors declared its 
opposition to the state's inflexible massive-resistance 
legislation and expressed a growing militancy:
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We reaffirm that we will exert all possible effort toward the 
preservation and improvement of a system of free public 
schools in Virginia....We urge the governor to convene the 
General Assembly at an early date for the purpose of enacting 
such legislation as will assure the continued operation of the 
Virginia Public Schools as a state-supported function 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1958, October 31).
The Virginia Teachers Association, the black teachers' 
professional organization, adopted a similar resolution urging the 
state to obey the Supreme Court’s mandate. One hundred delegates 
meeting in Richmond passed the resolution unanimously. Meeting in 
Hampton, the Virginia Congress of Colored Parents and Teachers 
also enjoined the legislature to comply with Brown and urged the 
governor to include blacks in efforts to resolve the school crisis 
(Southern School News. 1958, December, p. 7).
On November 4, 1958, Byrd was handily reelected to his Senate 
seat. What little competition he faced was, in essence, a 
symbolic protest against massive resistance. Dr. Louise 0. 
Wensel, a Fishersville physician, ran as an independent, and 
Clarke T. Robb as a Social Democrat. Byrd was so confident of his 
victory that he declined to mount a campaign (Muse, 1961, p. 99; 
Southern School News. 1958, August, p. 6).
Wensel was a native of North Dakota and had moved to Virginia 
only five years before the election. Her disrespect for 
Virginia's senior statesman infuriated organization supporters; 
she described Byrd as "an old man who proposes to destroy the very
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foundation of our democracy--our public schools" (Southern School 
News, 1958, August, p. 6).
Although Byrd received 317,221 votes to Wensel's 120,224 
(Robb's showing was negligible), the anti-Byrd vote in Norfolk 
increased significantly from that of 1952, from 29 to 40 percent. 
Clearly, there was in the city a growing level of dissatisfaction 
with the senator's intransigence (Muse, 1961, p. 99; Southern 
School News, 1958, December, p. 6).
Almond declared that Byrd's overwhelming victory was a clear 
indication of popular support for the senator's massive-resistance 
policies. Other observers insisted that the margin of Byrd's 
victory indicated little, in that it was nearly identical to that 
of his previous elections (Southern School News, 1958, December,
p. 6) .
The celebratory mood of organization loyalists changed to one 
of concern a week later when Jack Kilpatrick spoke to the Richmond 
Rotary Club. Although the News Leader's editor had been one of 
the primary architects of massive resistance--almost 
singlehandedly resurrecting the doctrine of interposition--he had 
come to see that the end was in sight for massive resistance. His 
speech was the first major indication of disharmony regarding 
massive resistance in the normally unified Byrd organization. He 
told his audience,
I believe the time has come for new weapons and new tactics. 
1 believe the laws we now have on the books have outlived 
their usefulness, and 1 believe that new laws must be
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devised--speedily devised--if educational opportunities are 
to be preserved and social calamity is to be avoided 
(Southern School News, 1958, December, p, 6).
Kilpatrick believed that the courts would declare the state’s 
massive-resistance legislation illegal. The editor now saw local 
option and tuition grants as the best means of combating public- 
school integration (Peltason, 1961, p. 216; Southern School 
News.1958 . December, p. 6).
Congressmen Watkins M. Abbitt and William M. Tuck 
categorically rejected Kilpatrick's "Johnny-come-lately" 
moderation. Abbitt urged localities to close their black schools 
if white schools were shut down as a result of litigation. Tuck 
blustered, "We cannot allow Arlington or Norfolk to integrate. If 
they won't stand with us, I say make them stand"
(Virginian-Pi lot, 1958, November 16).
Billy Prieur bristled at Tuck's remarks. Although he 
supported massive resistance and was every bit as loyal an 
organization man as the congressman, he resented Tuck's intrusion 
into the clerk of court’s territory. Prieur told Tuck to mind his 
own business and called his statement "arrogant and presumptuous" 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1958, November 16). Tuck shot back, "As 
a Virginian who loves every foot of her soil I think I have the 
right to voice my views" (Virginian-Pilot, November 16, 1958). 
Chambers, downplaying the disagreement between these two Byrd 
lieutenants as a relatively minor family spat, wrote, "No one 
should infer from the Tuck-Prieur debate that the cogs in the Byrd
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machine have suddenly begun to slip" (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, 
November 18).
The most critical response to Kilpatrick’s Rotary Club speech 
of November 11 was, of course, that of Byrd. The taciturn 
senator issued a rare public statement:
I have supported the strong anti-integration school policy of 
Governor Almond and his firm stand against the usurpation of 
power by the Warren Supreme Court. I shall continue to 
support this policy which I believe to be in the best interest 
of the people of Virginia (Southern School News, 1958, 
December, p. 6).
However, there were some indications--albeit minor ones--that 
Governor Almond was considering a change in his hard-line policy. 
The day after Kilpatrick’s speech, he acknowledged that the 
Virginia General Assembly's barriers to integration might be 
declared unconstitutional by the courts. "If [our laws] are 
stricken down, it is my present purpose to appoint a representative 
commission composed of members of the General Assembly for the 
purpose of advice and to receive the suggestions which I shall make 
at that time," he said. Still, Almond pledged to "stay with the 
statutes of Virginia as long as they are vital" (Virginian-Pilot, 
1958, November 13).
Even the suggestion that massive-resistance legislation 
might be struck down was grounds enough for the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties to question Almond’s loyalty. 
Collins Denny, Jr., former legal counsel for the DSSIL, wrote to
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Almond, "I do not believe that the future is as bleak as you seem 
to think it is, even if our Court of Appeals should decide the 
pending case against us"; and later, "I have also heard regret 
[among DSSIL members] that you have stated that you believed the 
laws adopted by Virginia would be struck down" {C. Denny to 
J. Almond, December 31, 1958, Almond Executive Papers; C. Denny to 
J. Almond, January 6, 1959, Almond Executive Papers).
Almond was continually besieged by hard-line resisters such 
as Denny, volunteering legal advice as to how segregation could be 
maintained. Despite his doubts as to the constitutionality of 
Virginia’s massive-resistance legislation, Almond had shamelessly 
catered to this constituency during his gubernatorial campaign. 
Now he found himself distanced from his base of support. "I'd 
say," he later recalled, "'Our Navy is depleted, and the Army is 
gone, and we just d on’t have the power to resist the federal 
government” ’ (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 9).
On November 11, circuit court judge Clyde H. Jacob and state 
supreme court chief justice John Eggleston, of Norfolk, refused to 
issue an injunction prohibiting Norfolk's city council from 
holding an "informative" referendum to determine whether voters 
felt council should petition the governor to return control of the 
schools to the city for operation on an integrated basis. A group 
of citizens had sought to enjoin the city from holding the 
referendum, in the belief that council should display leadership 
to reopen the schools immediately rather than use the predictable 
results of the election as an excuse for continued inactivity.
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The date of the election was set for November 18 (Virginian-Pilot. 
1958, November 12).
The wording of the referendum’s ballot was very 
controversial. The form included a section entitled "For 
Information Only," warning voters that
in the Event the Closed Schools are returned to the City of 
Norfolk, and are reopened Integrated by the City, It will be 
necessary, because of the loss of State Funds, for every 
family having a child or children in Public Schools from which 
State Funds are withheld, to pay to the City a substantial 
Tuition for each child in or entering such Public School 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1958, November 18).
The referendum's opponents protested that the inclusion of such a 
section was an intentional attempt by council to influence 
citizens to vote against petitioning the governor.
The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, 
campaigning against petitioning Almond, maintained that support of 
city-operated schools was equivalent to surrendering "to various 
pressure groups and professional race mixers" (Southern School 
News, 1958, December, p. 6). The DSSIL also said that parents 
would be forced to bear the brunt of the expense incurred by local 
operation of schools (Southern School News, 1958, December,
p. 6) .
The Norfolk Committee for Public Schools and the Norfolk 
Education Association warned of the dire effects to the public 
school system and the local economy if schools were not reopened
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shortly (Southern School News. 1958, December, p. 6).
George M. Kelley, Jr., the Pilot's highly acclaimed 
political writer, called the referendum "a choice between 
moderation or more massive resistance" and noted that the 
referendum would "represent the first direct expression of an 
affected area since Virginia's anti-integration laws closed nine 
white schools" (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, November 18).
Kelley had graduated from Wake Forest College and had served 
in Army intelligence during the Second World War. Dressed "in 
fashionably tailored suits and trenchcoat with looped belt, he 
cut quite a figure at city hall," according to Robert Mason.
But as admired as he was there and in the newspaper building, 
he followed a code...that a reporter's worth should be 
measured by the confidences he kept. He wrote with grace and 
authority, and he wrote quite a lot, but he didn't write half 
of what he knew (R. Mason, 1987, p. 155).
Despite the fact that Kelley was employed by the only major 
white Virginia newspaper to oppose massive resistance, he was 
closely tied to the Byrd organization and regularly informed Billy 
Prieur of events occurring at the newspaper. Shortly after the 
adoption of the Stanley Plan by the General Assembly, Prieur had 
written to Byrd, "I am enclosing a clipping from the local 
newspaper by our mutual friend, George Kelley....He is an 
excellent man and a stalwart friend" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, 
October 4, 1956, Byrd, Sr., Papers). Prieur had mentioned Kelley 
again to Byrd a few months later: "I immediately called George
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Kelley, my friend with the Pilot" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, December 
11, 1956, Byrd, Sr., Papers). The extent of Kelley’s loyalty to 
the organization can be glimpsed in Prieur's correspondence to the 
senator half a dozen years after the closing: "I am enclosing an 
article which appeared in the Virginian-Pilot...written by Luther 
J. Carter. George Kelley has always questioned whether or not 
Carter was friendly" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, February 17, 1964,
Byrd, S r ., Papers).
The Ledger-Dispatch and the Virginian-Pi 1ot took 
diametrically opposed positions on the November 18 referendum. 
Leslie and his staff defended the holding of the "special 
informative election." The Ledger maintained that Norfolk's 
city council was well within its rights in determining the 
sentiments of the city's voters before deciding whether to 
petition the governor (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, November 12). 
Although the results of the referendum would not be binding, the 
editor stated, they would enable the council to respond more 
confidently to the crisis (Ledger-Dispatch, 1958, November 15). 
The evening before the election, the Ledger fueled the emotional 
atmosphere surrounding the closing by declaring that a vote for 
petitioning the governor was tantamount to supporting the mixing 
of races in the city's public schools (Ledger-Dispatch. 1958, 
November 17).
Chambers and his staff strongly opposed the referendum. The 
Pilot adopted an unusually caustic and cynical tone for its 
criticism, writing that
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 9 9
the expected usefulness of the ballot is as uncertain as the 
arrangement of capital letters in its text. Sifting through 
the ambiguities, the perplexities, and the senselessness of 
the ballot and a note appended, in which voters are informed 
that a reopening of the schools would entail 'substantial 
Tuition (sic)' for each child enrolled, is a dispiriting 
experience (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, November 14).
The Pilot disputed the Ledger's claim that a vote for 
petitioning the governor was a vote for mixing the races in 
schools. In an attempt to defuse the crisis, the Pilot's editor 
reasoned that the issue was not integration, but whether the 
schools should be reopened (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, November 14).
In a lead editorial, "The Best Choice: Vote 'For,'" Chambers 
enumerated his concerns over the referendum. He called on the 
city council to display leadership in reopening the schools, 
rather than wait for the results of a poorly conceived and 
ambiguous referendum. Voters were likely to be especially 
confused by the referendum's inflammatorily worded ballot, which 
suggested that an uncontrolled wave of integration would result 
from reopening the schools. In reality only the seventeen black 
students would enter the white schools.
Chambers was also critical of the portion of the ballot 
claiming that should the schools be operated by the city, parents 
would be charged a substantial tuition for their children's 
education. The editor maintained that there were many ways the 
city could fund schools aside from charging tution
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(Virginian-Pi 1ot. 1958, November 16)-
Despite their severe reservations concerning the 
referendum and its ballot, Chambers and his staff advised voters 
not to boycott the election but to vote for petitioning the 
governor. Chambers wrote that the referendum presented Norfolk’s 
electorate with an important opportunity to display its support 
for public schools (Virginian-Pilot, 1958, November 16).
Norfolk's "special informative election" on November 18,
1958, was a victory for Mayor W. Fred Duckworth and other massive 
resisters. The city's electorate voted 12,340 to 8,712 (three to 
two, as predicted) to keep the schools closed. Only 21,052 in a 
city of well over 300,000 residents voted. George Kelley wrote 
that "massive resistance to school integration won a new direct 
endorsement from Norfolk's qualified voters." In fact, however, 
the referendum demonstrated little, aside from the continued 
notorious apathy of the majority of the city's electorate 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1958, November 19; Muse, 1961, p. 93; Ely,
1976, p. 80).
Leslie called the outcome of the referendum "a positive and 
direct declaration by the voters of their will to resist school 
integration even at the cost of closed schools"
(Ledger-Dispatch, 1958, November 19). The editor observed that 
the proportion of white voters opposing petitioning the governor 
was much higher than three to two. If the thirty-five hundred 
votes cast by blacks--nearly all in support of the petition— were 
deducted from the referendum totals, the results indicated that
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white voters overwhelmingly opposed the petition, two and a half 
to one (Ledger-Dispatch, 1958, November 19).
"The people have spoken," Mayor Fred Duckworth was quoted as 
saying (Virginian-Pilot. 1958, November 19). In Jane Reif's view, 
"the referendum hardened the attitude of the city government" 
(Reif, 1960, p. 18). City council assumed total control over all 
of the city's public-school funding on November 25 and began to 
allocate funding for the city's schools on a month-by-month basis, 
effective December 25, 1958. The ordinance declared,
The appropriation herein made for said public schools is made 
on a tentative basis, and no part of the funds so appropriated 
shall, in any event, be available to the School Board of the 
City of Norfolk except as the Council may, from time to time, 
by resolution authorize (Race Relations Law Reporter. 1959, 
Spring, p. 43).
This ordinance placed council in a position to close the city's 
black schools by eliminating the funding for these schools (Reif, 
1960, p. 18).
Billy Prieur was intimately involved with Duckworth in 
orchestrating the escalation of the school crisis. "I am 
enclosing," he reported to the senator’s son, Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 
"headlines in the Norfolk newspapers which indicate further steps 
we are contemplating taking. I believe that we have the City's 
budget in such a state that we can cut off the Negro schools as of 
January 1, 1959" (W. Prieur to H. Byrd, Jr., November 26, 1958, 
Byrd, Sr., Papers).
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Although Prieur was actively working behind the scenes to 
perpetuate school segregation, he expressed concern over the 
closing. The clerk of corporation court was a complex character. 
The Byrd loyalist was an astute politician, who appeared to some 
to be acutely troubled by the risky position the organization had 
chosen. Robert Mason remembers conversations he had with the 
powerful clerk of courts during the closing: "The school closing 
just didn't seem to suit him. He thought it was a shame....He was 
very, very gloomy about the whole thing. It just didn't seem a 
good policy to him" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 
1990).
After the referendum, Mayor Duckworth adopted an antagonistic 
stance regarding the city's teachers. In a confrontation with the 
mayor, school superintendent James Brewbaker had defended his 
teaching staff, saying, "We have good teachers." "Well, I won't go 
into that now," the mayor replied; "...with what some of them have 
done, along with others in your system, I would have to disagree 
with you" (Reif, 1960, p. 18). Rufus Tonelson remembers a similar 
incident: "Duckworth had called in Mr. Brewbaker and told him that 
if [the principals of the closed schools] didn’t change [their] 
philosophy about keeping the schools open, he wanted us fired. And 
Mr. Brewbaker said, ’Well, you can fire me, too' (R. Tonelson, 
personal communication, July 18, 1990).
The mayor began to achieve considerable notoriety as a result 
of his increasingly militant position. Robert Mason recalls a
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trip he took throughout the South during the closing: "Everybody
knew Duckworth. His name had become [almost as well known as that 
of Governor Orval Faubus, the segregationist governor of 
Arkansas]....That got to him.... Everybody was cheering [him]. 
Everybody was congratulating [him], including the senior senator of 
[his] state" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
Mayor Duckworth grew closer to Senator Byrd as the crisis 
escalated. After the reopening of the schools, Prieur would write 
to Byrd that the mayor "is one of your strongest admirers" (W. 
Prieur to H. Byrd, September 22, 1959, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
Duckworth's strong support of the organization's stand on school 
integration placed him firmly in the organization's inner circle. 
"The more I see of Fred Duckworth," Byrd wrote to Prieur, "the 
abler I think he is, and the finer" {H. Byrd to W. Prieur, October 
20, 1959, Byrd, Sr., Papers).
If Senator Byrd was impressed by Mayor Duckworth’s leadership 
qualities, moderates working to defuse Norfolk's school crisis
were not. Dr. Forrest P. White, a principal member of the Norfolk
Committee for Public Schools, was much disturbed by the militant 
position adopted by the mayor. White warned Duckworth that 
his policies could lead to violence: "One stick of dynamite under 
each of a certain two Negro houses would open Granby and Maury 
tomorrow. Is this what you want? I don't believe it is. But if
it happens can you disclaim all responsibility" (F. White to
W. Duckworth, December 6, 1958, White Papers).
White also wrote to Governor Almond to suggest that he
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develop "scape-goats" for the crisis. By suggesting to Virginians 
that Communists and northern industrialists were the only two 
constituencies benefiting from the crisis, White believed Almond 
could justify the reopening of the schools and suffer minimal 
political damage. "If you can find any better scape-goats than 
the Yankee industrialists and the Communists to aid the swing from 
massive resistance, you'll be doing well," the pediatrician wrote. 
"I personally regret the necessity of straining the bounds of 
logic to find emotionally appealing reasons for logical acts--but 
I do believe it is necessary" {F. White to J. Almond, December 7, 
1958, White Papers).
On the national level, although President Eisenhower 
continued to display a lack of leadership in resolving the school 
crisis, some members of his administration did speak out 
(Peltason, 1961, p. 50). On December 1, Secretary Arthur S. 
Flemming of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
called the school closings in Arkansas and Virginia "indefensible 
and warned that children kept out of school would suffer serious 
consequences" (Southern School News, 1959, January, p. 9).
During the crisis, Attorney General William Rogers made several 
speeches to the effect that southerners were being misled by their 
political leaders to believe that the Supreme Court's mandate 
could be legally ignored (Peltason, 1961, p. 49).
In November and December 1958, an informal group of the 
state’s leading businessmen and industrialists was organized by 
Stuart Saunders, president of Norfolk & Western Railroad.
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Saunders was concerned that Virginia was not as effective as other 
southern states in attracting out-of-state industries 
(Virqinian-Pilot, 1958, December 19). His concern was likely 
traceable to University of Virginia economist Dr. Lorin A. 
Thompson's report, "Virginia Education Crisis and Its Economic 
Aspects," which had been widely circulated throughout the state 
before it was published in New South. Thompson saw the school 
closing as largely responsible for the state's failure to attract 
new businesses, He maintained that new businesses were unable to 
persuade highly skilled workers to move to Virginia while the 
state's public schools were in such an unstable condition. He 
also claimed that some of Virginia's skilled work force had 
already relocated to other states because of the school problem 
(Thompson, 1959, February, p. 3). Thompson's views could hardly 
have been considered objective. He was actively involved in 
Charlottesville's pro-public-schools movement.
At Saunders's behest, the twenty-nine-member group of 
businessmen and industrialists met in Richmond in November or 
early December to discuss ways to promote economic development. 
Frank Batten was in attendance, as was future Supreme Court 
justice Lewis Powell, then a Richmond attorney. It was generally 
agreed that Virginia would face continued difficulty in attracting 
businesses unless the school crisis was resolved. The group 
decided to try to persuade Governor Almond to adopt a more 
moderate position on school integration (F. Batten, personal 
communication, September 25, 1990).
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In late December, at a secret dinner meeting at the Rotunda 
Club in Richmond, the twenty-nine business leaders met with 
Almond, Lieutenant Governor A. E, S. Stevens, and Attorney General 
Albertis Harrison (Carter, 1959, Autumn, p. 511; Wilkinson, 1968, 
p. 145; H. Sugg, personal communication, October 2, 1990). Frank 
Batten recalls that the governor was not receptive to the group's 
entreaties: "We just got hit by this barrage from the governor of
the same kind of things he'd been saying in his speeches for 
months, in which he talked about the evils of integration and 
everything else" (F. Batten, personal communication, September 25, 
1990) .
Batten remembers that Almond was particularly contemptuous of 
Chambers's editorials on massive resistance: "In the midst of this 
speech, he spent about ten minutes blasting the editorial policy 
of the Virginian-Pilot" (F. Batten, personal communication, 
September 25, 1990).
Although Almond later conceded that the business leaders' 
entreaties had a profound effect on him (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, 
June 9), public schools were only one factor--likely a minor 
one— that out-of-state businesses would have considered before 
deciding whether to locate their plants in Virginia. In 
retrospect, the fears of the state's business leaders appear to 
have been unrealistic (Ely, 1976, p. 85). Shortly after the 
reopening, Almond wrote to Senator Byrd,
I have not been able to find any documented evidence that any 
industry has declined to locate in Virginia because of the
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pending school problem. Throughout the struggle, our 
industries in Virginia have continued to expand and from 1950 
to date, there has been a steady and substantial acquisition 
of new and stable industries not only in Virginia, but 
throughout the South (J. Almond to H. Byrd, March 13, 1959, 
Byrd, S r ., Papers).
On December 22 Judge Hoffman announced that his three-judge 
panel had completed its decision in the James v. Almond case. 
Hoffman stated that the decision would be made public "within a 
reasonable number of days" (Southern School News. 1959, January, 
p. 9). The judge had good reason for delaying the release of the 
opinion. Earlier, while playing golf at a nearby country club, 
Hoffman coincidentally had met state supreme court chief justice 
John W. Eggleston, whose court was in the midst of deciding the 
crucial Harrison v. Day case. Eggleston persuaded Hoffman to 
postpone the release of the James v. Almond decision until the 
state court could act. "I just think it would be better for the 
people of Virginia if we spoke first," Hoffman recalls Eggleston 
as saying. Hoffman immediately called Simon Sobeloff: "I told him 
about Eggleston; and he said, 'Walter, for G od’s sake, hold that 
opinion. He's absolutely right'" (W. Hoffman, personal 
communication, August 30, 1990).
Governor Almond was an astute enough lawyer to sense 
what the courts' opinions would be. He had managed to 
secure a conference in Washington, D.C., with the elusive Senator 
Byrd. At the meeting, the governor described the precarious
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condition of massive resistance. Should the courts decide as 
anticipated, Almond told Byrd, the only means by which total 
segregation could be continued would be to shut down all of 
the state's public schools.
The senator, however, remained unalterably opposed even to 
token integration and expressed concern over what his southern 
senatorial colleagues would think if Virginia's resisters 
capitulated to the federal courts. Powerful organization insiders 
present at the secret meeting, among them Representatives William 
M. Tuck and Watkins M. Abbitt, echoed Byrd's stand and vehemently 
supported continued massive resistance. Tuck even advanced the 
notion that Almond should go to jail before he allowed black 
students to enter white schools. The governor rejected this ploy, 
maintaining that it would do nothing to stop integration and that 
it would constitute a public relations catastrophe for the Byrd 
organization. The meeting was adjourned without arrival at a 
satisfactory solution (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, June 9).
On December 30 Norfolk’s city council allocated another 
month's funding for the city's schools. The school board was 
prohibited from using any of these resources to operate the city's 
closed schools (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p.
43) .
On January 13 the council, in an action that exceeded the 
severity of the state's massive-resistance laws, voted six to one 
to cease funding all of the city's schools beyond the sixth grade. 
This would have had the effect of adding another five thousand
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black students and nineteen hundred white students to the ten 
thousand pupils already locked out of Norfolk's schools. Because 
blacks would be affected by this resolution to a much larger 
extent than whites, hard-line segregationists hoped the seventeen 
black students applying for admission to the city's white schools 
would be persuaded to withdraw their transfer applications (Ely, 
1976, p. 82; Dabney, 1971, p. 541; Muse, 1961, p. 119; Race 
Relations Law Reporter. 1959, Spring, p. 45).
Roy Martin, Jr., the only city council member to oppose 
Mayor Duckworth, had differed with the mayor throughout the 
closing, but never publicly. He recalls, "I think...[Duckworth's] 
thoughts were if the blacks are going to close the white schools, 
we're going to get everything closed down, which to me was a 
terrible mistake....I tried to talk several other members of the 
council to join with me, but none of them would. They just felt 
very strongly that [massive resistance] was the position of the 
state and we ought to adhere to it" (R. Martin, personal 
communication, August 20, 1990).
Normally, disagreements between councilman and the mayor were 
resolved privately. Duckworth sought to portray an image of a 
unified council to the public. "We used to have our words," 
Martin remembers, "but...most of our words were in the back room 
of a closed meeting. And that's why everything ran so smoothly 
when you got into the open meeting" (R. Martin, personal 
communication, August 20, 1990). To this end, Duckworth had taken 
to holding unofficial Monday-morning council meetings that were
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closed to the public.
Duckworth’s attempt to close the city’s black schools proved 
too extreme for even some massive resisters. Governor Almond, 
sounding increasingly moderate, expressed disapproval of the 
council’s action:
I have opposed any retaliatory moves against the Negro 
children in Virginia. It has been my purpose and will 
continue to be my policy to see to it that as far as I am 
able that all of Virginia’s children receive the educations to 
which they are entitled (J. Almond to W. Blount, January 15, 
1959, Almond Executive Papers).
On January 19, 1959, Robert E. Lee’s birthday and a legal 
holiday in the state, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and 
the three-judge federal district court released their decisions in 
Harrison v. Day and James v. Almond. The decisions delivered a 
one-two knockout punch to massive resistance.
The federal court, which was sitting in Norfolk, unanimously 
determined that the state of Virginia, by operating some schools 
and closing others, was in violation of constitutional guarantees
of equal protection and due process. Judge Hoffman wrote,
We do not suggest... the state must maintain a public school 
system. That is a matter for state determination. We merely 
point out that the closing of a public school, or a grade
therein,...violates the right of a citizen to equal protection
of the laws (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 
49) .
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The value of interposition as a defense against integration was 
dismissed out of hand as Hoffman emphasized the supremacy of 
federal over state law: "It is our duty to apply constitutional 
principles in accordance with the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and when state legislation conflicts with those 
constitutional principles, state legislation must yield" fRace 
Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 49).
The state supreme court decision was as devastating to 
massive resistance as was that of the federal court. In a 
decision written by Chief Justice John W. Eggleston, of Norfolk, 
the court determined that
the state must support such public free schools in the state 
as are necessary to an efficient system, including those in 
which the pupils of both races are compelled to be enrolled 
and taught together, however unfortunate that situation may 
be (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 71). 
Ironically, Governor Almond and his wife, Josephine, had 
hosted a dinner for the justices in the governor's executive 
mansion the previous evening (Muse, 1961, pp. 122-123).
Two justices, Willis D. Miller and Harold F. Snead, 
dissented. During the previous summer, these same two justices 
had attempted to issue an injunction restraining Norfolk’s school 
board from assigning black students to the city’s white schools.
The court attempted to soften the blow by sympathizing with 
the motivations of resisters:
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We deplore the lack of judicial restraint evinced by [the 
Supreme Court] in trespassing on the sovereign rights of this 
Commonwealth reserved to it in the Constitution of the United 
States. It was an understandable effort to diminish the evils 
expected from the decision in the Brown case that prompted the 
enactment of the statutes under review (Race Relations Law 
Reporter, 1959, Summer, p. 73).
Although Almond privately conceded that massive resistance 
was doomed, on January 20 he made a last defiant speech. “We have 
just begun to fight," he vowed. "I call upon the people of 
Virginia to stand firmly with me in this struggle. Be not 
dismayed by recent judicial deliverances" (Virginian-Pilot,
1959, January 21). Expressions of approval and support poured in 
to the governor from resisters across the state.
Later, however, Almond regretted this speech:
I don't know why I made that damn speech. If I had listened 
to my wife, I wouldn't have....I saw the whole thing 
crumbling. I was tired and distraught. I agonized and gave 
vent to my feelings, which never should have been done. My
underlying thought and motivation was to show the people that
we had done everything we could do (Virginian-Pilot, 1964, 
June 9).
Despite the fact that Byrd applauded Almond’s inflammatory 
speech, the senator carefully maintained a generous distance 
between himself and the governor. Almond's many telephone calls 
to the senator were not returned (Virginian-Pilot. 1959, June
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Time also appeared to be running out for Mayor Fred Duckworth 
and the Norfolk city council, who seemed to be on the verge of 
being left to twist slowly in the wind. At an open city council 
meeting on January 20, Duckworth lost control of the proceedings 
and was jeered by a pro-school crowd. When Norfolk artist Kenneth 
Harris satirically asked the mayor if he intended to cease holding 
open meetings and hold only closed meetings, Duckworth grabbed the 
artist by the arm and exploded, "You can't run a $37 million 
business in [this] kind of meeting." As the mayor turned to walk 
away, Harris replied, "You aren't running a business; you are 
running a city" (Virginian-Pi1o t , 1959, January 21).
The evening after the governor's speech, "The Lost Class of 
’59," a television documentary examining Norfolk's school closing, 
aired nationally at prime time on the Columbia Broadcasting System 
television network. The program was produced by the nationally 
acclaimed journalists Edward R. Murrow and Fred W. Friendly. 
Although "The Lost Class" featured many prominent actors in the 
crisis, Mayor Duckworth did not appear. Duckworth had made it 
known that he wished the producers of the documentary would "get 
the hell out of town" ("Introduction to the "Lost Class of ’59," 
January 21, 1959, White Papers; "The Lost Class of *59," January 
21, 1959, Byrd, Sr., Papers). Jane Reif wrote, "Murrow’s telecast 
helped crystallize half-formed opinions. Its national top 
television time, and the reputation of Murrow, impressed many
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Norfolkians who could no longer deny the facts’* (Reif, 1960, p. 
22 ) .
The same day CBS aired "The Lost Class of ’59,” Norfolk 
received additional national exposure during a presidential press 
conference. President Eisenhower, although still refusing 
to exert his personal influence to press for southern compliance 
with the Brown decision, expressed his concern for the children 
of Norfolk's federal workers and hinted that his patience with 
Virginia's policies was running out (Race Relations Law 
Reporter. 1959, Spring, pp. 5-6).
For the Ledoer-Dispatch1s editor, Joe Leslie, who had 
appeared prominently in the Murrow documentary, the combined blows 
from the federal district court and the state supreme court were 
too much. Leslie acknowledged that the battle--if not the 
war--was over. In a lead editorial, "Massive Resistance Breaks 
Down," Leslie wrote on January 20, 1959,
The rLedger-Pispatchi, which has fought for school segregation 
with every persuasive means at its command, reluctantly 
concludes that massive resistance as we have known it has come 
to an end, and it becomes necessary now for those who believe 
in segregation to seek some other field from which to carry on 
the fight (Ledoer-Dispatch, 1959, January 20).
Although the Ledger conceded that Virginia's resistance 
laws no longer offered a defense against school segregation, the 
editor, as Judge Eggleston had done, held that massive resistance 
had been an understandable response and had served a worthwhile
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purpose in communicating to the nation the degree to which 
Virginians were opposed to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown 
v. Board. Leslie decried the Brown decision, calling it a "tragic 
mistake," and warned that the court and the country would be 
haunted by the decision in years to come (Ledger-Dispatch.
1959, January 20) .
Leslie also defended his paper's role in the crisis, writing 
that the Ledger had provided a voice for the citizens of Hampton 
Roads, the vast majority of whom supported massive resistance.
"We have placed the North," Leslie wrote, "and the NAACP, and some 
of our own people who did not realize the intensity of the 
opposition to racial integration, and the dangers inherent in it, 
on notice as to what these dangers are" (Ledger-Pispatch, 1959, 
January 20).
The next day Leslie suggested that Virginia adopt a policy of 
containment to replace that of massive resistance. The editor 
recommended the development of pupil-screening procedures that 
would minimize the number of blacks allowed to enter white 
schools. He also encouraged the state to begin to provide 
private-school students with tuition support.
The day after the courts' opinions were made public, Chambers 
and his staff emphasized the importance of the two decisions by 
devoting all three of their major editorials to the courts’ 
findings. The Virginian-Pilot's editor urged citizens to abide 
by the decisions. Chambers wrote that the state supreme court was 
Virginia's court and that its decisions therefore should be
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respected. The federal court’s opinion was portrayed as 
restrained and logical, and the Pilot wrote that it too was 
worthy of Virginians' respect. "A historic opportunity now opens 
for Virginians," Chambers wrote. "The great of heart and mind 
will rise to it" (Virginian-Pilot, 1959, January 20).
Unlike Eggleston and Leslie, Chambers could discern no 
positive results from the state’s policy of massive resistance. 
The editor's writing was uncharacteristically harsh:
The massive resistance legislation was always considered by 
those who viewed it dispassionately to rest on most dubious 
constitutional pillars. It remained only for the courts to 
take a long, hard look at the monstrosities of the Stanley and 
Almond programs. This they have done, and the results are 
devastating. It remains now for the people of Virginia, 
including their elected officials, to ask themselves whether 
this distinguished commonwealth means to go on with the 
tragedy of legislative pretense that in practice has been 
legislative injustice and cruelty and perhaps permanent 
impairment to thousands of Virginia children (Virginian-Pilot, 
1959, January 20).
In an editorial later that week, Chambers denounced attempts 
by hard-line massive resisters to block the nomination of Justice 
Lawrence W. I'Anson of Portsmouth to the state supreme court.
I'Anson, who had been temporarily appointed to the court to 
replace a deceased justice, had sided with the majority in 
Harrison v. Day. Chambers also aired his concerns about the
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recent denial of Thomas C. Boushall, a moderate on the subject of 
massive resistance, to reappointment to the State Board of 
Education. Boushall had been replaced in this position by South 
Norfolk's superintendent of schools William J. Story, Jr., a 
militant segregationist and an avowed white supremacist. (Story, 
later a candidate for Virginia's governorship, was providing 
schooling for nearly a thousand of Norfolk's white school children 
in the public schools of the city of South Norfolk.) The Pilot 
feared that Story's appointment and the opposition to I'Anson's 
confirmation signaled that public officials who had opposed the 
school closings would be punished. Chambers urged legislators to 
protect the court's "right to think independently" 
(Virginian-Pilot, 1959, January 24).
In "A Decree That Is a Landmark," Chambers and his staff 
emphasized that the federal decision in James v. Almond was 
"controlling" and that it prohibited the state, as well as the 
localities, from engaging in any evasive schemes designed to 
circumvent public-school integration. The Pilot warned that any 
plans designed to maintain total segregation would likely be 
declared illegal by the courts (Virqinian-Pilot, 1959, January 
25) .
After his defiant speech of January 20, 1959, Governor 
Lindsay Almond broke with the Byrd organization and began to 
display an independent style of leadership. He called for the 
General Assembly to meet in special session January 28, urged the 
legislature to establish a commission of legislators to study the
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state's school problems, and recommended the adoption of a law 
designed to stop bomb threats. The governor also advised the 
legislators to repeal the state's compulsory-attendance law and 
consider the adoption of a tuition-assistance plan for private 
school students (Wilkinson, 1967, p. 147). The Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties felt strongly betrayed by the 
governor's about-face and began to refer to him as "Benedict 
Almond" (Dabney, 1971, p. 543).
On January 26, 1959, 141 days after the schools were 
closed and a week after the courts had rejected massive 
resistance, Norfolk’s business community finally acted to reopen 
the city's schools. One hundred of the city's business leaders 
placed a statement in the Virainian-Pilot. urging city council 
to take steps to end the school closing. The petition read,
While we would strongly prefer to have segregated schools, 
it is evident from the recent court decisions that our public 
schools must either be integrated to the extent legally 
required or must be abandoned. The abandonment of our public 
school system is, in our opinion, unthinkable, as it would 
mean the denial of an adequate education to a majority of our 
children. Moreover, the consequences would be most damaging 
to our community. We, therefore, urge the Norfolk City 
Council to do everything within its power to open all public 
schools as promptly as possible (Virginian-Pilot. 1959, 
January 26).
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Although some of the signers of the petition would encounter 
animosity for their actions, each of the businessmen who signed the 
petition received a rose from Grandy the Florist (Rorer, 1968, p. 
306) .
Persuading the city's business leaders to sign the 
petition had been problematic for Frank Batten and Pretlow Darden. 
Approximately a week before the courts issued their rulings, 
Darden finally determined that the time was right for action.
With the assistance of several other prominent businessmen, Batten 
and Darden developed the wording of the statement, and then the 
two organizers contacted business leaders throughout the city.
"We had to modify the wording of the petition to get a number of 
people to sign it," Batten recalls. "We ended up with what we 
wanted, but we had to qualify...it to get a number of people to 
sign it" (Batten, personal communication, September 25, 1990).
The petition infuriated Mayor Fred Duckworth, who felt 
betrayed by the signers, many of whom were supporters and close 
friends. Pretlow Darden recalls the mayor's response: "I called
Fred and I said, 'Now Fred, we are going to run an ad in tomorrow's
newspaper saying that the schools ought to be open.' And he said,
'Hell, why didn't you tell me?' And I said, 'We didn’t want to 
embarrass you. We know what your position is and how come you 
supported massive resistance.’ 'Well,' he said, 'you have just 
stabbed me in the back.' And I said, 'Well, would you like to see 
it?’ 'Hell no, I don’t want to see it if I can’t do anything about
it’" (P. Darden, personal communication, August 13, 1975).
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Three years later, when Roy B. Martin, Jr., succeeded 
Duckworth as mayor, he found the petition framed and hung on the 
back of a closet door in the mayor's office. Martin recalls, "Any 
time that door was opened [he saw it]. He really felt 
very...betrayed by a lot of his friends" (R. Martin, personal 
communication, August 20, 1990). Sam Barfield, a signer of the 
petition, who later was elected to city council on a reform 
ticket, tells the story--only half in jest--that Mayor Duckworth 
used the petition as a dartboard: "They tell me the dart hit my 
name the most. You can imagine how I felt when I got elected.... I 
didn't have an ally" (S. Barfield, personal communication, August 
8, 1990).
It is likely that an overriding concern for the well-being of 
Norfolk's schoolchildren was not the predominant motivation for 
many who signed the petition. Certainly economics figured 
prominently in their decision. Simply put, the business community 
had come to believe that the school closing was bad for business 
(Reif, 1960, p. 14).
The same day the businessmen's petition appeared in the 
Virginian-Pilot, Mayor Duckworth appeared in Judge Hoffman’s 
court to attempt to defend his plans to close all of the city's 
junior and senior high schools (Muse, 1961, p. 130). The 
following day Hoffman issued his decision in James v. Duckworth. 
The judge enjoined city council and the city treasurer from 
enforcing council's resolutions of November 25 and December 30, 
1958, and prohibited Norfolk's city council from engaging in any
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"evasive schemes" designed to subvert the will of the court 
(Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, pp. 55-56).
The city's political leaders acquiesced to the court's 
verdict and grudgingly began to make plans to reopen the six 
closed schools. Interestingly, one of the many plaintiffs in 
James v. Duckworth was Louis I. Jaffe, Jr., the son of the former 
editor of the Vircinian-Pi1o t .
On January 28, 1959, Virginia's General Assembly met in 
special session. The beginning of the governor's opening address 
was vintage Almond and gave no indication that massive resistance 
was to be abandoned:
Encompassed by the iron will of arrogated power, buffeted upon 
the storms of an uneven contest, pierced with the daggers of 
political expediency and battered by the unholy alliance of a 
conspiracy to destroy the Constitution, Virginia, true to the 
faith of the founding fathers and refusing to desecrate her 
heritage, must never recede in this struggle to preserve her 
rights nor suffer her voice to be stifled in the councils of 
nations (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 183). 
Partway through the speech, however, Almond changed course, 
revealing that he was distancing himself from the inflexible 
racial policies of Senator Harry Byrd:
I report as a fact, and not in a spirit of criticism, that the 
laws enacted to prevent the mixing of the races in our public 
schools...have been stricken down by a Federal Court, and by 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. The imminence of
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the peril to our people of the crisis thus engendered 
challenges the loyalty and dedication of our .hearts and minds, 
and the prompt application of our talents and efforts, to the 
very best we can give in the service of Virginia (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 184).
Importantly, the governor conceded that the powers of the 
federal government superseded those of the state: ”1 have 
repeatedly stated that I did not possess the power and knew of 
none that could be evolved that would enable Virginia to overthrow 
or negate the overriding power of the Federal government” (Race 
Relations Law Reporter, 1959, Spring, p. 188). Almond continued 
by making clear that he had no intention of forcing the federal 
courts to send him to jail as some hard-line resisters had 
suggested, That strategy, he maintained, would contribute to 
"nothing but the ridiculous" (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, 
Spring, p. 184).
Almond concluded his speech by proposing that Virginia's 
massive-resistance legislation be repealed, that 
compulsory-attendance laws be abolished, that $250 tuition 
stipends be made available to parents objecting to their 
children's attendance of integrated schools, and that a 
forty-member legislative commission be appointed to examine future 
responses (Peltason, 1961, p. 217). The General Assembly passed 
these proposals by large majorities.
Governor Almond’s pragmatism was rejected both by resisters 
and by some pro-school forces. Three hundred residents of the
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Southside met in Kenbridge on February 8, 1958, and unanimously 
adopted resolutions denouncing the actions of the governor and the 
General Assembly. "Virginia has... suffered at the hands of her 
own officials a most severe defeat," they declared (Southern 
School N e w s . 1959, March, p. 14). The Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, in various meetings 
throughout the state, accused Almond of integrating the schools. 
Additionally, a petition calling for the governor’s impeachment 
was widely circulated throughout the state. It was later 
determined that the petitions had been printed by Lincoln 
Rockwell, president of the American Nazi Party (Southern School 
News, 1959, March, p. 15).
On the other side of the issue, the Virginia Council on Human 
Relations, opposing the provision of tuition grants and the repeal 
of the compulsory-attendance laws, called the actions "hasty, 
unnecessary, and ill-advised" (Southern School News. 1959,
March, p . 15).
The day following the governor's opening address to the 
special session of the General Assembly, Norfolk's city council 
directed Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to reopen the six closed 
schools on February 2, 1959 (Race Relations Law Reporter, 1959, 
Spring, p. 56). Council's action was a cause for celebration for 
the city’s black community and pro-school forces. Blacks packed 
the city hall and cheered the vote to reopen the schools (R. 
Martin, personal communication, August 20, 1990).
On February 2, 1959, the day the General Assembly recessed,
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Norfolk's schools were reopened. Although every effort was made 
to downplay the possibility of violence, careful plans had been 
made by city officials to be prepared for every conceivable 
contingency. Plainclothes police and FBI agents were 
inconspicuously stationed near the schools scheduled to be 
integrated, and the homes of the seventeen black students were 
carefully guarded. Additionally, the situation in Norfolk was 
closely monitored by Attorney General William P. Rogers's staff, 
and U.S. marshals were placed on alert (Muse, 1961, p. 140; F. 
Powers, personal communication, October 4, 1990; W. Hoffman, 
personal communication, August 30, 1990).
Reporters, photographers, and film crews from more than fifty 
different newspapers, wire services, and television stations 
gathered at the schools— many at Norview High School, where there 
seemed the greatest likelihood of racial violence. A few years 
before, when nearby white communities had been integrated, a 
number of racial incidents had occurred in the Norview section 
(Reif, 1960, p. 25).
Frank Batten specifically directed that reporters from the 
Virginian-Pilot and the Ledger-Dispatch, as well as staff from 
WTAR-TV services (also owned by Norfolk Newspapers, Inc.), behave 
responsibly. To avoid fueling hysteria, reporters were to retain 
as low a profile as possible, and television cameras were not to 
be stationed at school doors (H. Sugg, personal communication, 
October 12, 1990).
The reopening of t'ne city's schools was, however, uneventful.
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Although there was some name-calling, a cross was burned near a 
school, and there was a mailing of racist literature from an 
unidentified source within the city, black and white students 
attended school together without incident. At worst, the black 
students suffered the isolation and loneliness for which Vivian 
Mason had prepared them so well (Carter, 1959, Autumn, p. 512; R. 
Tonelson, personal communication, July 18, 1990). Forrest White 
wrote that the press covering the reopening "had a rather dull 
day. The students arrived, went to school, went home again and 
that was that" (White, 1959, September, p. 29).
Of the ten thousand students displaced by the school closing, 
only sixty-four hundred returned. Nearly two thousand had 
received no schooling since the closure (Muse, 1961, p. 142).
The integration of the state's previously all-white schools 
was a watershed in Virginia history. Luther Carter later wrote, 
The desegregation of schools in Norfolk and Arlington, coming 
the day the assembly was recessed, cut away an important 
psychological underpinning of the resistance program. Once 
the barrier was broken by even a handful of Negro children, 
all talk of Virginia as a fortress of segregation sounded 
hollow (Carter, 1959, Autumn 1959, p. 519).
Joe Leslie and his editorial staff at the Ledger-Dispatch 
wrote that the reopening of the schools should not signify a 
surrender to the NAACP and substantial integration. Leslie 
recommended that strategies of containment, which would limit the 
number of black students attending school with white students to
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 2 6
an insignificant few, replace massive resistance. "This state’s 
initial 'massive resistance’ line has been breached, but 'massive 
integration’ doesn’t automatically follow" (Ledger-Dispatch,
1959, February 4). The Ledger advocated the development of 
"legal, carefully planned procedures" to prevent the "appalling 
destruction of the school system which integration itself, unless 
checked, would surely bring about in a matter of months or years, 
depending on how agressively the NAACP pursues its drive"
(Ledger-Dispatch. 1959, February 2). Virginia's massive 
resistance to public-school desegregation was defended by Leslie 
as having been an effective "bulwark" that postponed integration 
for three years (Ledger-Dispatch. 1959, February 3).
Although Leslie continued to oppose integration vigorously, 
he encouraged readers to abide by the laws, despite the 
"displeasure and bitterness which are bound to be the by-products 
of the years of conflict provoked by the Supreme Court’s ill-timed 
and ill-advised pressure for race mixing in the schools"
(Ledger-Dispatch, 1959, February 3).
Lenoir Chambers and his associate editors also urged readers 
to abide by the law and reminded them that the country's attention 
was focused on the city. Chambers wrote,
Norfolk's citizens all have obligations to the principles by 
which Americans live--principles of fairness, of justice, of 
opportunity, of obedience to law, and of good citizenship. In 
such respects this old city, with its good name for 
understanding, can add greatly to its own stat”re this week,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 2 7
and can set a fine example for the nation--indeed the 
world--that watches (Virginian-Pilot. 1959, February 1).
The Virginian-Pilot protested the recently enacted 
legislation that repealed the state's compulsory-attendance law 
and provided for private-school tuition (Virginian-Pilot and 
Ledger-Star, 1991, February 4). The Pilot also criticized the 
composition of the General Assembly's study commission--the 
"Perrow Commission," named for state senator Mosby Perrow of 
Lynchburg. Chambers viewed the forty-member commission, which was 
comprised exclusively of members of the General Assembly, as being 
too large to function effectively; and he objected to the 
exclusion of blacks and women from its membership (Virginian-Pilot, 
1959, February 6).
Still, the Pilot praised Governor Almond's conversion to 
moderation and reason. Chambers wrote,
It must be said that in a critical moment Governor Almond 
stood up for realism and practicality--and he won. In 
consequence Virginia has at least more hope of reasonable 
action ahead than at any time since Governor Stanley 
surrendered in 1954 to the massive resistance movement 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1959, February 4).
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The demise of Virginia's massive resistance and the peaceful 
integration of the state's schools portended the downfall of the 
South's resistance to the Supreme Court's decision. Francis 
Wilhoit observes that
the collapse of massive resistance in Virginia in 1959 was a 
decisive event in the history of the South's 
counterrevolution. And it is well to recall that the 
admission of black pupils to white schools, though doubtless 
resented by a majority of whites, took place without mob 
violence or abuse of black pupils (Wilhoit, 1973, pp.
148-149).
Norfolk, Virginia's most populous city, was one of the most 
crucial battlegrounds in the state's--and the South's--massive- 
resistance campaign. No other Virginia city experienced a school 
closing so tumultuous, complex, and large.
Many key figures and interest groups contributed to the 
resolution of the city's school crisis and the integration of its 
public schools. Among the factors were the landmark decisions 
issued by the federal and state courts, the refusal of the city's 
teachers to align themselves with the private-school movement, and 
the energetic campaign conducted by the Norfolk Committee for 
Public Schools. Additionally, the NAACP relentlessly sought 
school integration; and the black community, led by Journal and 
Guide publisher P. B. Young, Sr., used its influence to defuse the
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school crisis. There were other well-meaning but less influential 
groups, such as the Norfolk Ministers Association, the American 
Association of University Women, the League of Women Voters, and 
the Women’s Interracial Council. The Navy's Rear Admiral Massie 
Hughes, commandant of the largest naval base in the world, used 
his influence to lobby for a resolution to the closure. Finally, 
Norfolk’s business community issued a long-delayed statement 
urging that the schools be reopened.
Yet without the example set by the Virginian-Pilot and the 
moderating influence of its thoughtful and persuasive editorials, 
this coalition would have operated less effectively.
Robert Mason concludes,
The union of [the pro-school] elements was loose. But as 
each stood up, it had a rallying point. It had a veteran of 
the conflict to follow. It had the clear, unwavering, unafraid 
example set and maintained by The Virginian-Pilot throughout 
the difficult months.
For all during the school crisis, and particularly during 
the year of its nadir--1959--Lenoir Chambers said and said 
again in his editorial columns what the law was, and what 
justice was, and what reality was. He never wavered. He 
wasted no time on the fiction of what might have been or might 
b e .
It is not too much to say, I am persuaded, that Lenoir 
Chambers has done more, and under conditions more vexing and
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longer sustained, to give logic and direction to Virginia, and 
to the whole South, in the school problem than any other 
editor (Virginian-Pilot. 1960, May 3).
In 1960 Chambers was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for 
distinguished editorial writing--the nation’s highest award for 
journalism. The citation read that Chambers received the prize 
"for [his] series of editorials on the school segregation problem 
in Virginia, as exemplified by 'The Year the Schools Closed,’ 
published January 1, 1959, and 'The Year the Schools Opened,’ 
published December 31, 1959" (G. Kirk to L. Chambers, May 2,
1960, Chambers Papers). (Although the editor's two-volume 
Stonewall Jackson was nominated for the Pulitzer in biography that 
same year, Samuel Eliot Morison received the award for his study of 
John Paul Jones. Some knowledgeable observers believe Chambers's 
biography would have received the prize had he not been awarded the 
Pulitzer for his editorials [V. Dabney to L. Chambers, May 6, 1960, 
Chambers Papers]).
Chambers had been nominated for the honor four years 
earlier for his editorials on massive resistance. However, that 
application was complicated by associate editor William Meacham's 
insistence that he should receive or share the award. Harold Sugg 
believes that "these efforts... confused the situation and delayed 
Chambers’s Pulitzer by at least two years. If Bob Mason had not 
picked up the effort...and given it one more try, Chambers could 
have missed out altogether" (H. Sugg, personal communication, 
October 13, 1990) .
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Chambers was gracious in his acceptance and acknowledged the 
important contributions of his associate editors. He would say 
that
Virginian-Pi1ot editorials are written after conference 
and consultation in which many persons may play a part. I am 
especially indebted to the associate editors, William S. 
Meacham and Robert C. Smith; to earlier associate editors, 
Harold Sugg and Robert Mason; to members of the news staff and 
to others familiar with school problems; and to The Virginian 
Pilot's publisher, Frank Batten, and its president, Paul S. 
Huber, Jr., for their constant encouragement 
(Virginian-Pilot. 1960, May 3).
Chambers spent much of his $1,000 prize on the addition of 
a bathroom for his home. The remainder was used to replace his 
space-skipping typewriter. As soon as he received notice of the 
award, he called a local store. "I've won the Pulitzer Prize," he 
told the owner, "and I'm coming down there to buy a new 
typewriter" (Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Star. 1990, September 23).
For Alice Jaffe, Louis Jaffe’s widow, Chambers's 
prize-winning editorial campaign had been a continuation of her 
husband's work. She wrote to Chambers,
I feel happy not only about the wel1-deserved honor, but 
because of the special series of editorials singled out, 
in which the subject of human and racial justice followed the 
precedent of Louis’ earlier prize. This series did much to 
influence current thought and action also, as did his. Yours
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was one of the very few voices raised in public utterance for 
schools/ for law, for moderation, for intel1igence--the voice 
never wavered through dark days and (I'm sure) abuse, and the 
words were as measured and firm as the voice itself (A. Jaffe 
to L. Chambers, May 4, 1960, Chambers Papers).
The announcement of Chambers's prize also brought Jaffe to 
mind for Stringfellow Barr, a Princeton University faculty member 
who had written editorials for Jaffe. "I wish Jaffe could have 
been alive to see you win it. But given the kind of guy Louis 
was, he probably does know" (S. Barr to L. Chambers, May 3,
1960, Chambers Papers).
The national press believed Chambers's award was well 
deserved. The New York Times termed the Pilot *s editorial 
page a
voice of reason on a political battlefield that was a 
testing ground in the South. Mr. Chambers warned against the 
danger to the fabric of government that was inherent in 
resistance to a Supreme Court decision. His was a leading 
voice and a persuasive voice and it was heard beyond the 
bounds of his own state in the Southern region. The Pulitzer 
Prize in this instance crowned a long career that has been 
dedicated to the defense of civil liberty and public morality 
(New York Times, 1960, May 8).
C. A. ("Pete") McKnight, the former editor of Southern 
School News and editor of the Charlotte Observer, one of the 
nation's most knowledgeable journalists on the subject of massive
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resistance, wrote to Chambers: "I have followed your thoughtful 
and persuasive editorials with great interest and am quite sure 
that Norfolk's limited integration program went off so quietly 
because of the influence of your fine newspaper" (C. McKnight to 
L. Chambers, February 3, 1959, Chambers Papers). McKnight later 
wrote, "I have told many people that I thought your editorial 
writing on the desegregation problem was the most distinguished I 
had seen anywhere" (C. McKnight to L. Chambers, May 3, 1960,
Chambers Papers).
Chambers's peers had long applauded his injection of reason 
and moderation into the emotional debate over integration. R. H. 
Estabrook, the editorial page editor of the Washington Post, 
wrote,
I cannot resist writing to commend your courage and common 
sense in your editorial[s]. It is a great deal more difficult 
for you to say these things than for us across the polluted 
waters of the Potomac. I think you are abundantly right, and 
it gives me great heart to know this sort of comment is 
continuing in our super-heated atmosphere (R. Estabrook to L. 
Chambers, August 21, 1958, Chambers Papers).
The editor and publisher of the Journal and Guide, one of 
the nation's most widely circulated and influential black presses, 
were highly appreciative of Chambers's role in defusing racial 
tensions. Thomas W, Young, editor of the Journal and Guide, had 
chastised Henry R. Luce, Time magazine's editor, for neglecting 
to mention the Virginian-Pilot in a Time article on southern
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newspapers challenging segregation. In a letter to Luce, Thomas 
Young called the Pilot* s editorial page
a beacon in the South where the lights of reason and 
statesmanship are going out all over the land. I should 
imagine that Editor Lenoir Chambers and his associates, 
William S. Meacham and Harold Sugg, are high on the list of 
enemies claimed by the White Citizens Councils and 
other invisible Southern state governments, both hooded and 
unhooded (T. Young to H. Luce, February 22, 1956, Chambers 
Papers).
P. B. Young, the editor’s father, wrote to Chambers, "Your 
contributions to the proper understanding of the elements which go 
to create racial tensions have been wonderful. I am sure your 
paper has the gratitude of all patriotic citizens who read it, and 
who are influenced by it (P. Young to L. Chambers, December 24, 
1958, Chambers Papers). Thomas Young would later congratulate 
Chambers for receiving the Pulitzer, writing,
Those of us who believe the editorial pages of our newspapers 
still exert a powerful influence on public opinion can 
certainly find a relationship between the courageous and 
convincing editorial voice of the Virginian Pilot 
throughout the months of Norfolk's dilemma and the easy 
restraint and ultimate containment of massive resistance 
forces in our community (T. Young to L. Chambers, May 5, 
1960, Chambers Papers).
Although the national press's acknowledgment of Lenoir
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Chambers's role as an advocate for racial understanding and 
moderation is a significant indicator of the editor's influence, 
it is the testimony of on-the-scene participants and witnesses 
that establishes his most important contribution to the outcome of 
the crisis: the role he played in influencing key actors in the 
drama. School board chairman Paul Schweitzer, who despite 
personal reservations regarding puolic-school integration 
ultimately adopted a moderate position and likely helped to 
persuade members of the board and Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to 
adopt conciliatory positions, was deeply inspired by Chambers's 
editorials. The chairman wrote,
This community is indebted to you for the calm, dignified 
stand you maintained throughout the period of our recent 
controversy. Your reasonable approach, sound reasoning, and 
ability to clearly express your logic was a tremendous factor 
in resolving the problem we faced. You were, and remain, an 
inspiration to me personally in the humble part I had in this 
ordeal. M l  our civic problems are not yet resolved but with 
your continued leadership through the editorial pages of the 
Virginian Pilot, Norfolk can look to the future with 
confidence (P. Schweitzer to L. Chambers, May 3, 1960, 
Chambers Papers).
Judge Walter E. Hoffman read the editorials of the 
Virginian-Pilot and the Ledger-Dispatch closely during 
Norfolk's school crisis. Although the judge's actions were based 
on his interpretation of the law, not on media influence, he felt
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that Chambers practiced exceedingly responsible journalism and 
played an important role in defusing the crisis. Hoffman recalls 
that the Pilot1s editorials were "being written by people who 
were responsible to get the true facts." The judge has less 
respect for the Ledger-Dispatch: "[Joe Leslie] blasted the devil 
out of me, and I knew Joe very well....Not that I respected his 
opinion, because I'd read through it; and from the facts' 
standpoint, he had nothing to go on" (W. Hoffman, personal 
communication, August 30, 1990).
Other pro-school forces and figures were rallied by 
Chambers's editorials. Shortly after the schools reopened, the 
Norfolk Educational Association, which had played a critical role 
in the closing by refusing to support the activities of the 
Tidewater Educational Foundation, commended the editor for his 
"editorial policy on the troubled public school situation" (L. 
McGonegal to L. Chambers, March 31, 1959, Chambers Papers). Edie 
White, a key figure in several pro-school organizations, later 
praised the Pilot's role: "Our morning newspaper, the
Virginian-Pilot, of which we are proud, wrote and has continued to 
write excellent editorials urging the people to awaken to the need 
for action" ("How Norfolk's Schools Were Reopened," February 25, 
1959, White Papers). Jane Reif observed that the members of the 
Norfolk Committee for Public Schools considered the Pilot's 
editorials to have been "intelligent, thoughtful, and liberal" 
(Reif, 1960, p. 4).
Many of Norfolk's citizens not directly involved in the
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closing also perceived the Pi 1ot as having figured importantly 
in moderating the crisis. One reader wrote to Chambers,
your editorial policy was largely responsible for the 
crystallization of sane and purposeful action in regard to the 
opening of Public Schools in Norfolk. Without it, and the 
Virginian Pilot...the groups in Norfolk working for the 
schools would not have succeeded, or at least for some time to 
come (J. Nelson to L. Chambers, May 3, 1960, Chambers Papers). 
Chambers's surviving colleagues at the Virginian-Pilot 
contend that the paper's editorials had a significant influence on 
public opinion. The paper's publisher, Frank Batten, concludes 
that although "average day-to-day editorials" do not influence the 
public to a large degree, the Pilot’s campaign had an impact on 
Norfolk's citizenry because the closing affected them so 
immediately and profoundly. "In the midst of all that hatred," 
Batten recalls, "the Virginian-Pi1ot rs editorial policy was 
consistent and was very persistent. They wrote about [the crisis] 
a lot, but they did it in a very calm way...that helped calm the 
community.... I'm convinced that once the schools were integrated, 
after all the community had been through, the fact that it happened 
so smoothly and without a hint of violence. . .was helped by this 
long, calm argument the Pilot had been making all those years” (F. 
Batten, personal communication, September 25, 1990).
Luther Carter believes that the Virginian-Pilot's 
editorials were closely heeded by readers because of their 
uniqueness. "If someone expresses a contrary voice or sounds an
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advanced viewpoint and is a community institution such as the 
Virginian-Pilot--even though everyone doesn't read it--it becomes 
very visible. Because the Pilot disagreed with the Byrd 
organization, it was novel and people attended to it. If 
[newspaper editorials are written] persistently and in reasoned 
terms, [they can] have an effect. The editorials have to be 
written again and again and again. They have to be well thought 
out. Chambers was careful not to get too far ahead of the 
citizenry, but he still was intellectually honest" (L. Carter, 
personal communication, October 10, 1990).
Robert Mason, Chambers's successor as editor, although 
guarded in his conclusions regarding the Pilot's role in 
influencing public opinion, believes that the newspaper did have 
an important effect in educating Norfolk's citizenry and in 
mobilizing pro-school forces. "I think in Norfolk people read 
about everything on the school closing because everyone was 
involved, everybody was affected to some degree....[The 
Virginian-Pi1ot1 provided...a rallying point....[and] it kept 
scores on what was being done across the nation, what the reaction 
to Norfolk was" (R. Mason, personal communication, July 17, 1990).
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation I have explored the role of Lenoir 
Chambers, editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot newspaper, in 
moderating the explosive atmosphere surrounding the state of 
Virginia's massive resistance to public-school desegregation. I
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have examined Chambers's four-year editorial campaign--from Brown 
v. Board to the reopening of Norfolk's schools--attempting to 
defuse the South's emotional response to the court’s mandate for 
an end to what was, in essense, the southern way of life.
Chambers alone determined the Pilot's editorial policy and, 
with the assistance of a talented staff of editorial associates-- 
Harold Sugg, William Meacham, and later Robert Mason and Robert 
Smith--engaged in a tireless campaign that encouraged moderation 
and racial tolerance. The Virginian-Pilot, Virginia's second 
most widely circulated newspaper, was the only major daily 
newspaper in the state to oppose massive resistance and urge 
compliance with the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board decision.
In an effort to demonstrate the unique and forward-thinking 
nature of Chambers's editorial campaign, I have contrasted the 
editorial responses of the Pilot with those of its sister 
newspaper, the Ledger-Dispatch, in regard to fourteen critical 
events in Virginia's massive resistance. (The Ledger's 
editorials were relatively temperate by the standards of other 
Virginia white presses; the contrast between the Pilot's stance 
and that of a press in Danville, Farmville, or Richmond would have 
proved even more striking.)
Chambers's voice was heard throughout Virginia and indeed the 
South. His views were closely monitored by the principal 
architects of the state's resistance, including both Senator Harry 
Flood Byrd, Sr., and Governor J. Lindsay Almond. The editor's 
courageous role was widely recognized by his peers and colleagues;
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and as a result of his persistent campaign, he received the 
Pulitzer Prize, the nation’s highest award for editorial writing.
Lenoir Chambers played an important role in moderating public 
opinion and encouraging the peaceful resolution of Norfolk's 
school crisis. Television journalism was in its infancy, and 
radio coverage of news and opinion was limited and superficial. 
Newspapers were the overwhelmingly dominant media of the day. 
During the massive-resistance era and especially during the school 
closing, the Virginian-Pilot's editorials--normally read 
regularly by a select few--were read with unaccustomed and 
increasing frequency by rank-and-file residents, primarily because 
so many were affected by the closing. Of so wide a readership, 
many persons would likely have been swayed to some degree by the 
reasoned arguments of Chambers. And it is likely that some of the 
opinion leaders and elite known generally to read editorials were 
persuaded by the Pilot to temper their views and in turn 
influenced followers.
The Virginian-Pi1o t 1s editorials also attracted attention 
because of their novelty; they contrasted profoundly with the 
opinions expressed by other Virginia newspapers. And Chambers's 
editorial campaign further attracted the attention of Norfolk’s 
citizenry, especially opinion leaders in the community, through 
sheer persistence and duration. For four years the editor 
attempted to inform his readers of the need for compliance with 
the law of the land, the importance of public education, and the 
necessity for racial understanding and tolerance. The campaign
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continued day after day after day.
For readers who knew of his character and 
background— certainly a large number of the city's most powerful 
elite--Chambers was an especially credible and influential 
spokesperson. His opinions and arguments were not easily 
dismissed by this audience. The genteel and impeccably mannered 
Chambers, who on occasion confided that he would have felt more 
comfortable living in the previous century, was a "son of the 
South," born into its aristocracy and steeped in its traditions. 
Chambers commanded and was accorded respect in the southern city 
of Norfolk. He invoked what was noble (perhaps, albeit, imagined) 
about the South--its manners and democratic heritage; and deplored 
its excesses--racism, intolerance, and emotionalism. When readers 
unfamiliar with his background called or wrote to complain about 
the Pilot's editorial stance, they were dismayed to learn of the 
editor’s southern roots and his authorship of a biography of "Marse 
Robert's" most revered lieutenant.
Chambers, although he would likely have objected to the 
appellation, was one of Virginia’s leading intellectuals. His 
views on racial issues were singularly advanced in their time and 
context; and pro-school organizations and individuals opposing 
massive resistance were rallied by his editorials expounding those 
views.
At the very least, Chambers raised the quality of the debate 
on integration to a higher level. In painstaking detail, he 
informed his readers and encouraged them to form opinions that
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were based on objective evidence rather than emotional reaction.
Lenoir Chambers truly was a symbol of courage. Afforded 
complete editorial autonomy by the Pilot's publisher, he could 
easily have chosen to pursue an editorial policy that would have 
conformed to the tenor of the times. The editor, despite 
tremendous pressures to do otherwise, stood alone.
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